Logo Museum
Museum
Friends of Durham Mining Museum
Events Calendar
e-Books and Books for sale
Photograph Gallery
Document Archive
Main Document Archive
Newspaper Articles
Articles by date
Articles by colliery
Personal name index
Local Record Extracts
D.M.A. Document Archive
Transactions of I.M.E.
Miners' Welfare
N.C.B. Archive
The Colliery Engineer
The Colliery Guardian
Mine & Quarry Engineering
Mining Journal
The Science and Art of Mining
Coal Magazine
Coal News
Coke and Gas
Master Name Index
What's new in the site
Mining
Mining History
Colliery Index
Colliery Maps
Company Overviews
Who's Who
Mineral Information
Managers Certificates
Educational Material
Bibliography
Statistics
Workers/Employee Lists
Notes for Family Historians
War Service information
Disasters
Disaster Reports
Names of those killed
Disasters in the 1700s
Disasters in the 1800s
Disasters in the 1900s
Memorials
Awards for Gallantry
On this day ...

Links to other sites of interest
Industrial Heritage Days Out
Former www.pitwork.net web site

Index to site

Contact and address details

Share Page with Social Media

Share on Facebook

Share with Reddit

Share on Delicious


 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

27th February 1937, Page: 257, Column: 1

The Gresford Explosion

Chief Mines Inspector's Report

H.M. Stationery Office, price 3s. 6d.

General.

The following general notes on Gresford Colliery are gathered from the Report by Sir Henry Walker on the explosion which occurred on 22nd September, 1934, causing the loss of 265 lives. The Gresford Colliery, situated about two and a half miles north of Wrexham, Denbighshire, three years ago found employment for about 2,200 persons — 1,850 below and 350 above ground. The mine has two shafts, namely, the downcast known as the "Dennis," and the upcast known as the "Martin." Coal was wound at the Dennis, and materials sent down the Martin shaft. Men were lowered and raised in both shafts. Three seams were worked, namely, Main, Crank and Brassey, but at the time of the explosion the Brassey workings were idle. The Dennis section of the Main Seam in which the explosion occurred comprised five districts, each worked on the longwall system and known respectively as 20's, 61's, 109's (including 95's), 14's and 29's; and in this section 280 persons were employed on the day shift, 240 on the afternoon shift, and 195 on the night shift. Coal was got and wound on the morning and afternoon shifts. Some coal was also got and wound during Friday and Sunday nights. The packs and face conveyors were moved up during the night shift. Electric power was in use for coal-cutting and conveying.

Three-phase current at 3,300 volts was taken down the Dennis shaft to two transformers, each rated at 300 kilo-volt amperes, situated near the shaft bottom, where the pressure was reduced to 570 volts, to work the haulage engines, coal-cutting machines, and conveyors.

Lighting about the pit bottom was supplied from a small transformer which reduced the pressure to 110 volts, and this transformer was controlled by a switch and fuse fed from one of the two switchboards.

There was one main cable, installed in the Dennis main intake airway, carrying current inbye for the whole of the Dennis section, and this cable was controlled at its origin by a switch and fuse.

The signal bells were of certified intrinsically safe type, but the magneto telephones were neither intrinsically safe nor in flameproof casings.

The haulage on the Dennis Main Intake and 142's Deep was by endless rope driven by electric motor placed near the Dennis shaft bottom. In the districts there were main and tail and main rope haulages driven by electricity or compressed air.

Except for some 30 electric lamps used mostly by electricians, the safety-lamps were flame lamps of the Prestwich Patent Protector Type.

Ventilation.

Brief reference was made on page 248 of this journal to the Report by H.M. Inspector of Mines on the Gresford explosion. The following further particulars are gathered from the Report :—

Ventilation of the mine was produced by a double-inlet Walker fan placed at the surface and steam driven. There was no proper air-lock at the top of the upcast (the Martin) shaft, platforms (butterfly boards or policemen), raised by each of the two cages as it came to bank, being relied upon to prevent air flowing direct from the surface to the fan.

