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5th November 1927, Page: 118, Column: 1 Dangers From Accumulations Of Underground WaterBy H. T. Foster, B.Eng.(Sheffield), H.M.I.M. At the October meeting of the North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers Mr. Foster submitted a paper on "Notes on an Inrush of Water at the Montagu Colliery, Scotswood-on-Tyne, on March 30th, 1925." Some extracts are appended. This lamentable disaster caused the death of thirty-eight persons, and was the subject of a formal investigation under Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, by the Rt. Hon. Hugh Pattison Macmillan, K.C., with the assistance oi Mr. Henry Walker, C.B.E., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, as Technical Assessor. The report on the enquiry concludes with very important recommendations, which are specially applicable in districts where mining has been carried on for several generations and where extensive areas of water-logged workings exist. The accumulation of water which caused the accident was in the workings of the Paradise Colliery, which was abandoned in 1848. The Paradise shaft was about 9 feet in diameter, and was situated 100 chains to the eastward of the Montagu View Pit. Two seams were worked at the Paradise Mine, the Beaumont, 237.59 feet below Ordnance datum, and the Brockwell, 423.59 feet below O.D., the distance between the two seams being 186 feet. The Beaumont Seam was more extensively wrought than the Brockwell, but the workings of both seams had penetrated a considerable distance from the shaft. The workings were in every direction round the shaft, which showed that the conditions as to gradients for haulage, and the small amount of water pumped, must have been favourable for mining at that period. The Paradise shaft was inspected in 1913 down to debris, which was thought to be on a scaffold about 20 feet above the Beaumont Seam, and this was the most recent information available concerning the pit prior to the accident. The scaffold had evidently collapsed during the interval, probably when the inrush occurred, as no trace of it was found when the shaft was examined after the disaster. The occurrence of the inrush is lucidly described in the report referred to. The salient facts as disclosed by the evidence are as follows :— (1) Two hewers worked in the holing-bord, which was 24 feet in width, on the Friday night preceding the inrush, and left a jud of coal, 6 feet wide and 3½ feet deep, kirved on the right side. (2) The coal in this place was tender in comparison with other places. (3) The usual volume of water collected in the bord from Friday night to Monday morning. (4) The deputy fired two shots in the jud at 9-30 a.m. on Monday, roughly straightening the face, and did not notice any unusual conditions on inspection of the face or roof. (5) Fifteen minutes later, the hewer sent for the deputy, who found a trickle of water coming from the face, about the middle of the seam, between the positions of the two shots, whieh had been fired in the right side. (6) The water had an unpleasant smell, and was evidently draining from old workings, but the deputy did not detect or suspect any noxious gases. (7) The deputy instructed the water-leader to fetch an overman for advice, but the water burst through shortly afterwards whilst the deputy was still in the bord. He took a few paces down the bord, saw the water rushing towards him, turned, and escaped. (8) The holing was afterwards found to be oval-shaped, 7 feet in width and 1 foot 8 inches in height. The rib of coal which held the water back for about half-an-hour after the two shots had been fired was approximately 6 inches in thickness on the right side and 2 feet 6 inches on the left side of the opening. After recording some of the observations made during the period of unwatering, Mr. Foster proceeded :— I propose in the concluding portion of this paper to discuss the dangers from accumulations of underground water in ancient workings, making a distinction between more modern workings, of which complete and certified plans have been deposited as required by the Coal Mines Act, 1911. It is interesting to note that the late Mathias Dunn, in his remarks on "The Inrush of Water at Heaton Colliery" on May 3rd, 1815, from old workings which had been abandoned seventy years previously, and which caused the death of seventy-five men and boys, said : "The accident happened for want of plans of the workings being available. Surely a melancholy argument for the necessity of recording old plans." The value of a knowledge of former workings was evidently obvious more than a century ago. Holings into ancient workings are made unexpectedly at relatively frequent intervals, even at the present time, and old mine plans, valuable as they are, should be taken only as indications of mining activity, remembering that they may be incorrect, and not completed up to the time of abandonment. It follows that the workings shown on these plans should be approached with very great caution. Even modern working-plans err in many cases in not showing the positions of staples and cross-measure drifts, and it cannot be too strongly urged that all the detail possible should be clearly shown on the plans. The possibilities of inrushes of water when working seams under water-logged goaf are very real, and are not confined to seams with a short distance of intervening strata. Trial staples or cross-measure drifts were often driven in former days, as now, to prove a lower seam, especially near faults, in order to get the advantage of the throw. A few places were then driven to prove the seam and discontinued, but were not shown on the plan, and these are sometimes met with unexpectedly, with the potential danger of a large accumulation of water under pressure in each case. It is remarkable that all signs of surface mining activity should disappear in a relatively short time in some cases. I have known instances where shafts, of which no traces could be found on the surface, have been proved by underground workings, and have had to be discovered by digging a number of trial holes. Old plans are often very confusing, and sometimes do not even name the seam being worked. The difficulties are increased where the workings passed through faults from one seam to another without indication on the old plan, thus setting up a state of uncertainty and becoming a source of danger to the present workings. Even when a method of working is adopted for safety in doubtful localities, to enclose areas of coal by driving winning places with advance and flank boreholes, before actual working in the area commences, this does not completely solve the problem as regards unknown shafts or trial workings within the area. Individual pumping-stations are being closed down year by year, involving further large accumulations of underground water. The subject is very complex, and the solution to the difficulty appears to be the establishment of collective drainage systems to unwater the extensive water-logged areas in the district. The underground water has to be pumped ultimately, and it would seem to be a more satisfactory way to deal with it at the lowest points in a few pumping-stations, allowing no large accumulations to exist, than to pump small feeders from numbers of collieries after filling up extensive underground areas and setting up a very real source of danger to modern mining operations. The collective pumping would undoubtedly be more economical than the present pumping by individual collieries, and in addition to eliminating the dangers from serious inrushes of water this would unwater large areas of valuable pillars in the flooded seams and render it possible to work seams below these areas which cannot be worked at present because of water dangers. Referring again to the Transactions of the North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers (1850-1857, Vol. V., page 135), the late T. J. Taylor contributed a paper on "Suggestions Towards a less Local System of Draining Coal Mines." Even in those early days the attention of the Institute was drawn to the problem, and the suggestions were to save, if practicable, the loss incurred by the provision of barriers between collieries, and also the expense of lifting water, which ultimately was not diminished by the coal-barrier system, in a divided and therefore expensive manner, instead of concentrating the drainage power. A lucid description of the proposed co-operative scheme was given, and I cannot do better, in conclusion, than quote the first two paragraphs of this interesting paper :— "There are certain circumstances, the inconvenience of which is hardly experienced in the first working of the mines of a country, but which operate with more mischievous effect as portions of a mining field become progressively exhausted. I allude particularly to the injurious and often fatal consequences of suspended drainage. The cost of such drainage is always an inducement to discontinue it, if found practicable to do so ; and thus it happens that, where an upper seam is worked out, it has become, or is fast becoming, almost a rule in our district to dam back its feeders ; this being done with a view not merely to save the lifting of those feeders, but also to secure the immediate tract of mining ground which is being worked against the possible influx of water from other royalties whose drainage has been discontinued. "The entire process thus results in the creation of a deep lake overhead, beneath which the future mining operations of the country are to be conducted." These observations apply with still greater force now, and the present time, with the recent calamity in mind, would appear to be opportune to consider the advantages to be derived by the setting-up of collective pumping-stations in this part of the coalfield.
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