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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

23rd July 1937, Page: 144, Column: 1

The Wharncliffe Woodmoor Explosion

Sir Henry Walker's Report

A report on the causes of and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Wharncliffe Woodmoor Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Colliery, Yorkshire, on August 6, 1936, by Sir Henry Walker, C.B.E., LL.D., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, has recently been issued.* We make the following extracts :–

The explosion occurred in the Wharncliffe Woodmoor Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Colliery about 3.15 am. on Thursday, August 6, 1936, whereby 58 persons lost their lives. The colliery is situate some two miles north-north-west of Barnsley and adjoins the North Gawber (Lidgett) Colliery, where an explosion occurred in September 1935. Both collieries are under the same control. The Lidgett seam, in which this explosion also occurred, is about 2 ft. 4 in. thick and is reached by drifts from the Haigh Moor seam some 34 yd. above it. The depth from the surface to the Haigh Moor is about 280 yd. at the shafts.

The plan shows the workings of the Lidgett seam affected by the explosion and known as the North-East section. The districts in this section were developed from the North-East bord which was driven almost to the full dip — 1 in 11 — of the seam. The distance from the haulage engine house at the top of the North-East bord to the face at the bottom was, at the time of the explosion, about 1,600 yd. The coal in the four districts — 18's, 9's, 2's or Blackett's, and 1's — was undercut by machines and filled on to conveyors which delivered on to loaders at the inbye ends of 18's, 9's and 1's levels and the middle of the Blackett face. This machinery was all electrically driven. Electricity was also the motive power for haulage, which on the North-East bord was by endless rope, nnd along 18's, 9's and 1's levels by main and tail rope.

With the exception of 18's level, all the mechanical haulage roads were intake airways. All, including 18's, were traversed by the explosion.

Cause of the Explosion.

The attendant of the haulage gear at the top of the North-East bord was the only man to be brought out alive from the section of the mine affected by the explosion, and he died in hospital five days later. But, within 48 hours of the occurrence of the explosion, the whole of the workings comprised in the section had been explored, and it is from the evidence of what was then, and during subsequent inspections, seen that the cause of the explosion has to be deduced.

In Sir Henry Walker's judgment, the crucial parts of that evidence were :–

(1) The two doors separating the intake airway, known as 1's level, from the main return airway were found uninjured and wide open.

(2) Shots were not fired on 1's face during the night of August 5 to 6; and

(3) The commutator cover of the motor of the loader near the inbye end of 1's level was found on the floor and the cover of the starting switch of this motor was found to be loose.

The facts that the overcast, of which the two doors on the high side and the one door on the low side of 1's level formed part, was destroyed and that the one door on the low side was smashed to pieces and blown 30 or 40 yd. down the return airway whilst the two doors on the high side were undamaged, are p roof that these last-named doors were wide open when the explosion occurred. These two doors were the only ones in the section left undamaged by the explosion.

The question why these two doors were open now arises and the answer, in Sir Henry's judgment, is as follows : Two men were engaged cleaning up 1's top return airway, and to do this work they had to take empty tubs from 1's level, push them through the two doors, fill them with rubbish in 1's lop return airway and then push them back to 1's level. Apparently, the doors were a hindrance to them and they spragged each of them wide open. Naturally there was some demur on the part of the representatives of the Yorkshire Mineworkers' Association in accepting the evidence given on this point, but it was conclusive. How long the doors had been open could not be ascertained.

The effect of leaving these doors open would be that most of the ventilation reaching 1's level would pass straight into the main return and little, if any, go into 1's face, with the result that firedamp would accumulate in that face and eventually extend outbye along 1's level towards the overcast.

It may be significant that no shots were fired on 1's face during the night of August 5 to 6 as was intended to be done. G. Farmery was the deputy in charge of 1's district on the shift during which the explosion occurred. Some 23 or 24 shotholes had been drilled in the face ready for charging and firing, and this was part of the work he was to do during that shift; for some reason he had not started upon it before the explosion occurred although more than half the shift had elapsed. Surmises were made during the inquiry upon what might have delayed Farmery, but no one, of course, actually knew.