The air measurements, said to have been made monthly, as required by Section 29 (2) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, were entered in the prescribed book, Mines and Quarries Form No. 37, to 30th June; the measurements said to have been made in July and August were found in the note-book of the Assistant Surveyor (W. I. Cuffin), who said he made the measurements. Sir Henry says he does "not believe that many of the measurements recorded even in the prescribed book were ever made"; and he also thinks "Mr. Cuffin was given more work than he could overtake and that in consequence he scamped the work of air measurement." The Commissioner proceeds to say: "When examining the figures in the note-hook, I found that there were errors in the calculations — in some cases the entries in the prescribed record being 10,000 cubic feet per minute too little, and in the prescribed book itself there were errors in simple addition. Some of these figures cannot be accurate; for example, in January they represent that 26,305 cubic feet per minute or 57 per cent. more air was coming out than was going in, whilst in June 425 cubic feet more were going in than were coming out.

"Had the evidence substantiated the accuracy of the figures themselves, and had due precaution been taken month by month to measure the quantities of air under conditions sufficiently like to ensure their full comparability over a lengthy period of time, I think the arguments based upon the graphs would, in the main, be sound; but, as it is, I feel that the figures are quite unreliable and that they give little or no guidance in themselves in regard to the actual state of the ventilation or of the return airways."

Following the examination of considerable evidence regarding the state of the ventilation, Sir Henry says :—

"For the reason why the scheme of ventilation in the Dennis Section had got into such a position, it is necessary to go back 12 to 15 years to the time when the three main roads — the Dennis Main and the roads parallel to and on either side of it — met the downthrow fault to the North-East of the 'Clutch.' Apparently it had been the intention to maintain these three parallel roads and, after workings had been opened out, on the dip side of the fault, it was still intended to maintain return airways on either side of 142's Deep. But when a further fault was met — this time an upthrow — only the return on the South side of 142's Deep was put through it. That on the North side was abandoned, and no proper consideration was then given to the problem of ventilating any subsequent workings beyond that upthrow fault. "But even if a return parallel to and on the North side of 142's Deep had been maintained, the method of working 29's district, involving the use of doors across the haulage road into that district, would still have resulted in considerable leakage of air at 29's Turn. This difficulty was the result of the failure to drive the Dennis Main road and the roads on either side of it through the downthrow fault North-East of the 'Clutch,' and this failure was the initial cause of the unsatisfactory scheme of ventilation existing at the time of the explosion.

"Had these three roads been driven through that fault and the seam then developed to the East and North-East, there would have been no difficulty in providing separate splits of ventilation for each district. It is evident that the mistake of not maintaining the return airway on the North side of 142's Deep had been recognised, for an attempt had been made, though in a desultory fashion, to reopen that airway to the rise and to the dip of 61's main road.

"The position at the time of the explosion was that the bigger scheme had been held up due to the dead work necessary after the fall in 14's face, and, even at that time, due to lack of vigour in pressing on with 105's drift and the scouring in 14's district, the lesser remedial measures had not been completed. Whether this lack of vigour was due merely to dilatoriness or to lack of funds, it is not possible to say, but on this point the Manager, in evidence, in answer to Mr. A. T. Miller, said that in the matter of finances, moneys required by him for upkeep and maintenance, there had been no stint whatever and there was no foundation for the suggestion that he was working under undue pressure to produce output.

"Be that as it may, work was being carried on in face of excessive leakage of ventilation hut, so long as the lie of the workings allowed such air as was available to take a natural course, the workings were kept clear of gas. As soon as an attempt was made to course heated air downhill, however, then trouble began and, in addition to that natural difficulty, there came the fails on 14's face.

"So long as 14's face abutted on the return, the ventilation, which in the deeper workings of the mine was most probably due to natural causes alone, was sufficient to carry away the gas but, so soon as the air on that face had to be brought downhill, difficulty arose and, when after the fall on 24th May, the return air had to be brought right away back to within a few yards of the intake, the position became so precarious that drastic remedies were needed and should have been taken.

"Work on 14's face should have been stopped altogether until a return air-course, far removed from the intake, was made. Work on 95's and 24's faces should have been stopped until the place (105's) being driven to the dip from 81's level had holed, and, in order to get more air into the inbye districts, 29's district should also have been stopped and the leakage of air direct into the return by way of 29's Turn prevented.

"These seem drastic remedies but even had they been taken, there would still have remained the initial error, and, until it was repaired, the position would not have been entirely satisfactory. I think the under-manager realised the predicament into which he had stepped and that he knew the remedy."

Shot-firing.

The mine being one to which Part II. of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, 1934, applied, only permitted explosives were allowed to be used for the firing of shots. The Manager stated that the explosive Kentite was used for shots in the coal and Polar Saxonite for shots in the rippings. Firing was done by single-shot high-tension magneto exploders of a type approved by the Mines Department.

