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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

23rd February 1929, Page: 250, Column: 1

Flameproof Enclosure

By R. M. Chalmers, B.Sc. (Glas.).

From paper (and demonstrations) read before a joint meeting of the Past and Present Mining Students' Association and the North-western branch of the Association of Mining Electrical Engineers in the Wigan Mining and Technical College.

Problem of Maintenance.

Without labouring the importance of preventing open sparking from electrical apparatus in mines I would ask you to peruse the Mines Department Circular 31 recently issued on this matter, and specially referring to coal-cutting machines. I would simply quote therefrom that "During the last live years there have been thirteen such accidents (due to the ignition of firedamp attributable to the use of electrical power at or near the coal face), and they have resulted in the deaths of seventeen persons and injuries to fifty-two others." No other reason or excuse for preaching this text should therefore be necessary, but if any were to be given it would be found in the reply of the Electrical Inspector of Mines to a question relative to the lack of information amongst users on the subject of flame-proof enclosure. His words were (ref. Transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers, Vol. LXXV. p. 261) : "I agree that there is ample scope for the instruction of colliery electricians and other officials at a colliery in this problem of flame-proof maintenance. I am convinced that the best, if not the only, way of teaching the men concerned is to give them actual demonstrations of the effect of omitting one or two bolts, and so forth. When I was in Germany last year I witnessed a demonstration devised for the instruction of colliers, to teach them why only 'permitted' explosives should be used for shot-firing in coal and why stone-dusting should be practised. Such instruction can be given quite simply ; it is convincing and lasting in effect." Certainly such instruction can be given and demonstrations carried out with simple improvised apparatus. This has been done throughout the major part of Lancashire Coalfield during the past year by members of the staff of the Mining Department of this College, and under the auspices of the Lancashire Education Authority.

Flame-proof Enclosure Defined.

And now to the subject. Rule 127, Par. V. of the Electrical Special Rules states that "All parts shall be so protected as to prevent the occurrence of open sparking where firedamp is likely to occur." Apparatus on which sparking takes place must therefore be enclosed in flame-proof enclosure which, according to British Standard Specification No. 229 of 1926, is "one which will withstand without injury any explosion that may take place in practice within it under the conditions of operation within the rating of the apparatus enclosed by it (and recognised overloads if any associated therewith), and will prevent the passage of flame such as will ignite any inflammable mixture which may be present in the surrounding atmosphere." Where firedamp is likely to occur such enclosure is necessary, because electrical arcing or sparking or heated conductors may cause its ignition, which might result in a devastating explosion. (At this stage it was shown that electrical sparking would ignite an explosive mixture of firedamp and air. The apparatus used was simply a long glass tube closed at one end by a stopper through which the leads to a spark gap were taken).

The aim of the designers when electrical apparatus was first installed in mines was to make the necessary enclosure "gas-tight" and a packing was inserted between the flanges of cover and box. But they set themselves an impossible task. It is impossible to have an enclosure made and maintained gas-tight. Firedamp, which is probably 96 to 98 per cent. methane, is a gas which is lighter than air, and is therefore found first near the roof, in the ripping, etc. It must not, however, be forgotten that it can travel downwards by the process of diffusion. By this process it can be shown to pass through porous pots. (The second experiment demonstrated this.) When a jar containing firedamp is brought over a porous pot the increased pressure due to diffusion of the gas through the pot is clearly indicated on a gauge. From this experiment it would surely be impossible to prevent the passage of gas into electrical apparatus or enclosure through between flanges and along operating spindles.

It was not long before this was recognised, and the designer was set the task of designing an enclosure — without any effort to make it gas-tight — capable of withstanding the force of an explosion of firedamp and air taking place within it, and of preventing the passage of flame to the outer atmosphere. To design such an enclosure one must understand the characteristics of firedamp-air mixtures, the most explosive mixture of firedamp and air, the pressures that can be set up in enclosures by the ignition of such a mixture, the factors governing the intensity of pressures thus set up, and how such pressures can be safely released.

Characteristics of Firedamp-air Mixtures.

