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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

28th April 1934, Page: 322, Column: 1

Grassmoor Colliery Explosion

On the 19th of November, 1933, an explosion occurred in the North District (then about 200 yards long) in the Deep Hard Seam, No. 8 Pit, Grassmoor Colliery, Derbyshire, resulting in the death of 14 persons and shock to several others. The causes and circumstances of the explosion were investigated by Sir Henry Walker, C.B.E., LL.D., and in the Mines Department Report (Cmd. 4550, 1s. net, H.M. Stationery Office) says the seam as worked consisted of 1 ft. 11 in. of top coal, 9 in. of thin layers of bat and coal, and 1 ft 7 in. of bottom coal. Above the top coal 10 in. of hard coal were left unworked ; over it was some 20 to 25 ft. of blue bind overlaid by sandstone. The method of working was as follows: During the afternoon shift the face was undercut to a depth of 5½ to 6 ft. in the 9 in. of thin layers of bat and coal by two electrically driven coal-cutters, one in each bank. During the night shift the conveyors were moved forward, the packs extended, and shot-holes bored by a Siemens-Schuckert electrically-driven drill. During the day shift the coal was filled on to the conveyors. Shots were fired in the coal during each shift, but usually the greatest number was fired during the day shift. The work of getting, packing and repairing was all done under a contract let to six contractors, two of them worked on each shift.

The highest point in the district was at the face opposite the left tail gate, there being a gentle rise across the face from right to left, and the left tail gate rose toward the face at a gradient of 1 in 13.

The workmen used electric safety-lamps, either hand or cap, and the deputy and the shotfirer on the night shift and the deputy on the afternoon shift carried electric cap-lamps in addition to their flame safety-lamps. The deputy on the morning shift carried a flame safety-lamp, and the men ripping the left tail gate had a similar lamp which they kept hanging some 4 ft. from the ripping and 6 ft. from the floor. On the afternoon shift, the "chargeman" in the left bank and the men working in two headings near the foot of the left tail gate also had flame safety-lamps.

There was no evidence that, prior to 5th November, firedamp had ever been found in the district except on one occasion, some eight or nine months prior to the explosion, when the deputy Stewart said he found gas "in a crevice into the roof at the ripping."

In the section of the report on the cause of the explosion the evidence is passed in review. On certain facts given Mr. Felton formed the opinion that there had been an explosion in the region of the tail gate not far from where the hurdle sheet was said to have been erected. In regard to the igniting medium he was left with two possibilities, namely, the missing headpiece of electric cap-lamp No. 99 and a naked light. The latter he rejected, for on search being made no evidence of matches or of smoking was found. Whilst he could not say definitely that the missing head-piece was, in fact, the cause of the ignition, it was certainly under suspicion. He thought the explosion was originated in the second waste from the tail gate: firedamp was ignited there and flame passing by way of breaks in the roof to the left tail gate ignited in the cavity in that tail gate an accumulation of firedamp which exploded with some violence. Flame passed into and along the face and burned the men who were nearest to the tail gate.

Following references to other evidence Sir Henry Walker says: "It is very unfortunate that that headpiece was not found; a careful examination of it might have shown whether or not the bulb filament had been exposed and might have yielded some evidence as to the probability or otherwise of firedamp having been ignited by it. In the absence of any evidence on these points, I do not feel justified in drawing a definite conclusion as to the cause of the explosion. Judging by practical experience of electric safety-lamps in the past, the risk of the bulb filament giving rise to an explosion is very small indeed, and there are other possible causes of ignition which, though again it seems very unlikely, may have been present in one or other of the wastes or in a pack — for example, a detonator or a primer cartridge exploded by the weighting of the roof. It maybe said that a single detonator will not ignite firedamp, but there have been instances in which the sulphur used for sealing electric detonators has been seen to be burning following the firing of a shot, it may also be said that a primer cartridge could not be lost, but experience has shown otherwise . . Subsequent to the inquiry, a test was made by the Research Department, Woolwich Arsenal, at the instance of the Chief Inspector of Explosives, with detonators supplied by the manager of the colliery. The test consisted of dropping a weight of 11 lb. from a height of 4 ft. 10 in. and the first detonator thus tested detonated. But even so, neither of these tests represent anything like the pressure exerted by a roof which is weighting."

Referring to evidence as to the amount of air passing Sir Henry says the more important point was not the quantity of air actually passing but what was done to. use whatever quantity was available in the most advantageous manner. There was no evidence that gas had been found in the left tail gate next the ripping at any time prior to the explosion, but according to evidence a hurdle sheet was kept just on the low side of the ripping as a precautionary measure.