Reviewing the evidence on shot-firing in the different districts, with reference to 14's district Sir Henry says :—

"My conclusion on the evidence . . . is that shot-firing in 14's district was carried on with little regard for the requirements laid down in the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, and that the workmen were just as keen to get shots fired speedily as those who were firing the shots were under the necessity of firing them quickly — if they were to get through their shift's work. One of these workmen said 'Robert Jones (night-shift deputy) would only ram one hole at a time. We have tried him to ram more, but he wouldn't.'

"According to their evidence, there were many workmen who not only saw the deputies and shot-firers breaking the law but also assisted them in their offences. In such circumstances it was not likely that they would draw the attention of the Inspector to these malpractices.

"Whilst officials who do not obey the regulations have no excuse, workmen who aid and abet those officials cannot be held to be free from blame. They first take part in law-breaking and then after an accident occurs turn round and blame those with whom they have acted in collusion."

The following are Sir Henry's general conclusions as regards shot-firing in the districts :—

"Most of the evidence was directed to shot-firing practices and malpractices in 14's district, and in regard to that district I have already drawn from the evidence the conclusion that in a number of respects little regard was paid, either by officials or workmen, to the requirements of the E.C.M.O.

"I will now deal with two other matters, the first relating to the use of 'gumming' for stemming and applying in all machine-cut districts, and the second relating to the firing of an excessive number of shots per shift and applying, though in different degree, to all districts except perhaps 20's and 61's.

"Nearly all the witnesses agreed that when short of clay 'gumming' was used for stemming, the only question being whether gumming contained coal or not. It was said that the coal-cutting machines cut in the dirt below the seam though at times the cutter rose into the coal. Mr. Dominy, who visited the 29's district on the 10th September, 1934, found that the machines then were cutting in the coal.

"I think there can be no doubt that the 'gumming' contained coal and coal dust, but whether or how often to a degree violating the letter of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order (Clause 2 (b)), that 'only clay or other non-inflammable substance shall be used for stemming,' I am unable to say.

"To my mind the figures in the Record of shots fired prove beyond question that on frequent occasions, and in some instances regularly, some of the deputies and shot-firers in all districts of the Dennis Section except perhaps 20's and 61's fired more shots per shift than they could possibly have fired with proper care and proper attention to the requirements of the E.C.M.O."

Stone-dusting.

The material used for stone-dusting the roads was a residue from the water-softening plant installed at the surface of the mine. The Commissioner accepts the evidence of Henry Tomlinson, rope-splicer, who said he worked every other week on the night shift, and when on that shift he visited the Dennis Section he had always found stone-dusting and cleaning going on. He then says :—

"Whether these operations were sufficient to comply with the requirements of Clause 2 of the General Regulations in respect of precautions against coal dust could only be proved by sampling as prescribed by Clause 4 of those Regulations. Such proof was not however forthcoming. The regulation requires that 'Tests of samples of dust so taken as to be representative of the normal composition of the dust throughout the roads of the mine on the floor, roof and sides respectively, shall be made as often as may be necessary but not less frequently than once a month.' That requirement was not carried out.

"I am satisfied that some cleaning up and stone-dusting of these roads (district) was done, but, as samples were never taken by the management in 14's district or in the 95's part of 109's district, and as in 109's district proper and in 29's district samples had not been taken since September, 1932, and as in 61's district samples had not been taken except at the outbye end of the haulage road, since September, 1981, there is not sufficient evidence on which to base a judgment of the condition of those roads at the time of the explosion.

"The manager said that in his opinion the dust on the roads in the districts, except in 14's, although stone dust was in fact applied to those roads, would have complied with the General Regulations even if stone dust had not been applied. He had no real ground on which to form such an opinion. On the contrary, in spite of the stone-dusting, of 16 samples taken during 1930 and 1931 from the roof, the floor and the sides respectively (48 samples in all) of the roads in 61's district, those last taken, namely on 30th September, 1931, showed generally an increasing percentage in the amount of combustible matter present.

"But even if the manager had faith in his opinion, it was not open to him to act upon it as he thought fit. His duty under the General Regulations was to prove by representative tests that the natural conditions were such as to comply with those Regulations and that proof established — and not otherwise — he would have become entitled to the relief of repeating representative tests at intervals not exceeding three months or at such longer intervals as might have been approved in writing by the Inspector of the Division. No such steps were taken, the manager giving as his reason merely that he did not think it was 'necessary.'