The deputy, W. H. Ashton, in 1's district during the afternoon shift produced his report of the inspection made by him between 8 and 10 p.m. on August 5. He had found no noxious or inflammable gas and the ventilation was good. The under-manager, when asked if he could give any explanation or make any suggestion why the shots, or at least some of them, had not been fired by Farmery, said "We have thought a lot about it and discussed it, and we cannot come to any conclusion, because he was a very conscientious deputy and he has always been well on top of his job."

Mr. Cook, senior inspector, said the removal of a fall in the top gate which the afternoon-shift deputy, Ashton, had reported, would be Farmery's first job if it was interfering with the ventilation — Ashton had already said it was not doing so — and that might have caused a certain amount of firedamp to come on the face until it (the fall) was cleared. Farmery had told Ashton he would see to the fall and he had done so for, after the explosion, be (Mr. Cook) found it had been cleared away. That, Mr. Cook said, would probably delay him at the beginning of the shift and then afterwards, if the two doors on the high side of the overcast were left open, that would, of course, delay him further because firedamp would then tend to come to the face. Shortly, in answer to Mr. Hall, Mr. Cook said he thought Farmery had not fired any shots because he was troubled with gas on the face.

The manager could not say why Farmery had not fired the shots. The matter could not be taken any further, but it is a peculiar circumstance.

The evidence bearing on the circumstances attending the loader motor was to the effect that an electrician had been instructed to make a general overhaul of the electrical apparatus in 1's district, which meant that he would remove the covers and examine the commutator and the starter of each unit. After the explosion the starting switch was found in the "off" position and the gate-end switch, being fitted with a no-voltage release and the current having been cut off at the surface of the mine shortly after the occurrence of the explosion, was, of course, also found "off," but the cable between these two switches had not been disconnected from either. Mr. Thomas Storrs, the chief electrician, said he had been present on many occasions when motors had been opened up, and this instance was the first in which he had found a cover off a motor and at the same time the cable connected.

Everyone who expressed an opinion was satisfied that the initial explosion was one of firedamp and that it had originated near the inner end of 1's level: the only question undecided was the cause of ignition.

In view of all the circumstances, appearances certainly point to the starting switch or the commutator of the loader motor having been the cause and, although there is no absolute proof, Sir Henry has no doubt that sparking at the one or the other was the cause. In case there should be instances in which it has been the custom of electricians to run motors after opening them to observe the condition of a commutator or to clean it, a letter on the subject has been issued from the Mines Department stating that it is a practice which is expressly forbidden by the terms of General Regulation 132 (iii) in any circumstances where that Regulation applies.

There was common agreement amongst the witnesses that the explosion spread to all the districts of the North-East section of the mine, travelling into the face in each case by way of the haulage road and outbye as far as the North level by way of the main haulage road. In spreading along roads over which coal was hauled and ignoring all other roads, this explosion resembles those which occurred before stone dusting of the roads became compulsory on January 1, 1921, and in that respect was similar to the explosion which occurred at the Haig pit, Whitehaven Colliery, Cumberland, on January 29, 1931.

Dust on the Roads.

Before the Explosion. — Richard Parry, who was in charge of the work, gave evidence of the system of sampling the dust on the roads. The samples were taken diagonally across the road. On the floor the depth of sample collected was about 2 in. Of the samples taken in July, one contained more than 50 per cent. of combustible matter; it was collected from the floor, and the result, which was not known until the day of the explosion, showed 53 per cent. of combustible matter to have been present.

