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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

13th May 1933, Page: 338, Column: 1

Garswood Pit Explosion

Chief Mines Inspector's Report.

In his report on the inquiry into the causes and circumstances of the explosion which occurred in the Ravin Seam of the Garswood Hall No. 9 Colliery, Edge Green, Lancashire, on 12th November, 1932, in which 27 persons lost their lives, Sir Henry Walker, C.B.E., LL.D., Chief Inspector of Mines, refers to evidence relating to a signal "to stretch up," and says: "There is no doubt whatever in my mind that an electric spark made when that signal was given ignited firedamp which had collected in the shunt on No. 12 Level."

The report opens with some general notes from which we quote:

"The Garswood Hall No. 9 Colliery is one of a group of collieries owned by the Garswood Hall Collieries Company Limited, of which Mr. James H. Edmondson is the managing director. Mr. William Sword is the consulting engineer, and Mr. H. J. Whitehead the agent. Mr. J. Latham is the manager and Mr. Peter Bullough the under-manager of the No. 9 Colliery, which has three shafts, namely: No. 9, the downcast and coal-drawing shaft; No. 2, the Upcast; and No. 3, a shaft close to No. 2 but not now in use.

"The seams worked are the Ravin and the Orrell 4 Foot or Arley; the latter being worked from the Ravin by two tunnels driven through an upthrow fault to the East of some 80 to 90 yards. The strata dip to the South-East at the rate of 1 in 5½.

"Ventilation. — Ventilation of the mine was by means of a 'Walker' fan, situated near the top of No. 2 shaft, which caused a total quantity of some 28,500 cubic feet of air per minute to pass through the workings of the mine. Of this total quantity, 10,500 cubic feet ventilated the 'North Side' district, and the remainder passed along the South Level to ventilate the 'Orrell 4 Foot,' and the 'No. 5 Brow' and 'No. 2 Brow' districts."

Following a description of the scheme of ventilation Sir Henry says it "appeared to have been sufficient so long as the workings were in the 'whole,' i.e., so long as the working of the Ravin Seam was confined to the getting of coal in 'stret' places only, but when the predetermined boundary had been reached and the taking out of the pillars, formed by the driving of the 'stret' places, became necessary, then its sufficiency became doubtful, especially as the goaf to be laid down was to the dip of the district. The first sign of this, so far as could be ascertained from the firemen's report books or any of the witnesses, was the finding of firedamp, towards the end of the shift on 1st September, in the working place of a collier, William Edwards. According to the evidence of Edwards, he had just found this firedamp when the fireman, William Marsh, came into the place and Marsh, after making a test, withdrew him from it. At this date, 1st September, the manager was on holiday. He returned to work on 5th September and, after consulting with the agent and the under-manager, he set about to try and improve the ventilation in the No. 5 Brow district. As things were, he found his greatest difficulty was to concentrate the ventilating current on the goaf edge and on the working places, and to keep it from escaping through the stret places driven in the first working."

There are some further references to the efforts to keep the air on the working places, and then Sir Henry says: "It is difficult not to doubt whether the whole of the facts in connection with the occurrence of firedamp in the No. 5 Brow district were divulged during the inquiry, especially having regard to the evidence given on the last day of the inquiry by a miner, Francis Smith. Smith said that three weeks before the explosion when packing rubbish behind a stopping in the brow to the dip between Nos. 5 and 6 Brows, he was 'gassed' and had to be taken out of the mine. He was off work for a fortnight, had to have a doctor and was paid compensation."

Firemen's reports are referred to and one occurrence in No. 3 Engine Brow tending to show "how quickly firedamp accumulated, following derangement of a brattice, even at the intake end of the district."

Quoting further from the notes on ventilation, "Mr. Latham became manager of the colliery in May, 1931, and it is fair to him to record that he did not consider the scheme of ventilating the Orrell 4 Foot, the No. 5 Brow and No. 2 Brow districts a good one. Accordingly, he determined to have two separate splits of air, one for the Orrell 4 Foot and the other for the No. 5 and No. 2 Brow districts. To effect this it was necessary to build two air crossings, one over No. 5 Brow and the other over No. 2 Brow, and to drive a road in the coal for some 130 yards along which to lead the return air from the Orrell 4 Foot to the overcast over No. 5 Brow... Unfortunately the intended rearrangement of the ventilation had not been made prior to the explosion although everything had been completed for that purpose, the air-crossing over No. 2 Brow having been finished about a fortnight previously.

"Shot-firing. — Shots were fired in the coal by duly appointed shot-firers during the morning and night shifts and by the fireman during the afternoon shift. The explosive, Hawkite No. 2, was supplied free to the colliers who took it underground in locked canisters, the shot-firers only having a key.