"Stone dust appears to have been regularly provided but, as in other matters, the manager was content to rely hopefully on vague general impressions of the working and adequacy of his arrangements for its distribution and the results of that distribution, instead of on specific checks based on reliable records and reports kept and made by his subordinates."

Hours of Work Below Ground.

"Though no direct evidence as to the hours of work below ground was taken, there was a considerable amount of incidental evidence that men were allowed to work and did work longer hours than are permitted by the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1908 — generally known as the Eight Hours Act — as amended by later Acts. In fact, the provisions of that Act were, to all intents and purposes, ignored.

"It was a common, if not a standing, practice to work double shifts, and it would seem that there was at least some tacit arrangement between the management and the workmen or their representatives. It does not, of course, excuse breaches of the law to say that the men were willing to work overtime. But, in such a case, it does not lie with those representing the men to blame only the Management and the inspectors. And yet in these circumstances and despite the fact that Mr. Boydell's specific request for information had proved fruitless, there was at the Inquiry vehement complaint against Mr. Dominy by the North Wales Miners' Association because he did not find out that such a practice existed.

"The question of preventing the working of illegal overtime is one within the power of the men themselves and their Trade Unions, and I regret the increasing extent to which, of recent years, it has taken up the time of H.M. Inspectors and encroached on their proper duties of attending to matters directly concerned with health and safety.

Workmen and Complaints.

"It was a distressing feature of the Inquiry that there were so many workmen who, according to their evidence, knew of and were alarmed at conditions which they considered dangerous and yet took no steps to secure for themselves or their fellow workers the protection to which they thought. they were entitled . . .

"I hope that I am not exceeding my function in saying now what I have held for many years, that miners should be members of some effective trades union. That opinion is based on grounds of safety, with which alone I am concerned, for I believe that a well organised trades union, wisely directed, can be as potent an influence for promoting greater safety in mines as it is already in matters, for example, of wages and conditions of employment.

"Lest it might be supposed from what I have said that H.M. Inspectors pay attention only to complaints made through a trades union, I mention here that unsigned complaints are attended to as if they were signed. That fact appeared to come as a surprise to many at the Inquiry, but it has been stated publicly over and over again, and to my personal knowledge has been a standing instruction to the inspectors for over 35 years . . .

"It has been my duty to say that in certain respects, in my judgment, certain Inspectors were at fault in their dealings with this colliery over a period of years . . . Apart from those matters I find no justification in the evidence for imputing any general neglect or incompetency on the part of the Inspectors concerned, and I feel that a large part of the general charge of complete failure made against them and more particularly against Mr. Dominy was based on an erroneous idea of the duties of the Inspectorate under the present system and practice of Government inspection in this country . . .

"Questions of Government inspection are ultimately a matter of policy for the Government and not for me, as Commissioner for this Inquiry, to deal with. One important matter which has a direct bearing on the Inquiry is that any enlargement of the scope of Government inspection should have careful regard that the powers of Inspectors are commensurate with their responsibilities. That point was made by Mr. Charlton in dealing with the criticisms of himself and staff. They were charged, he said, with neglect of many matters which the law did not empower them to deal with; and in respect of ventilation, in particular, he pointed out that if ventilation, judged by the absence of gas, is adequate the Inspectors have no power to deal with such matters as large leakages of air and small size of return airways."

Fire followed the explosion, and Sir Henry says that from the evidence it is difficult to say whether, when it was first discovered, it could or could not have been subdued had the means been available. He adds that it is obvious that the lesson to be learned is that the necessary means for dealing with fires should he provided in mines.

The Commissioner points out how difficult it is to state the exact place of origin and the actual cause of an explosion even when inspection can be made of all the workings traversed by that explosion, but when, as in this case, no inspection is possible, he says the place of origin and cause become matters of conjecture not capable of proof, and, as Mr. Joseph Hall rightly indicated in his speech, it is not possible to state the cause of this explosion. He, however, in his review of "theories," says that for reasons given in the body of the Report he "looks with grave suspicion upon the circumstances existing in connection with 24's airway in 95's district."

Principal Lessons.