The manager said that during the first seven months of the year 201 tons of limestone dust had been sent into the pit. In the Lidgett seam the amount used was 36 lb. per ton of output : it was sent down as ordered by the under-manager, and the afternoon shift haulage road deputy saw to its distribution to the various parts of the pit. The distribution did not depend on an adverse analysis. If he (the manager) got an analysis which showed that the combustible matter in any length was approaching 50 per cent., ha immediately acquainted the overman and had that length stone-dusted. Apart from that, it was left to the deputy to ascertain by eye whether he thought stone dust was required. He had always aimed at a 40 to 60 working margin — that is, 40 per cent. of combustible matter. He agreed that on July 27 a sample was taken which, on analysis was found to contain 53 per cent. of combustible matter. He did not see that result until the date of the explosion, so that no special remedy had been applied, but he could not say that no stone dust had been spread on that length of roadway since the sample was taken. Mr. Stone, sub-inspector, said ha was satisfied that this system resulted in considerably more stone dust being used than the General Regulations demanded. He had taken three samples from the floor of the haulage roads during this year (1936) before the explosion and they contained, in round numbers, 24, 32 and 41 per cent. of combustible matter respectively.

In view of the precautions taken, it was very disturbing to find the explosion had spread over such an extent of workings, and it is important that the reason should, if possible, be determined.

After the Explosion. — Evidence was given in regard to the dust on the roads after the explosion : (i) By those who made inspections; and (ii) by Dr. A. L. Godbert, of the Safety in Mines Research Board's staff, who carried out a series of tests on samples of dust and of coal collected by Mr. Collinson, junior inspector,** and Mr. Stone, after the explosion.

Of the witnesses in the first category, Mr. Cook, senior inspector, said that he had seen a number of patches of undisturbed stone dust; they were widespread end covered the whole area of the explosion. He agreed, in answer to a question put by Dr. Houldsworth, that a considerable part of the stone dust had not risen during the course of the explosion. Similar evidence was given by the manager, who stated that the stone dust had definitely not been dispersed. The under-manager, Mr. Bradwell, also considered that if the stone dust had risen at all it had not risen very much.

Mr. Collinson was of the same opinion. Mr. Stone said that the stone dust did not appear to have risen. However much limestone dust had been used, he was doubtful if it would have risen. Alfred Hotchkiss, day-shift overman, said stone dust was put down in liberal quantities, and after the explosion it was there just the same practically as before.

Dr. Godbert explained the tests he had carried out on the samples of dust and coal collected after the explosion. Dr. Godbert said that if coal from the Lidgett seam were ground fine enough so that all of it passed through a 100-mesh (I.M.M. standard) sieve and 80 per cent. passed through a 200-mesh sieve, then any road dust from the Lidgett seam containing 35 per cent. of combustible matter of that fineness would be capable of propagating flame in fresh air under the standard conditions of the Buxton gallery test. If firedamp were present, under the same conditions of test, the 35 par cent. would be reduced by about 5 per cent. for every 1 per cent. of firedamp. Basing his opinion on these premises, he said that if more stone dust had been spread, the propagation of the explosion would have been prevented. Leaving aside the difficulty of applying to the actual conditions of the mine the results of gallery tests under standard conditions, this also disregards of course the real fineness of the coal dust as it existed in the mine and takes no account of the undisturbed state in which some of the stone dust was found by inspection on the spot, as has already been described.

He found it difficult to say if the dust in the mine before the explosion was as fine as that used in his tests; he could only give en idea of the fineness after the explosion, which, on the average for about 60 of the samples, was approximately 43 per cent. passing a 200-mesh sieve, the variation being from 10 to 80 per cent. This would allow of an increase in the figure of 35 per cent.; for example, if 50 per cent. only of the dust passed a 200-mesh sieve, approximately 50 per cent. of coal dust would have to be present for the dust to be capable of propagating flame in fresh air.