"Stonedusting. — The roads were dusted with carbonate of lime, between three and four pounds of this dust being spread per ton of coal drawn. The No. 12 level from No. 5 Brow to the shunt at No. S Brow was so treated on the Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday (8th, 9th and 10th November) prior to the explosion. Samples of dust taken from the roads in various parts of the mine prior to the explosion were low in combustible matter.

"Lighting. — The manager, under-manager, firemen and shot-firers used 'Protector' flame safety-lamps and the leading collier in each working place was provided with a similar lamp for gas-testing purposes. He also had an 'Oldham' electric lamp, and this type of lamp was used by all other workers underground. The shaft siding to the top of No. 2 Brow was lighted by fixed electric lights.

"Searching. — Two of the eight persons making each cage load were searched at the surface for matches and other prohibited articles, and every person was searched at the shaft bottom.

"Haulage. — An electrically driven hauling engine was placed near to the No. 9 shaft bottom for working the endless-rope haulage on the South Level and South Brow. All other hauling engines in the mine were driven by compressed air.

"Signals. — Signalling on mechanical haulage roads (named in the report) was by means of electric bells except in No. 7, No. 9 and No. 9a Brows. The battery in each circuit consisted of several Leclanche three-pint cells and the conductors were, one of galvanised iron wire, bare, and the other of copper covered with vulcanised india-rubber. Pushes were provided at places from which signals had, or might have, to be given, and it was intended no doubt that signals should be given only by means of these pushes."

In the course of his story of the explosions reconstructed from the evidence Sir Henry pays a warm tribute to the rescue work done by five youths, named Armstrong, Daly, Duffy, Garswood, and Hesketh. He gives the story at length "because," he says, "I think they deserve it. They show that the spirit which imbued their confreres in Yorkshire after the explosion at Bentley Colliery, almost a year before, lives in the pit boys of Lancashire." Similar praise follows the evidence given by a nightshift fireman, James Smith. "A simple tale told by one of many courageous men who were in the mine that night."

Commenting upon the work carried out by the Howe Bridge rescue team Sir Henry says: "Its first duty should have been to explore the workings to see (1) if there were any survivors and (2) if there was anything alight or burning. If this had been done, Fearnley would have been discovered on No. 13 Level long before 3-30 p.m., which was the time he was brought out, and the ventilation in the district could have been restored and all the bodies which were recovered by men wearing breathing apparatus could have been recovered by men unhampered by that apparatus. The primary object for which men are trained in the use of breathing apparatus is to save life. Such men may quite legitimately be used for other purposes, such as erecting stoppings or sheets in connection with the restoration of the ventilation, or if a fire be discovered, in an attempt to extinguish it, but their first job is to explore the workings with the object of saving life."

Of the possible causes of the first explosion there were (1) shot-firing; (2) a fire due to spontaneous combustion, to which the Havin Seam is subject; (3) a match struck for the purpose of smoking; (4) sparks or heat due to falling rock; (5) a damaged safety-lamp; and (6) electricity.

The reasons given against the first four possible causes are briefly stated, and with reference to the damaged lamp Sir Henry says: "I do not think this lamp was damaged before either the first or the second explosion. I think it was damaged by the force of the second explosion, which was of a much more violent character than the first, throwing the lamp from where it had been hung to where it was found, and that its glass was broken and its bonnet damaged when it landed on the floor.

"There is now left only one other cause, namely, electricity, which was in use in the No. 5 Brow district at the time of the explosion for the purpose of giving signals. The evidence is quite clear that Harold Hesketh, driver of the hauling engine working the haulage along No. 12 Level, received a signal from the gang-rider, who was in the shunt on that Level between No. 7 and 8 Brows, 'to stretch up' and that within a short interval — tested twice by Mr. Charlton, Hesketh gave that interval as 13 seconds and then as 18 seconds — he heard a report like a shot which came out of No. 12 Level and was followed by dust also out of that level. There is no doubt whatever in my mind that an electric spark made when that signal was given ignited firedamp which had collected in the shunt on No. 12 Level.

"The second explosion was due to a fire left as a result of the first explosion, and that fire I believe to have been at the shunt in No. 12 Level and to have been extinguished by the heavy fell which was found later in that shunt."

The report closes with some general remarks by Sir Henry as follows :—

"Ventilation. — The scheme of ventilation was bad and the manager evidently recognised that this was the case. Long before the working-out of pillars was begun, Mr. Latham had started to make preparations with a view to an alteration. It was unfortunate that he did not press on with this work. It could have been completed long before the removal of the pillars formed in the stret work began, and it is surprising that when firedamp began to give trouble he did not then immediately complete his scheme; it is also surprising that the agent, Mr. Whitehead, did not press him to do so instead of telling him, as he did, to put more brattices across No. 12 Level. This scheme would have given each district its own supply of fresh air and have got rid of the several doors erected on the haulage brows. The air-current at the time of the explosion had to find its way as best it could along the edge of the goaf; this was not right, proper travellable airways should have been kept open either by the use of chocks or stone buildings.