Most underground workers are familiar with the method of testing for firedamp with the lowered flame of a safety-lamp. When firedamp is present in small percentage it will be seen to burn, forming a cap over the oil flame of the lamp. With small percentages of firedamp in air combustion of the gas is confined to the surface of the flame, it cannot proceed throughout the mixture ; there is insufficient gas present, insufficient being burned to raise the temperature of the adjoining layers of gas to the ignition temperature, or in other words to cause the propagation of flame throughout the mixture. A rich mixture of gas and air, one with 80 per cent. firedamp, was now ignited, but combustion was confined to the mouth of the tube, there being insufficient oxygen present to permit the flame to proceed throughout the mixture. Between these two extremes, however, there is a range of firedamp-air mixtures (from 6 per cent. to 15 per cent. firedamp) which might be called the explosive range, and if any mixture of this range is ignited the flame will travel rapidly through it. To emphasise the existence of this explosive range, a bell-jar was filled with firedamp and sparking at the spark gap arranged within the jar failed to ignite it, but when a light was put to the mouth of the jar the gas was ignited, and it burned only at the opening. The jar was again filled with gas ; sparking within the jar failed to ignite it, but after air had been slowly forced in through an opening in the stopper at the top by means of a cycle pump an explosive mixture was formed and ignition took place.

Pressures Set Up by Explosions of Firedamp-air Mixtures.

The pressures set up by the explosion of different firedamp-air mixtures have been thoroughly investigated by the Safety in Mines Research Board. Experiments were conducted in a spherical bomb. The spherical form was chosen as being that in which the maximum pressure would be developed. In any other shape of vessel, as for example a rectangular vessel, the flame will not reach the walls simultaneously. One part will reach one wall before another part reaches the other wall ; some of the hot gases will be cooling off while combustion is proceeding in another part of the vessel. In consequence, pressures developed in rectangular vessels are less than in spherical vessels, and greatest pressures are registered when explosions are produced in spherical vessels. The findings of the Safety in Mines Research Board as a result of experiments are

(1) That the greatest pressures are produced by a 10 per cent. mixture of firedamp and air.

(2) That the greatest pressure developed is 102 lb. per sq. inch.

Investigations have also been carried out with different sized vessels, and the conclusion arrived at is that 102 lb. per square inch is the highest pressure than can be produced by firedamp explosions within a single enclosure, however big that enclosure may be.

Influence of Turbulence on Pressures Set Up.

Experiments have been conducted in order to determine the effect of turbulence on pressures set up, and on the time taken to develop these pressures. The spherical bomb had a fan fitted and tests were made with the fan running and with it stationary. It was shown that turbulence has no appreciable effect on the maximum pressure produced. With a 10 per cent. firedamp mixture a 5 per cent. increase of pressure may be noted. However, the time taken to reach the maximum pressure by ignition of samples of the same mixture is much shorter.

Pressures Developed in Partitioned Casings.

In the Mines Department Circular No. 31 of the 12th November the suggestion is made that in flame-proof enclosure there should be no connecting passages between separate parts of an enclosure. The reason for this may not at first be quite apparent, but a study of the results obtained by the Safety in Mines Research Board affords an explanation, and it will be realised that the recommendation is completely justified. Experiments were conducted in a large steel drum connected with a spherical bomb through a short pipe. Both drum and bomb were filled with an explosive mixture of firedamp and ignition commenced in the drum. It was found that the pressures developed in the bomb were much greater than the maximum of 102 lb. per square inch previously recorded. This phenomenon is referred to as "pressure piling." The reason would seem to be that the pressure developed in the drum is transmitted to the bomb, and when ignition actually takes place in the latter it does so at an increased initial pressure, and then the final pressure attained is much greater. In all probability, turbulence is also set up in the bomb, and this also influences the pressure set up. Partitioned casings are therefore undesirable unless each division of the enclosure is in itself flame-proof.

A summary of the points demonstrated and referred to is as follows:—

1. An explosive mixture of firedamp and air is readily ignited by electrical sparking.

2. It is impossible to prevent sparking on electrical plant.

3. It is impossible to ensure that an explosive mixture of firedamp and air will not gain access to such plant, no matter how it may be enclosed.

4. It is therefore necessary to house apparatus on which sparking takes place in an enclosure which is capable of withstanding the force of an explosion taking place within it, and this enclosure must be such as will prevent the passage of flame to the outside atmosphere of the mine.