Mr. J. Brass, one of the assessors, regrets that he does not agree with Sir Henry Walker's Report on several important points, and he therefore submits a separate report in which he reviews some of the evidence of witnesses upon which his own views are based. With regard to the disaster itself he has "come to the conclusion that the point of origin of the explosion was near the 'Clutch,' due to firedamp being ignited by the use of the telephone." He concludes that the following are the principal lessons to be learned from the disaster :—

"(1) All telephones and similar apparatus to be used in safety-lamp mines should be of a type or types approved by the Mines Department for such mines.

"(2) The necessity of providing at convenient points means for attacking fires in their initial stages. There is no doubt in my mind but that the fire resulting from the explosion caused a great loss of life, and the fire when first seen was of small dimensions. Mr. Benjamin Edwards said in evidence that when he first saw the fire 'there was not much flame' and that 'it did not seem much of a fire then.' I am of the opinion that, had such means been available at or near the 'Clutch,' the fire near 29's junction could have been got under control and many lives saved.

"(3) It may be desirable to arrange for workmen occasionally to travel the alternative roads from the working places to the pit bottom, but I am of the opinion that it would be better to signpost these roads effectively so as to give a clear indication of the route to be taken to reach the shaft.

"(4) In mines where oil safety-lamps are in general use, consideration should be given as to whether a proportion of electric safety-lamps ought not to be provided. These would enable workmen to find their way out more quickly in cases of accidents in which oil lamps may be extinguished."

Mr. Joseph Jones, the other assessor, also makes a separate report, a large part of which is devoted to the management of, and discipline and observance and law and regulations, of the mine. He says "the evidence regarding the management revealed glaring instances of indiscipline and complete demoralisation among the officials of the mine, and conveyed quite definitely the impression that the mine lacked leadership and character, that the officials responsible for the safety were more concerned with output than with the law or safety precautions, and that flagrant risks were taken with the knowledge of all concerned."

In the statement of his conclusions Mr. Jones says that of the possible danger points mentioned :—

"I am convinced that of them all, the most likely was 14's. As regards this area a definite chain of corroborated evidence established beyond all dubiety that 14's was a veritable 'gasometer' awaiting the unfortunate coincidence of ignition.

"The inadequate supervision of the inspectorate and management must be regarded as a contributory factor, since the conditions in 14's and elsewhere could hardly have persisted in the presence of effective supervision and stricter conformity to the law and existing regulations.

"The system of stone-dusting was entirely unsatisfactory, and could not be regarded as conforming to Clause 2 of the General Regulations.

"The seriousness of investigations demands that they be entrusted to members of the Judiciary, whose training and experience is required, but with whom there might sit persons of practical experience in mining to advise them only on matters concerning current mining practice and conditions."


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Boydell, Thomas R.    H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Brass, John    Assessor  Whos Who Page
Charlton, William John    H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Cuffin, W. I.    Assistant Surveyor  
Dominy, Percy George    H.M. Junior Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Edwards, Benjamin    Miner  
Hall, Joseph    M.F.G.B.  
Jones, Joseph    Assessor  Whos Who Page
Jones, Robert    Deputy  
Miller, A. T.    K.C.  
Tomlinson, Henry    Rope Splicer  
Walker, Henry, Sir    H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Gresford Colliery  Gresford Colliery



