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2nd February 1935, Page: 228, Column: 1 Report On Bilsthorpe ExplosionsInspector's Safety Recommendations(Cmd. 4780) H.M. Stationery Office. Price 9d. net. At Bilsthorpe Colliery in Nottinghamshire two explosions occurred on the 26th of July, 1934. In the first explosion eighteen persons were injured, of whom six died. In the second, which followed three hours later, twenty-two were injured and three died. The verdict of the jury at the inquest was that death in each ease was due to toxaemia and shock following upon burns. The first explosion of firedamp, by which six men lost their lives, was brought about through unforeseen circumstances, and the second explosion, causing the deaths of three men, was also accidental. The jury added a rider that more chemical extinguishers should be available in future as a precaution against similar occurrences. In the course of his report the Inspector says :— "The shot-firer, the deputy and the men working at the face in both banks unanimously agreed that the first explosion originated at or near the first waste on the left of the loader gate, and that this followed almost immediately, or within a very few seconds, the firing of the third shot in the loader gate ripping. This shot was in the left top corner of the ripping, and the shot-firer gave it as his opinion that 'there must have been some break connecting the loader gate with the first waste by which flame travelled into the first waste and ignited gas there,' although he said he had found no evidence of a break when making his examination, and could not account for the gas in the waste. "I am satisfied that this explosion was due to the firing of the third shot, and that there was a break from the ripping connecting with the first waste in the left bank in which the explosion occurred. It would seem from the evidence of the shot-firer and of others along the face that there was first a flash due to the ignition of firedamp in the break, and this was followed by the rumble and rush of flame arising from the explosion in the waste It is possible that the first two shots liberated some gas or exposed some break which a careful examination immediately before the firing of the third shot should have revealed, but which Bradshaw (a deputy on the afternoon shift) failed to find. "Bradshaw has had about 20 years' experience as a deputy, during part of which period he also fired shots, and he gave his evidence regarding the inspections he made in a very clear and straightforward way. I should have felt more satisfied as to the value of these, however, if his inspections had been made immediately before firing, as the law requires, since, especially in the case of the third shot, the interval between his inspection and the firing may have had an important bearing on the position. "The evidence clearly indicated shot-firing as the cause of the explosion. "The flame from the first explosion appears to have set fire to clothing hanging on a wood chock at the entrance to the first waste, and then to the chock itself. The smouldering clothes and chock were of very little account, and were quickly extinguished by the rescue men on reaching the face about an hour later. The fire they had then to deal with was back in the waste, and consisted of burning timber and coal on the floor. . . It was from this fire that the second explosion originated, an accumulation of firedamp in the waste and on the face having been ignited thereat. While on the evidence I agree with the finding of the jury that the first explosion probably was due to unforeseen circumstances, I am definitely of opinion that the second explosion ought not to have occurred and that it was brought about by: (1) The changing of the screen from the loader gate into the intake airway; and (2) The delay in dealing with the fire and the lack of suitable means available to cope with it." One of the reasons given by Bradshaw for changing the screen "was to cut off the air from the fire, and undoubtedly the changing of the screen would have the effect which Bradshaw desired. He admitted that it did not occur to him that shutting off the air from the left bank would allow firedamp to accumulate there, but this, in fact, was what happened. No doubt some air would continue to pass up the airway and along the left bank, but not sufficient to dilute and render harmless firedamp issuing from the wastes and from any breaks along the face, the result being that the percentage of firedamp rose steadily until it reached explosive point in the region of the fire. If the air had been allowed to take its normal course and circulate along the left bank, I think the current would have been sufficient to dilute the firedamp to below explosive point. Any fear which Bradshaw may have entertained that smoke might be forced on to the men travelling out from the right bank by way of the return was, in my opinion, groundless, since the men had left the face fully half an hour before the alteration of the screen was made. Moreover, it is evident that a considerable scale of fresh air must have been passing up the loader gate into the right bank even when the screen was in position, and further, there does not appear to have been at that time any great body of smoke at the fire or in the bank. It is worthy of note that the second explosion did not occur until approximately 2½ hours after the position of the screen was altered, which indicates that the quantity of gas issuing from breaks and the waste cannot have been great." Regarding the second point (2) Mr. Felton recalls that the first rescue brigade reached the workings "approximately 1¼ hours after the first explosion had occurred, and that during this interval no attempt — apart from shutting off the air — was made to deal with the fire... The Mansfield brigade on arrival at the colliery proceeded underground without taking any fire extinguishers. They had not then been informed that there was a fire, and their chief concern was that of rescuing any men who had