5. The most explosive mixtures of firedamp and air are those containing 9 to 11 per cent. firedamp.

6. With such a mixture 102 lb. per square inch is the maximum pressure developed in the largest enclosures likely to be employed in housing electrical apparatus.

7. Turbulence of the explosive gas mixture has no great material effect on the actual pressure developed, but it hastens the development of this pressure.

8. Partitioned casings are undesirable on account of pressure "piling."

Design of Flame-proof Enclosure.

It would therefore seem necessary that enclosures should be capable of withstanding an internal pressure of probably 600 lb. per square inch to give an adequate factor of safety. Enclosures would thus be heavy and unwieldy. This pressure, however, need not be provided for if some means of releasing the pressure be instituted ; but the function of the enclosure must not be lost sight of, and the means adopted for pressure release must be such that the flame will not be permitted to pass from within the enclosure to the outside atmosphere.

The safety-lamp gauze presents a solid wall to the passage of flame ; when the lamp flames the gas burns within the gauze, but the flame does not pass to the outer atmosphere. It might be thought, therefore, that the provision of gauze-covered openings in the walls of an enclosure would allow of release of pressure and at the same time prevent the passage of flame. Such openings would certainly give the necessary release of pressure, but their gauze coverings would not be so effective here as in the safety-lamp. The speed of the flame as it reaches the gauze must be considered. A tube was now filled with an explosive mixture and fired, ignition being made at the closed end. The tube was again filled and the explosive mixture again fired, but ignition this time was made at the open end, the flame travelling towards the closed end. In both cases the increasing speed of the flame was noted. The gauze of the safety-lamp prevents the passage of flame by its cooling action, but if the flame approaches the gauze at speed there is insufficient time for this cooling action and the flame passes. The next experiments showed this clearly. An ordinary safety-lamp gauze was fitted in the end of a glass tube held vertically over a bunsen burner. When the gauze was at the upper end of the tube and the gas ignited there the gauze held the flame, but with the tube inverted so that the gauze was at the end nearest the burner and the gas ignited again at the upper end the flame travelled rapidly down the tube, passed the gauze, and lit the burner underneath. Gauze-covered opening cannot therefore be employed if an enclosure is to be flame-proof.

The principle of the gauze, however, can be made use of. If enclosures are provided with broad flanges and gaps are left between these the action of the metal of the flanges will be such as to lower the temperature of the flame to below the ignition point of the gas. A brass plug with a number of holes drilled in it was placed half-way along a tube, which was then filled with an explosive mixture of firedamp and air. The mixture was ignited at one end, but the flame was arrested at the plug in spite of the presence of the explosive mixture on the other side of it. The gaps provided between the flanges must not, however, be too wide, or the flame may pass.

Research Board Tests.

The Safety in Mines Research Board have conducted numerous tests to find the dimensions of suitable flanges and gaps. These experiments were made in a spherical bomb which had a means of fixing a gap between the flanges. In the general arrangement of these tests the bomb was placed in a large compartment in which, to avoid disastrous pressures being set up, an opening covered with oiled paper is provided. Both the bomb and the outer case in which the bomb was placed were filled with a 10 per cent. firedamp mixture which was ignited within the bomb. If the gap arranged between the flanges was too wide the flame of the explosion initiated within the bomb would travel through the gap and cause an explosion in the outer or containing compartment. Gaps of 1/64th and 1/32nd of an inch were found to be safe gaps, and with these the pressure developed is between 25 and 30 lb. per square inch as compared with 100 lb. per square inch previously obtained. The actual limitation of pressure is determined by the gap area per unit volume of enclosure, and this is, of course, dependent on the shape of the enclosure.

Protection against passage of flame in this way is called flange protection, and there are various forms in which it may be applied, according to the method of obtaining the necessary gap. These different forms are :—

(a) With rough machined flanges.

(b) With vented flanges obtained by machining the flanges down between the bolts.

(c) With vented flanges obtained by providing washers round the bolts.

(d) With a corrugated relief device.

(e) With spring relief bolts.

Forms of protection other than flange protection take the form of :—

(a) Ring relief vents.

(b) Plate relief device.

(c) Spiral release.

(d) Perforated plate release.

(e) Metal sponge release.

Note : A special course of demonstrations and lectures for coal-cutting machinemen, etc., is now running at the College.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Chalmers, R. M.      


 

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