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19th June 1937, Page: 388, Column: 1 Report On Markham ExplosionBrief reference was made in the last issue of this journal to the Report (Cmd. 5456, price 9d. net, H.M. Stationery Office) on the causes of and circumstances attending the explosion on 21st January at Markham Colliery in Derbyshire. At the conclusion of the inquests on the bodies of the nine men who had lost their lives the jury returned the verdict that "The deaths were accidentally caused by an unforeseen combination of abnormal conditions, that is, an accumulation of gas which was exploded by a flame which escaped from a cutting machine box caused by a faulty replacement of the cover plate. The jury is satisfied that every precaution and provision has been and is taken by the Staveley Coal and Iron Co., Ltd., to ensure the safety of the men working in their mines. Mr. J. R. Felton, O.B.E., H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines, states in his report that safety-lamps were used throughout the mine. At the face electric hand lamps were in use, and a proportion of the workmen — in excess of that required by the General Regulations (Firedamp Detectors) of 1st May, 1985 — were provided with flame safety-lamps and "Ringrose" automatic firedamp detectors. The colliery is wholly mechanised, the coal-cutters and conveyors being driven by electricity; shot-holes, however, are drilled by compressed air. It was in No. 2 development unit, south-east district, of the Blackshale seam, that the explosion took place. The seam lies at a depth of 700 yards from the surface, and has an average thickness of 4 ft. 3 in. with an overlying dirt band or "flamper" 8 in. thick. The No. 2 unit comprises a longwall face, the length of which at the time of the explosion was 192 yards, viz., 72 yards on the left side of the main loader and haulage gate and 120 yards on the right of that gate. In each bank there was a belt conveyor delivering to a gate-end loader in the centre gate. The loader gate was the main intake and, on reaching the face, the air split right and left, the right split returning down the right tail gate and the left split travelling partly by way of the left tail gate and partly by way of No. 9's face, these two latter currents joining in the No. 2 return gate outbye of No. 9 left-hand airway. A description is given of the conditions before the explosion, and the statement is made that "the evidence of Dowds (a shot-firer) eliminates any possibility of the explosion having originated through the firing of a shot." Following a narrative of the explosion and rescue work the report discusses the cause of the explosion. The evidence of the survivors and of men working in the right bank, and the position of, and injuries sustained by, the deceased men (several of whom apparently had moved nearer the leader gate after the explosion), all clearly established that the explosion originated in the left bank and travelled towards the loader gate, the flame extending as far as the roll crossing that face. It was generally agreed that the explosion began in the top corner of 2's left bank, and radiated therefrom down 2's face and along 9's face and, to a lesser degree, along the left tail gate. It was an explosion of firedamp and, in the Inspector's opinion, coal dust played little part in it. Two samples of dust taken on 9's face after the explosion showed just over 50 per cent. of combustible matter present, and samples taken on the tail gate contained less than 30 per cent. of combustible matter. Limestone dust was used on the roads. The coal-cutter, which was in the top end of the face, was working between 1.40 p.m. and the time of the explosion, and had cut a little into the rib side in the process of being turned round ready for starting to cut the face. Shortly after 2 p.m. something happened at the machine causing a visible flash following which the machineman went down to the gate-end switch box for some purpose — probably to replace the switch there — stating as he returned that he intended to "try it again." What was done after this can only be surmised. It is reasonable to assume that either in switching on again or, if the machine was running — probably light as they were getting ready to re-set the anchor prop — in switching off, there was another flash, and this ignited an explosive mixture of firedamp and air surrounding the machine. The switch was found in the "off" position. The machine was subjected to a minute examination at the surface. When the cover was carefully removed it was observed that coal and dirt had been trapped in the bottom right corner of the controller casing flange, causing a gap of inch in the flange joint. It was then decided to send the machine to the Mines Department Testing Station at Buxton to test as to whether in that condition it would pass flame, the flange gap being recreated by the insertion of 3/16-in. steel packing. A preliminary observation test with a 9 per cent. firedamp mixture inside the switch was first made, and flame was ejected through the gap at the cover joint. The test was then repeated in an explosive mixture of 10.2 per cent. firedamp surrounding the machine, upon which external ignition resulted. General Remarks. In the course of some general remarks the statement is made, following a reference to G.R. 132, that the coal-cutter, though ten years old and not of certified flameproof design, when tested in an explosive atmosphere with the cover properly closed, failed to ignite the surrounding mixture, but unfortunately the cover was not kept in this condition, partly owing to human failure and partly to the design, which did not permit of such careful gauging of the closeness of the joint as it ought to have had. Even in machines of much newer design than that in question a similar difficulty is presented. In the manufacture of new machines this point should receive attention, and Mr. Felton suggests that the matter be brought to the notice of coal-cutter makers, it should also be possible, he thinks, to alter existing machines so as to ensure that after a cover has been taken off and replaced the closeness of the joints can be readily observed and tested in situ. Flame safety-lamps and the "Ringrose" automatic firedamp detector have been officially approved by the Mines Department as detectors, and both these types of detectors were in use at Markham Colliery. The Staveley Coal and Iron Co., Ltd., were among the first to install the "Ringrose" automatic firedamp detector at their collieries, and since the year 1933 Mr. J. Hunter and his officials have by their investigations and suggestions contributed in no small measure to the improvement of this appliance to its present state of efficiency. Every encouragement was given to the workmen to make tests for firedamp and to watch the detectors carefully, the instructions being that if a detector indicated the presence of firedamp the men in the vicinity were to leave the face and report to the deputy at once. On several occasions the red bulb of a "Ringrose" detector has lighted up showing firedamp to be present and the instructions as to withdrawal have been observed; on arrival the deputy found gas present and having removed it the men returned to the face. The man who reported the gas was rewarded for his vigilance, and payment was also made to the workmen for any loss sustained through their withdrawal. The fact remains, however, that there was a hitch in the effective provision and use of the detectors, and that full advantage was not taken of the efforts of the management to provide the best means available for the detection of firedamp as a safeguard against such happenings as this. Even a perfect detector will be of no avail if it is not used, and its warnings promptly acted upon. This consideration raises the question as to the best position for a detector. Apparently it was customary here for the detector to be placed ahead of the machine somewhere near the anchor prop and moved forward with that prop from time to time, and Mr. Felton understands this is also the practice at other collieries. In some conditions this may be a satisfactory arrangement, but where as in this case the machine is to cut downhill against the ventilation, the Inspector considers the detector should be kept as near the machine as possible if it is to serve the purpose for which it is intended. Incidentally, the "Ringrose" detectors here were set to operate at 2 per cent. of firedamp. At this setting the detector does not meet the requirements of General Regulation 132 (v), nor provide the means for compliance with Section 60 (2) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911 ; to do so it must be set to function at 1¼ per cent., failing which a flame safety-lamp must also be provided. A further point arises. So long as a firedamp detector, whether automatic or flame lamp, is in the nature of a separate appliance additional to the lamp a workman needs to provide light for his work, it is liable to be regarded as an "extra" and treated accordingly, and excellent though the detector may be its object may be defeated by human neglect or failure. A man should always have his detector with him, It would, in Mr. Felton's opinion, be a distinct step forward if a lamp could be designed which combined a good light and an automatic detector in one unit, so that attention to the presence of firedamp would necessarily be directed by a diminution of the light.
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