The combustible content in the dust before the explosion had been estimated. The average combustible content of the samples of this dust was 35 per cent. and Dr. Godbert agreed, in answer to Dr. Houldsworth, that under the conditions of his tests, if the samples of dust collected after the explosion properly represented the physical characteristics of the dust in the mine, less than 50 per cent. of stone dust, in the absence of firedamp, would be adequate to prevent propagation of flame. Dr. Godbert explained, in answer to Mr. Hall, that the figure of 35 per cent. was the average combustible content of the whole of the dust he examined, but he did not believe that it was a valid average for the whole of the mine. He thought a more valid average would be that of the samples collected from the floor, the average combustible content of which was 45 per cent. Even so, if the dust in the mine before the explosion was of the same coarseness as that in the samples taken after the explosion. it would appear that there was present a sufficient percentage of stone dust to have prevented propagation of the explosion. This. of course, is assuming that the whole of the stone dust had been raised into the air by the explosion, but the evidence of witnesses who made inspection after the explosion shows that such was not the case.

A comparison of the analyses of the samples taken in the ordinary way from the floor, the sides and the roof before the explosion with those taken after the explosion shows that whilst the average decrease in the combustible content of the floor samples was only 2 per cent., in the samples from the sides and from the roof it was 12 and 8 per cent. respectively. These results would appear to indicate that the dust on the sides and on the roof had played a greater part. in the explosion than the dust on the floor.

Dispersibility of the Dusts. — Dr. Godbert gave evidence on the relative dispersibilities of the limestone and coal dust, reporting that the minimum velocity of air-current required to cause particles of the limestone dust to began to move was from 3,300 to 3,500 ft. per min. and that, after the dust had been exposed to moist air, the minimum velocity required to produce the same effect was from 3,700 to 4,200 ft. per min. A test made to find the dispersability of a sample of coal dust collected from the screens at the colliery showed the minimum velocity of air-current required to cause particles to begin to move from the surface of the coal dust was 1,500 ft. per miss. The fineness of this coal dust was such that 74 per cent. passed through a 200-mesh (I.M.M. standard) sieve.

Propagation of the Explosion.

It has already been stated that the witnesses were agreed that the explosion originated near the inner end of 1's level end extended into each district of the North-East section of the mine by way of the haulage roads, all of which, except 18's level, were intake airways. 12's level was the intake airway for 18's face, and 18's level the return. 18's level was also the haulage road. The explosion passed inbye to the face along 18's level, but did not enter 12's level. The fact that the explosion was confined to the haulage roads is significant, they being the roads on which most coal dust is deposited, and is, of itself, a reason for considering that coal dust was responsible for the extension of the explosion away from its point of origin. At the same time, the possibility of firedamp being present in the intake air has to be considered.

In a report made of an inspection on April 16, 1936, a deputy, E. Hirst, recorded that he had found 2 per cent. of firedamp at the bottom of old 448's bord — a point some 15 yd. beyond the haulage engine house in the North level at the top of the North-East main haulage plane. The under-manager gave evidence that on each of two following days the lad in this engine-house said he had found firedamp; that although on the first day he (the under-manager) and, on the second day the manager, made an examination within half-an-hour, neither of them could find firedamp. The temperature of the engine-house was, however, high and, to get more ventilation to pass through it, a new road was driven on the low side during the Easter week. Since that time up to the time of the explosion there had been no further report of firedamp in the house, but some time after the explosion 2½ per cent. had been found on two occasions. The leaving open of the two doors at the rise side of 1's overcast would increase the liability of firedamp to be drawn out of the goaf in the immediate vicinity of the engine-house and so into the main intake airway. Whether this occurred or not it is not possible to say, but the circumstances afford a good example of the necessity for airways being so arranged that goafs drain into returns and thus the possibility of intakes being fouled by firedamp from them prevented.

Mr. Cook, Mr. Mitchell (the manager), Mr. Collinson and Mr. Stone were all of opinion that the propagation of the explosion was due to coal dust.