"Attention would appear to have been concentrated on the ripping lip, and that this was so, is confirmed by the demonstration in Court by Leonard Wheatcroft which clearly showed that the deputy confined his examination for gas in the left tail gate, three-quarters of an hour prior to the occurrence of the explosion, to that lip. Such an examination was not one with which a competent and conscientious deputy would have been content at any time, and much less so when a week before the whole face and tail gate had been fouled with firedamp. . . . It is to he feared that it was not his habit, when acting as deputy, to make such careful examinations as a deputy is required to make. Had a proper examination been made by Albert Wheatcroft he would, I think, have found gas near the highest point and could have taken steps to remove it; steps which required an efficient hurdle sheet properly placed.

"The highest part of the left tail gate was some ten feet outbye from the described position of the hurdle sheet, and any gas lodging in that part would not be affected in the least by the presence of a hurdle sheet of the description given in evidence and so placed. It is to this lack of proper examination and proper distribution of the quantity of air available that the disastrous effects of the explosion were due. Had a tight hurdle sheet — that is tight to the sides and touching the floor — been erected beneath the highest point in the left tail gate, there would have been no accumulation of gas in that gate and consequently no such disastrous results."

Other Matters Arising During the Inquiry.

In the first item under this caption the Chief Mines Inspector refers to Section 64, C.M.A., 1911, remarking that the instruction should have been quite definite. He then proceeds :—

"Explosives in Coal Mines Order. — Investigation of the manner in which detonators and explosives were taken into the mine took up a considerable time during the Inquiry. Each day a deputy, whose duties were to inspect the roads in and around the shaft bottom, went to the surface and there obtained a supply of detonators and explosives. These he took down to the deputies' cabin at the pit bottom, and then, having a key for the door of the under-manager's cabin, he went into that cabin, and having obtained from a drawer the key or keys of two cupboards in the deputies' cabin, proceeded to put the detonators into one of those cupboards and the explosives into the other. From these cupboards, after going through the process of obtaining the key or keys from the under-manager's cabin, the shotfirers drew their supplies. This arrangement was not in accordance with the requirements of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order.

"Coal Mines Act, 1911. Section 36 (3). — Sub-section 3 of Section 36 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, reads as follows: 'Every part of the mine in which ten or more persons are employed at the same time shall be provided with at least two ways affording means of egress to the surface, and so arranged that, in the event of either becoming impassable at any point, the other will afford means of egress to the surface.' Prior to the occurrence on 4th November of the fall in the right bank, the above quoted requirement of the Act was complied with, but subsequently, this fall having blocked one of the two means of egress, it was not, in my opinion, permissible for more than nine persons to be employed at the same time in that part of the North District lying beyond the road affording communication between the intake and return. There were two means of egress from the left bank, namely the middle gate and the left tail gate, but at 8's junction they came together and became one, that junction being common to both. The manager, when giving evidence, was asked if it had ever occurred to him that this sub-section, having regard to the fact that the right bank was blocked was not complied with, and he replied that in his opinion he was in order.

"Cover-glasses for Cap-Lamps. — Since 1st January, 1933, manufacturers of approved electric cap-lamps have been required to fit the head-pieces of such lamps with cover-glasses of unsplinterable glass except those protected with a safety device which automatically cuts off the current from the bulb on the breakage of the cover-glass. The cap lamps in use at Grassmoor Colliery were obtained prior to the above date and were not fitted with unsplinterable cover-glasses. Although the chance of such a lamp being the cause of an ignition of gas is remote, it is nevertheless desirable that all such lamps in use should be protected so far as practicable against the risk of such an ignition by the exposed filament of the bulb."


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Felton, John Robinson    H.M. Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Stewart, —    Deputy  
Walker, Henry, Sir    H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Weatcroft, Albert    Miner  Deceased, Individual Page
Wheatcroft, Leonard    Miner  



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Grassmoor, Deep Hand seam, No. 8 Pit  Grassmoor, Deep Hand seam, No. 8 Pit



Related Articles

Pub.
Date
Article (Newspaper)
25 Nov 1933  Chesterfield Colliery Disaster (The Science and Art of Mining)
09 Dec 1933  Grassmoor Explosion (The Science and Art of Mining)
23 Dec 1933  Grassmoor Colliery Accident (The Science and Art of Mining)
28 Apr 1934  Grassmoor Colliery Explosion (The Science and Art of Mining)
26 May 1934  Prosecutions Under C.M.A. (The Science and Art of Mining)

Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Grassmoor, Deep Hand seam, No. 8 Pit
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page
Report Page  Text of the official report into the incident

 

 

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