23rd February 1929, Page: 250, Column: 1
Flameproof Enclosure
By R. M. Chalmers, B.Sc. (Glas.).
From paper (and demonstrations) read before a joint meeting of the Past and
Present Mining Students' Association and the North-western branch of the
Association of Mining Electrical Engineers in the Wigan Mining and Technical
College.
Problem of Maintenance.
Without labouring the importance of preventing open sparking from electrical
apparatus in mines I would ask you to peruse the Mines Department Circular 31
recently issued on this matter, and specially referring to coal-cutting
machines. I would simply quote therefrom that "During the last live years
there have been thirteen such accidents (due to the ignition of firedamp
attributable to the use of electrical power at or near the coal face), and they
have resulted in the deaths of seventeen persons and injuries to fifty-two
others." No other reason or excuse for preaching this text should
therefore be necessary, but if any were to be given it would be found in the
reply of the Electrical Inspector of Mines to a question relative to the lack
of information amongst users on the subject of flame-proof enclosure. His words
were (ref. Transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers, Vol. LXXV. p.
261) : "I agree that there is ample scope for the instruction of colliery
electricians and other officials at a colliery in this problem of flame-proof
maintenance. I am convinced that the best, if not the only, way of teaching the
men concerned is to give them actual demonstrations of the effect of omitting
one or two bolts, and so forth. When I was in Germany last year I witnessed a
demonstration devised for the instruction of colliers, to teach them why only
'permitted' explosives should be used for shot-firing in coal and why
stone-dusting should be practised. Such instruction can be given quite simply ;
it is convincing and lasting in effect." Certainly such instruction can be
given and demonstrations carried out with simple improvised apparatus. This has
been done throughout the major part of Lancashire Coalfield during the past
year by members of the staff of the Mining Department of this College, and
under the auspices of the Lancashire Education Authority.
Flame-proof Enclosure Defined.
And now to the subject. Rule 127, Par. V. of the Electrical Special Rules
states that "All parts shall be so protected as to prevent the occurrence
of open sparking where firedamp is likely to occur." Apparatus on which
sparking takes place must therefore be enclosed in flame-proof enclosure which,
according to British Standard Specification No. 229 of 1926, is "one which
will withstand without injury any explosion that may take place in practice
within it under the conditions of operation within the rating of the apparatus
enclosed by it (and recognised overloads if any associated therewith), and will
prevent the passage of flame such as will ignite any inflammable mixture which
may be present in the surrounding atmosphere." Where firedamp is likely to
occur such enclosure is necessary, because electrical arcing or sparking or
heated conductors may cause its ignition, which might result in a devastating
explosion. (At this stage it was shown that electrical sparking would ignite an
explosive mixture of firedamp and air. The apparatus used was simply a long
glass tube closed at one end by a stopper through which the leads to a spark
gap were taken).
The aim of the designers when electrical apparatus was first installed in mines
was to make the necessary enclosure "gas-tight" and a packing was
inserted between the flanges of cover and box. But they set themselves an
impossible task. It is impossible to have an enclosure made and maintained
gas-tight. Firedamp, which is probably 96 to 98 per cent. methane, is a gas
which is lighter than air, and is therefore found first near the roof, in the
ripping, etc. It must not, however, be forgotten that it can travel downwards
by the process of diffusion. By this process it can be shown to pass through
porous pots. (The second experiment demonstrated this.) When a jar containing
firedamp is brought over a porous pot the increased pressure due to diffusion
of the gas through the pot is clearly indicated on a gauge. From this
experiment it would surely be impossible to prevent the passage of gas into
electrical apparatus or enclosure through between flanges and along operating
spindles.
It was not long before this was recognised, and the designer was set the task
of designing an enclosure — without any effort to make it gas-tight
— capable of withstanding the force of an explosion of firedamp and air
taking place within it, and of preventing the passage of flame to the outer
atmosphere. To design such an enclosure one must understand the characteristics
of firedamp-air mixtures, the most explosive mixture of firedamp and air, the
pressures that can be set up in enclosures by the ignition of such a mixture,
the factors governing the intensity of pressures thus set up, and how such
pressures can be safely released.
Characteristics of Firedamp-air Mixtures.