not yet come out from the workings, rendering assistance to the injured, and afterwards making a preliminary exploration of the workings to ascertain the conditions." Describing the circumstances and conditions under which the rescue men had to work Mr. Felton concludes his reference by saying that "in their zeal to overcome the fire, admirable though that zeal was in the face of very great difficulties, they stayed too long." Shot-firing Precautions. To his general observations Mr. Felton offers some safety recommendations, as for example :— "This explosion, in common with others that have occurred during recent years, demonstrates the fact that in an explosion caused by shot-firing in face-rippings the persons most likely to be injured are those working on the face, the men in the gate roads escaping. If, therefore, the ripping shots were fired between shifts, or the men withdrawn from the face into the roadways during firing, increased safety would undoubtedly be secured, and I suggest that this course should be adopted wherever practicable. "I am fully aware of the difficulties arising from the fact that on conveyor faces the daily cycle of operations has to be performed more or less to schedule, that each shift has to bear its proper part, and that owing to the limited time available any delay on one shift tends to hinder another and to result in overtime or overlapping, particularly where gate-end loaders are in use and have to be moved before and after ripping. "Underground conditions vary and with them the difficulties, but after careful thought and inquiry I am convinced that in many mines the work could, without much inconvenience, be organised so as to get the shots fired at the change of shifts, or alternatively to withdraw the men from the face altogether or to a distance of 60 to 80 yards from the shot during the firing. Since this accident several managers have adopted one or other of the precautions, and others I hope will follow their example. "The subject of simultaneous firing is pertinent in this connection, since any reduction in the time required for the firing of a number of shots should make it easier for this to be done between shifts or for the withdrawal of men from the face during firing operations. Dealing with Underground Fires. "This accident also raises the question of the adequacy of the means provided under the existing regulations and at present available for dealing with underground fires following an explosion or otherwise, and the jury's rider made reference to this matter. "Section 70 deals only with places where inflammable material is stored or timber used for constructional purposes, and General Regulation 122 refers only to electrical plant. At some mines, particularly those at which water is not readily available, chemical extinguishers are provided at insets, and also at main haulage or other engine-rooms and underground electric substations ; elsewhere the common practice is to keep only one or more buckets of sand at such places. The inadequacy of such means has been clearly demonstrated in several cases of fire in this Division during the past few years, in two or three instances resulting in the seam or district in which the fire occurred having to be sealed off. I think the time has arrived for the provision at every mine, unless naturally wet throughout, of more adequate fire-fighting appliances, and for the organisation of a system by which these appliances can be brought into operation in any time of emergency with the least possible delay, time being a most important factor in such cases. My suggestions as to appliances and organisation are ns follows "(1) Water: (a) At most mines an adequate water supply is available at the surface and in many cases also at the pit bottom. I think that at all mines, unless owing to exceptional circumstances this is shown to be impracticable, there should be a supply of water available under pressure at each pit bottom and inset from which coal or men are raised, and that hydrants or connections should be provided for the attachment of hose pipes, the connections being standardised to those of the local rescue station equipment. (b) Where the conditions permit, water pipes connected to this supply should be carried along the main haulage roads to junctions from which hoses could be utilised to extend inbye. This system is already in operation at a few mines. At mines in which compressed air is used inbye, arrangements might be made to turn water into the air mains in case of emergency (if these are of suitable size and strength), and this system also is already in existence at several mines. (c) In addition to the provision of water pipelines as above, tanks or barrels of water and a small portable hand-operated pump with a supply of hose for use in conjunction therewith, should be provided and kept readily available in each deputy's district. "(2) Sand and Stone Dust: A reserve supply of sand and stone dust should be kept near junctions and at convenient points inbye in each district. "(3) Chemical Extinguishers: In addition to the supplies of sand and stone dust as aforestated, a chemical fire extinguisher of not less than two gallons capacity should be kept at every electric sub-station and motor room, and one at least in each deputy's district. The type of extinguisher to be adopted will require careful consideration. Extinguishers should be simple to operate, not liable to rapid deterioration, and should not emit dangerous gases. As a safeguard against shock when an extinguisher is being used on electrical plant, an insulated handle is desirable or the user should wear rubber gloves. The position of all fire-extinguishing appliances should be clearly indicated by a distinctive sign or notice, and definite instructions regarding them to all persons who may be required to use them. Further, all such appliances should be periodically inspected by persons appointed by the manager for the purpose, and a report made as to their condition."
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