Mr. Collinson said if the doors at 1's overcast were open for any length of time, he thought firedamp would be given off in the Blackett district and would come up the main engine plane to above 1's level end, even against the air current, and that this firedamp would help in the propagation of the explosion. He could not find where firedamp could have accumulated or could have been present to extend the explosion so far as it was extended without coal dust. Mr. Cook thought some firedamp might have collected in districts other than 1's and aggravated the explosion. The explosion was originally one of firedamp, and it was carried on by coal dust; there was not sufficient firedamp, be thought, to carry the explosion the distance it travelled without the assistance of coal dust. The manager and Mr. Stone thought the extension of the explosion was due to coal dust alone.

Dr. Godbert, in answer to Mr. B. Harrison, said he thought that round the ignition source it was possible, in fact perhaps probable, that if the coal dust overlaid the stone dust, the coal dust would be raised substantially alone; but as the explosion left the ignition source behind and developed even mild violence, he believed that both the coal dust and the stone dust would be raised.

The conditions of mining are changing and, as practised in this colliery, comparatively large tonnages of coal are filled into tubs close to the face by mechanical loaders and thence hauled by machinery along a single road. In this way there is much more coal dust deposited on particular roads leading direct from the faces than is possible when the coal is worked by stall roads at short distances apart. In the latter case the traffic up and down each stall road, it may be, by horses or ponies, tends to mix the coal and the stone dust; but, in mechanical mining, the traffic on the one haulage road is very much less in proportion to the weight of coal transported and there are no horses or ponies. It is necessary that steps should he taken to collect the coal dust made at mechanical loading points. Apparatus has been designed for this purpose and is efficient.

It is also necessary either to find an incombustible dust that is "of such a character that it can be raised into a cloud with facility" or to apply stone dust at such frequent intervals that it is never overlaid "by an accumulation of much coal dust."

Mr. Stone, sub-inspector, has been entrusted with the carrying out of experiments on the dispersibility of different kinds of stone dust in several mines, and his preliminary report contains the following shrewd observations :–

Some years ago, when stone dusting had created the opinion that "the day of the big explosion is over," the methods were very different from those prevailing at Wharncliffe Woodmoor Colliery. The experiments illustrating the action of stone dust in reducing or preventing a coal dust explosion always implied that the coal dust and stone dust formed an intimate mixture. This mixing of the dusts was fulfilled during this older methods of mining. To-day men travel separate roads and there were no ponies at Wharncliffe Woodmoor Colliery. Large outputs are transported in a few hours along fewer roadways.

Then, again, the type of roadway has changed. Wood props and bars were the methods of support. These often only took care of the roof. The side crumbled and dribbled, and it was usual to have extra men to work after a holiday in order to clean the track for the next shift coal-turning. Shale and stone dribblings were weathered and trampled into a very useful inert dust. On the modern steel-arched roadways, roof and sides are supported. Dribblings from the sides are rare, and falls of roof almost unknown.

These two alterations in method of transport of coal and style of roof support have altered conditions in favour of increased safety from falls of ground amid haulage accidents, but they certainly do not assist in the formation of an intimate mixture between coal dust and inert dust, but tend to supply a coating of inflammable dust resting on top of the inert dust.

The mere application of large amounts of inert dust is not the correct method of preventing a coal dust explosion. This idea is comparable with that of an older generation who thought that the way to prevent firedamp explosions had been opened by the adoption of safety lamps. We realise that ventilation comes a long way first. The safety lamp is but the second defence. No colliery manager would contemplate allowing men to work in firedamp merely because he had plenty of safety lamps in the mine. Stone dust must not be looked upon as the means of preventing an explosion of coal dust. It must stand in the same position as the safety lamp, and coal dust be viewed in the same light as firedamp, and every effort be made to prevent it being formed, followed up by similar efforts to collect it if formed and to prevent it being spread along the roadways.

Other Matters Arising During the Inquiry.