"It would have been a wise thing for Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Latham to have taken Mr. Charlton into their confidence. When they found themselves in difficulties they should either have gone to see Mr. Charlton or asked him to visit the colliery to discuss the position. If they had done so, the advice which Mr. Charlton, with his long and varied experience, could have given them would have been of great value.

"On many occasions I have tried to impress upon those in charge of the working of mines that when in difficulty their proper course was to take the Inspectors into their confidence, to put their troubles clearly before them and to ask for their help. The Inspectors are at all times anxious to be of assistance and especially in times of difficulty.

"Signalling System. — The signalling system in use was unsafe in the presence of firedamp. It might be thought that No. 5 Brow on the inbye side of the doors and the No. 12 Level were not parts of the mine in which inflammable gas, although not normally present, was likely to occur in quantity sufficient to be indicative of danger and, therefore, that General Regulation 132 did not apply; but there could be no such thought in regard to the foot of No. 8 Brow.

"The position does not appear to have been understood. The system in use has been described — two conductors, one insulated and one bare; pushes and bells, which were thought to be flame-proof; and batteries of Leclanche cells. Had the bells and pushes been, in fact, flameproof and maintained in that condition, and had signals been given by means only of the pushes, then the system was safe. But the bells and pushes, even if flameproof when new, were not maintained in that condition and signals, in view of the numerous bare places on the insulated conductor, obviously were made otherwise than by using the pushes. The bells were not 'intrinsically safe,' i.e., they were of such construction that the spark given when the circuit was made and then broken at any unprotected point was capable of igniting firedamp. It had been realised that to ensure safety under all conditions when using electric bells, the bells themselves must be of such construction that the spark given at any point on the conductors or within the bell is incapable of igniting firedamp.

"Many types of bell are available which have been tested and certified by the Mines Department as intrinsically safe; their safety is achieved by incorporating in the bell a device which absorbs part of the energy which otherwise would be released on breaking the circuit at the point at which the signal is given. But a word of warning is necessary, for even with such bells, when used in parallel, the battery supplying the current to the signalling wires must consist of Leclanche cells of the porous pot type and only one such battery may be connected in any one circuit. General Regulation 134 (a) which limits the pressure in any one circuit to 25 volts must also, of course, be compiled with. The position is complicated and not easy to understand. It is necessary that it should be cleared up and steps are being taken by the Mines Department to this end.

"Rescue Work. — When an explosion occurs in a mine it is natural for those men who have been affected, without waiting for the arrival of a rescue brigade, to enter the area covered by the explosion with the object of giving aid to any of their comrades who may be alive. They test for firedamp and, so long as they can keep a light, go forward unaware of the much greater danger from carbon monoxide. It would be hopeless to attempt to prevent men acting in this manner, but the officials, at least, of every mine should have knowledge of this danger and of the means by which men unequipped with rescue apparatus can guard against it.

"This point was mentioned during the inquiry, and at the close I made some observations upon it which were to the effect that in mines in which an explosion is possible, mice or small birds should be kept in every district for the use of those who attempt rescue operations before the arrival of a rescue brigade. The suggestion no doubt may seem to be fantastic, but I know of no other means of protecting men in such circumstances. It does not appear to be sufficient, as is now required, to keep birds at the surface of every mine, for the would-be rescuers are themselves already underground and forget, or may have never known of, the birds kept at the surface; were birds kept underground, their presence would be known and the reason for their presence would become common knowledge."


* Report on Explosion at Garswood Hall No. 9 Colliery, Lancashire. Cmd 4292. 2s. net. H.M. Stationery Office.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Armstrong, —    Miner  
Bullough, Peter    Under Manager  
Charlton, William John    H.M. Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Daly, —    Miner  
Duffy, —    Miner  
Edmondson, James H.    Managing Director  
Edwards, William    Miner  
Garswood, —    Miner  
Hesketh, Harold    Driver  
Latham, J.    Manager  
Marsh, William    Fireman  
Smith, Francis    Miner  
Smith, James    Fireman  
Sword, William    Consulting Engineer  
Walker, Henry, Sir    H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Whitehead, H. J.    Colliery Agent  



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Garswood Hall, No. 9  Garswood Hall, No. 9



Related Articles

Pub.
Date
Article (Newspaper)
26 Nov 1932  Colliery Explosions (The Science and Art of Mining)
08 Dec 1932  "All Seemed To Come Hot", Miner's Experience In Explosion (Northern Daily Mail)
10 Dec 1932  Garswood Hall Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
24 Dec 1932  Garswood Hall Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
13 May 1933  Garswood Pit Explosion (The Science and Art of Mining)

Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Garswood Hall, No. 9
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page

 

 

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