Related Articles

Pub.
Date
Article (Newspaper)
13 Apr 1934  Pitmen's Debt of Honour (The Science and Art of Mining)
28 Sep 1934  Explosion at a North Wales Colliery, Loss of 264 lives (The Colliery Guardian)
29 Sep 1934  The Gresford Disaster (The Science and Art of Mining)
05 Oct 1934  The Gresford Colliery Explosion, Relief Measures (The Colliery Guardian)
05 Oct 1934  Gresford Colliery Explosion, Date of Inquiry Fixed (The Colliery Guardian)
13 Oct 1934  The Gresford Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
19 Oct 1934  Gresford Colliery Explosion, Splendid response to appeals (The Colliery Guardian)
26 Oct 1934  Gresford Colliery Explosion, Official Inquiry Opened (The Colliery Guardian)
27 Oct 1934  Gresford Fund (The Science and Art of Mining)
02 Nov 1934  Gresford Colliery Explosion, The Official Inquiry (The Colliery Guardian)
09 Nov 1934  Gresford Colliery Explosion (The Colliery Guardian)
10 Nov 1934  "House" and Gresford Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
16 Nov 1934  Gresford Colliery Explosion (The Colliery Guardian)
16 Nov 1934  Notes from the Coal Fields, Administration of Gresford Funds (The Colliery Guardian)
23 Nov 1934  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales, Gresford Colliery Reopening Decision (The Colliery Guardian)
23 Nov 1934  Gresford Colliery Explosion (The Colliery Guardian)
30 Nov 1934  Gresford Colliery Explosion, Resumed Inquiry (The Colliery Guardian)
30 Nov 1934  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales, Position of Gresford Relief Fund (The Colliery Guardian)
07 Dec 1934  The Gresford Explosion, The Official Inquiry (The Colliery Guardian)
07 Dec 1934  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales, Preparations for Descent at Gresford Colliery (The Colliery Guardian)
07 Dec 1934  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales, Position of the Gresford Relief Fund (The Colliery Guardian)
14 Dec 1934  The Gresford Explosion, Technical Evidence (The Colliery Guardian)
14 Dec 1934  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales, Gresford Colliery Disaster: Inquest Adjourned (The Colliery Guardian)
21 Dec 1934  The Gresford Explosion, Inquiry Adjourned (The Colliery Guardian)
22 Dec 1934  The Gresford Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
19 Jan 1935  Gresford Inquest (The Science and Art of Mining)
02 Feb 1935  Gresford Colliery (The Science and Art of Mining)
02 Mar 1935  The Gresford Fund (The Science and Art of Mining)
16 Mar 1935  The Gresford Task (The Science and Art of Mining)
27 Apr 1935  Gresford Relief Fund Officials (The Science and Art of Mining)
25 May 1935  Prospects at Gresford (The Science and Art of Mining)
06 Jul 1935  Gresford Recovery Plans (The Science and Art of Mining)
12 Jul 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
19 Jul 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
26 Jul 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
02 Aug 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
09 Aug 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
16 Aug 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
17 Aug 1935  Foresters And Gresford Fund (The Science and Art of Mining)
23 Aug 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
13 Sep 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
20 Sep 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
27 Sep 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
04 Oct 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
11 Oct 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
25 Oct 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
01 Nov 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
09 Nov 1935  Gresford Disaster Settlements (The Science and Art of Mining)
15 Nov 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
23 Nov 1935  Gresford Disaster (The Science and Art of Mining)
29 Nov 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
06 Dec 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
13 Dec 1935  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
01 Feb 1936  Gresford Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
01 Feb 1936  Gresford Relief Fund (The Science and Art of Mining)
15 Feb 1936  Gresford Position Unchanged (The Science and Art of Mining)
29 Feb 1936  Gresford Pit Conditions (The Science and Art of Mining)
28 Mar 1936  Gresford Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
11 Apr 1936  Gresford Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
25 Apr 1936  Gresford Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
20 Jun 1936  The Gresford Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
17 Jul 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales, The Gresford Inquiry (The Colliery Guardian)
18 Jul 1936  Gresford Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
24 Jul 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
07 Aug 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields (The Colliery Guardian)
02 Oct 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
30 Oct 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales, Position of Gresford Relief Fund (The Colliery Guardian)
16 Jan 1937  The Position at Gresford (The Science and Art of Mining)
13 Feb 1937  Report On Gresford Explosion (The Science and Art of Mining)
19 Feb 1937  Award of Edward Medal (London Gazette)
27 Feb 1937  The Gresford Explosion, Chief Mines Inspector's Report (The Science and Art of Mining)
27 Feb 1937  Medal For Gresford Survivor (The Science and Art of Mining)
10 Apr 1937  Gresford Summonses (The Science and Art of Mining)
08 May 1937  The Gresford Case (The Science and Art of Mining)
05 Jun 1937  Heroism Recognised (The Science and Art of Mining)
09 Jul 1937  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
17 Jul 1937  Gresford Inquest Adjourned (The Science and Art of Mining)
23 Oct 1937  Gresford Inquest Adjourned (The Science and Art of Mining)
21 Jan 1938  Notes from the Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
30 Sep 1938  Notes From The Coal Fields, North Wales (The Colliery Guardian)
12 Aug 1939  Gresford Colliery (The Science and Art of Mining)

Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Gresford Colliery
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page
Report Page  Text of the official report into the incident
Memorial Page  Memorial images gallery

 

 

mail
Mail:
Webmaster
Back
Back
Home
Home
Open Government Licence   Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Copyright © 1999-2024 by The Durham Mining Museum and its contributors
Registered Charity No: 1110608
Page last updated: 28 Nov 2022

Privacy Policy
 
Terms & Conditions
 
Search
Search
Print
Print