Most underground workers are familiar with the method of testing for firedamp
with the lowered flame of a safety-lamp. When firedamp is present in small
percentage it will be seen to burn, forming a cap over the oil flame of the
lamp. With small percentages of firedamp in air combustion of the gas is
confined to the surface of the flame, it cannot proceed throughout the mixture
; there is insufficient gas present, insufficient being burned to raise the
temperature of the adjoining layers of gas to the ignition temperature, or in
other words to cause the propagation of flame throughout the mixture. A rich
mixture of gas and air, one with 80 per cent. firedamp, was now ignited, but
combustion was confined to the mouth of the tube, there being insufficient
oxygen present to permit the flame to proceed throughout the mixture. Between
these two extremes, however, there is a range of firedamp-air mixtures (from 6
per cent. to 15 per cent. firedamp) which might be called the explosive range,
and if any mixture of this range is ignited the flame will travel rapidly
through it. To emphasise the existence of this explosive range, a bell-jar was
filled with firedamp and sparking at the spark gap arranged within the jar
failed to ignite it, but when a light was put to the mouth of the jar the gas
was ignited, and it burned only at the opening. The jar was again filled with
gas ; sparking within the jar failed to ignite it, but after air had been
slowly forced in through an opening in the stopper at the top by means of a
cycle pump an explosive mixture was formed and ignition took place.
Pressures Set Up by Explosions of Firedamp-air Mixtures.
The pressures set up by the explosion of different firedamp-air mixtures have
been thoroughly investigated by the Safety in Mines Research Board. Experiments
were conducted in a spherical bomb. The spherical form was chosen as being that
in which the maximum pressure would be developed. In any other shape of vessel,
as for example a rectangular vessel, the flame will not reach the walls
simultaneously. One part will reach one wall before another part reaches the
other wall ; some of the hot gases will be cooling off while combustion is
proceeding in another part of the vessel. In consequence, pressures developed
in rectangular vessels are less than in spherical vessels, and greatest
pressures are registered when explosions are produced in spherical vessels. The
findings of the Safety in Mines Research Board as a result of experiments are
(1) That the greatest pressures are produced by a 10 per cent. mixture of
firedamp and air.
(2) That the greatest pressure developed is 102 lb. per sq. inch.
Investigations have also been carried out with different sized vessels, and the
conclusion arrived at is that 102 lb. per square inch is the highest pressure
than can be produced by firedamp explosions within a single enclosure, however
big that enclosure may be.
Influence of Turbulence on Pressures Set Up.
Experiments have been conducted in order to determine the effect of turbulence
on pressures set up, and on the time taken to develop these pressures. The
spherical bomb had a fan fitted and tests were made with the fan running and
with it stationary. It was shown that turbulence has no appreciable effect on
the maximum pressure produced. With a 10 per cent. firedamp mixture a 5 per
cent. increase of pressure may be noted. However, the time taken to reach the
maximum pressure by ignition of samples of the same mixture is much shorter.
Pressures Developed in Partitioned Casings.
In the Mines Department Circular No. 31 of the 12th November the suggestion is
made that in flame-proof enclosure there should be no connecting passages
between separate parts of an enclosure. The reason for this may not at first be
quite apparent, but a study of the results obtained by the Safety in Mines
Research Board affords an explanation, and it will be realised that the
recommendation is completely justified. Experiments were conducted in a large
steel drum connected with a spherical bomb through a short pipe. Both drum and
bomb were filled with an explosive mixture of firedamp and ignition commenced
in the drum. It was found that the pressures developed in the bomb were much
greater than the maximum of 102 lb. per square inch previously recorded. This
phenomenon is referred to as "pressure piling." The reason would seem
to be that the pressure developed in the drum is transmitted to the bomb, and
when ignition actually takes place in the latter it does so at an increased
initial pressure, and then the final pressure attained is much greater. In all
probability, turbulence is also set up in the bomb, and this also influences
the pressure set up. Partitioned casings are therefore undesirable unless each
division of the enclosure is in itself flame-proof.
A summary of the points demonstrated and referred to is as follows:—
1. An explosive mixture of firedamp and air is readily ignited by electrical
sparking.
2. It is impossible to prevent sparking on electrical plant.
3. It is impossible to ensure that an explosive mixture of firedamp and air
will not gain access to such plant, no matter how it may be enclosed.
4. It is therefore necessary to house apparatus on which sparking takes place
in an enclosure which is capable of withstanding the force of an explosion
taking place within it, and this enclosure must be such as will prevent the
passage of flame to the outside atmosphere of the mine.
5. The most explosive mixtures of firedamp and air are those containing 9 to 11
per cent. firedamp.