Shots Fired on Main Haulage Planes. — The night shift deputy, S. Gallagher, of 428's district, a district not affected by the explosion, gave evidence to the effect that he had been accustomed for a number of years so fire shots on the main haulage plane in his district, although he knew it was contrary to the Regulations to do so. He had been instructed to fire them by the overman, J. R. Miller, who was killed in the explosion. As a rule, there were no shots to be fired on the main roadway, but during the night of the explosion he fired one about 2.20 am. L. Watts, deputy in 9's district on the morning shift during the week in which the explosion occurred, said he had fired shots in the main haulage plane, the last one possibly two months before the explosion. The manager said he had never given any authority for shots to be fired in the intake airway (which was also the main haulage road), and so soon as he knew that shots had been fired there he stopped it. On July 11 he told Fletcher and the overman, in the presence of H. Senior, that it they had any shots on the main haulage road, they should notify him so that they could be fired at the week-end, just in the same way as those in 227's haulage read in the Haigh Moor seam were fired, and he would give authority in writing.

Use of Open-type Electric Motor in Main Haulage House. — The legality of continuing to use an open-type electric motor in the haulage house in the North level at the top of the North-East main haulage plane after the finding of 2 per cent. of firedamp in close proximity on April 16 by the deputy, E. Hirst, falls to be considered. The Regulation pertinent to this question is General Regulation 132 (ii), which requires that in any part of a mine in which inflammable gas, although not normally present, is likely to occur in quantity sufficient to be indicative of danger, all motors shall be constructed so that when any part is live all rubbing contacts (such as commutators and sliprings) are so arranged or enclosed as to prevent open sparking. In Sir Henry's judgment, the position of the haulage engine house in relation to the goaf in the immediate vicinity was such that it was part of the mine in which firedamp might be present from time to time. The circumstances show the necessity for so arranging airways that goafs drain into returns, thus preventing the possibility of firedamp issuing from them into the intakes.

General Regulations (Firedamp Detectors), 1935. — Flame safety lamps were issued to a proportion of the workmen for use as gas detectors but, after the explosion, these lamps were found in some cases, far removed from the men to whom they had been issued. The purpose of these Regulations is not achieved by providing gas detectors; and unless such detectors are conscientiously and systematically used, they may be a danger or give a false sense of security, and it would he better not to have them taken into the mine at all.

General Remarks.

Discipline. — It will have been noticed from what has already been said that discipline in this mine on the night shift was not good, for example

(i) Ventilation doors propped open, contrary to the requirement of General Regulation 18.

(ii) Cover of commutator removed without first disconnecting the cable, in accordance with instructions given under s. 74 of the Act.

(iii) Shots fired in main haulage roads contrary to the requirements of clause 7 of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order; and

(iv) Use not made of the detector lamps issued in compliance with the General Regulations.

Whilst the evidence of the firing of shots in main haulage roads was that they were fired on the instructions of the night-shift overman, it is difficult to believe that such shotfiring was not known to the manager and under-manager. The manager said he had stopped such shotfiring in the North-East main haulage plane on July 11, when it first came to his knowledge; but, apparently, in view of the evidence of S. Gallagher, the night shift deputy in 428's district, it still went on in that district by order, according to Gallagher, of the night shift overman who was killed in the explosion. These acts of indiscipline reflect upon the management and may be due indirectly to the numerous changes of manager and under-manager which have taken place at this and the other collieries under the same control.

Stone Dust. — In his report*** on the explosion which occurred at the Haig pit, Whitehaven Colliery, on January 29, 1931, Sir Henry stated that that explosion was extended throughout the district because of dampness causing the limestone dust to bind, and not rise and intermingle with the fine coal dust which lay upon it. Sir Henry believes this Wharncliffe Woodmoor explosion spread along the' haulage roads for the same reason. He saw the limestone dust in place after each of these explosions; it was white, with a thin film of black dust lying upon it. The black film was easily disturbed by blowing upon it, but the white limestone dust beneath remained in position.

Whilst limestone dust may be an effective dust to use in deep and hot mines, it is not one which is suitable for use in comparatively shallow mines, which, especially during the summer months, are apt to be damp. Also, stone dust would be more effective if it were blown into the air currents, by means of compressed air, from tubs or bunkers placed at the sides of the roads, rather than by being spread by hand.

Experiment Made with the Doors Above 1's Overcast Wide Open. — On Sunday, March 14, 1937, an experiment was made to see the effect of opening the two doors on the high side of the overcast in 1's level. Samples of the air were taken at the places named and with the results shown below :–

 Firedamp.
 Per cent.
(a) In the main engine plane 10 yd. above 18's level  0.09
(b) In the main engine plane 10 yd. below 1's level   0.28
(c) In 18's level 10 yd. from the outbye end   0.51
(d) In 1's level 10 yd. from the face ripping   0.19
(e) In 1's low side return airway   0.42

The above results are, in each case, the average of samples taken at 5 min. intervals between 11.45 a.m. and 1 p.m. The quantity of air passing into the face along 1's level as measured on August 5, 1936, the day before the explosion, was 6,960 cu. ft. per min. ; on March 3, 1937, it was 11,200 cu. ft. per min. ; and on March 14, 1937, within the doors on the high side of the overcast wide open, 5,200 cu. ft. per min. The quantity taking the short cut afforded by the doors being open on March 14, 1937, was 9,200 cu. ft. per min.

It will as noticed that the quantity, 5,200 cu. ft. per min., passing into the face along 1's level when the doors were open on March 14, 1937, was only 1,760 cu. ft. per min. less than the quantity passing along that level on August 5, 1936, with the doors shut, and that the leakage with the doors open was 9,200 cu. ft. per min., which was only 1,000 cu. ft. short of the total quantity available on August 5, 1936, for this ventilation of the Blackett and No. 1 faces. In these circumstances, the experiment was of no use.


* Cmd. 5503. H.M. Stationery Office. Price 2s. net.

** Mr. Collinson is now professor of mining in the University of Nottingham.

** Report on the explosion which occurred at Haig pit, Whitehaven Colliery, Cumberland, on January 29, 1931 (Cmd. 3858.)


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Ashton, W. H.    Deputy  
Bradwell, —    Under Manager  
Collinson, Percival Leigh    H.M. Junior Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Cook, George    H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Farmery, G.    Deputy  
Fletcher, —      
Gallagher, S.    Deputy  
Godbert, A. L., Dr.      
Harrison, B.      
Hirst, E.    Deputy  
Hotchkiss, Alfred    Overman  
Houldsworth, —, Dr.      
Miller, J. R.    Overman  
Mitchell, —    Colliery Manager  
Parry, Richard    Miner  
Senior, H.      
Stone, Frank Ernest    H.M. Sub-Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Storrs, Thomas    Chief Electrician  
Walker, Henry, Sir    H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Watts, L.    Deputy  



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Wharncliffe Woodmoor Colliery  Wharncliffe Woodmoor Colliery



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16 Oct 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, Yorkshire (The Colliery Guardian)
24 Oct 1936  Wharncliffe Woodmoor Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
24 Oct 1936  Coroner's Advice To Jury (The Science and Art of Mining)
21 Nov 1936  Automatic Alarms (The Science and Art of Mining)
21 Nov 1936  Further Stone-Dusting Research Suggested (The Science and Art of Mining)
04 Dec 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, Yorkshire (The Colliery Guardian)
05 Dec 1936  Educational Grant from Fund (The Science and Art of Mining)
16 Jul 1937  Wharncliffe Pit Explosion (The Colliery Guardian)
23 Jul 1937  The Wharncliffe Woodmoor Explosion, Sir Henry Walker's Report (The Colliery Guardian)
31 Jul 1937  Report On Wharncliffe Explosion (The Science and Art of Mining)

Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Wharncliffe Woodmore
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page

 

 

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