6. With such a mixture 102 lb. per square inch is the maximum pressure
developed in the largest enclosures likely to be employed in housing electrical
apparatus.
7. Turbulence of the explosive gas mixture has no great material effect on the
actual pressure developed, but it hastens the development of this pressure.
8. Partitioned casings are undesirable on account of pressure
"piling."
Design of Flame-proof Enclosure.
It would therefore seem necessary that enclosures should be capable of
withstanding an internal pressure of probably 600 lb. per square inch to give
an adequate factor of safety. Enclosures would thus be heavy and unwieldy. This
pressure, however, need not be provided for if some means of releasing the
pressure be instituted ; but the function of the enclosure must not be lost
sight of, and the means adopted for pressure release must be such that the
flame will not be permitted to pass from within the enclosure to the outside
atmosphere.
The safety-lamp gauze presents a solid wall to the passage of flame ; when the
lamp flames the gas burns within the gauze, but the flame does not pass to the
outer atmosphere. It might be thought, therefore, that the provision of
gauze-covered openings in the walls of an enclosure would allow of release of
pressure and at the same time prevent the passage of flame. Such openings would
certainly give the necessary release of pressure, but their gauze coverings
would not be so effective here as in the safety-lamp. The speed of the flame as
it reaches the gauze must be considered. A tube was now filled with an
explosive mixture and fired, ignition being made at the closed end. The tube
was again filled and the explosive mixture again fired, but ignition this time
was made at the open end, the flame travelling towards the closed end. In both
cases the increasing speed of the flame was noted. The gauze of the safety-lamp
prevents the passage of flame by its cooling action, but if the flame
approaches the gauze at speed there is insufficient time for this cooling
action and the flame passes. The next experiments showed this clearly. An
ordinary safety-lamp gauze was fitted in the end of a glass tube held
vertically over a bunsen burner. When the gauze was at the upper end of the
tube and the gas ignited there the gauze held the flame, but with the tube
inverted so that the gauze was at the end nearest the burner and the gas
ignited again at the upper end the flame travelled rapidly down the tube,
passed the gauze, and lit the burner underneath. Gauze-covered opening cannot
therefore be employed if an enclosure is to be flame-proof.
The principle of the gauze, however, can be made use of. If enclosures are
provided with broad flanges and gaps are left between these the action of the
metal of the flanges will be such as to lower the temperature of the flame to
below the ignition point of the gas. A brass plug with a number of holes
drilled in it was placed half-way along a tube, which was then filled with an
explosive mixture of firedamp and air. The mixture was ignited at one end, but
the flame was arrested at the plug in spite of the presence of the explosive
mixture on the other side of it. The gaps provided between the flanges must
not, however, be too wide, or the flame may pass.
Research Board Tests.
The Safety in Mines Research Board have conducted numerous tests to find the
dimensions of suitable flanges and gaps. These experiments were made in a
spherical bomb which had a means of fixing a gap between the flanges. In the
general arrangement of these tests the bomb was placed in a large compartment
in which, to avoid disastrous pressures being set up, an opening covered with
oiled paper is provided. Both the bomb and the outer case in which the bomb was
placed were filled with a 10 per cent. firedamp mixture which was ignited
within the bomb. If the gap arranged between the flanges was too wide the flame
of the explosion initiated within the bomb would travel through the gap and
cause an explosion in the outer or containing compartment. Gaps of 1/64th and
1/32nd of an inch were found to be safe gaps, and with these the pressure
developed is between 25 and 30 lb. per square inch as compared with 100 lb. per
square inch previously obtained. The actual limitation of pressure is
determined by the gap area per unit volume of enclosure, and this is, of
course, dependent on the shape of the enclosure.
Protection against passage of flame in this way is called flange protection,
and there are various forms in which it may be applied, according to the method
of obtaining the necessary gap. These different forms are :—
(a) With rough machined flanges.
(b) With vented flanges obtained by machining the flanges down between the
bolts.
(c) With vented flanges obtained by providing washers round the bolts.
(d) With a corrugated relief device.
(e) With spring relief bolts.
Forms of protection other than flange protection take the form of :—
(a) Ring relief vents.
(b) Plate relief device.
(c) Spiral release.
(d) Perforated plate release.
(e) Metal sponge release.
Note : A special course of demonstrations and lectures for coal-cutting
machinemen, etc., is now running at the College.
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Names mentioned in this article
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| Name | Age | Occupation | Notes |
| Chalmers, R. M. | | | |