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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

10th April 1926, Page: 301, Column: 1

Shawfield Winding Accident

The Mines Department has issued the report of Mr. Henry Walker, C.B.E., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, on the causes of and circumstances attending the winding accident which occurred at Brownlee No. 2 Pit, Shawfield Colliery, Carluke, Lanarkshire, on the 5th May, 1925 (Cmd. 2585, 6d. net, H.M. Stationery Office).

Four men lost their lives, and the narrative of the accident indicates in a general manner the causes of the accident: (1) the error on the part of the winding enginemen, and (2) the failure of the over-wind preventer and the detaching hook and plate to avert the fatal consequences of this error. In regard to (1) there were circumstances under which the report indicates that little blame for the accident should be attributed to him. Regarding the failure of the mechanical safeguards, the description given shows that from the crank shaft of the winding engine a horizontal worm shaft was revolved by means of bevel gear and along this worm a threaded nut travelled backwards or forwards, according to the direction the engine was winding, thus simulating on a small scale the upward and downward movement of the cage in the shaft. The movement of this nut was 25 17/32 in. along the worm for a complete wind in the shaft, i.e., for a travel in the case of the south cage of 763 ft. a gear ratio of 1 to 359. Attached to another shaft above the worm shaft were two trip plates (one at each end) so arranged that on any movement of the engine beyond its proper wind, the travelling nut pressing against one of these plates would slide the shaft along and so by lifting a pawl cause the release of weights which cut off steam and applied the brake.

As a movement of one inch on the part of the travelling nut coincided with a movement, for the south cage, of approximately 30 ft. in the shaft the adjustment of the apparatus needed to be accurate to a very minute degree. This was particularly the case at Brownlee No. 2 Pit for the following reason The existing headgear was a small one, erected some years ago beneath an old one which had become unserviceable and was afterwards dismantled. Detaching hooks were fitted on the coming into force of the Coal Mines Act, 1911. Later, preliminary to the winding of coal at this pit, the banking level was raised to some 10 ft. above the ground level, but no change was made in the position of the detaching-hook plate. The effect of this alteration in level was to leave only a space of 4 ft. 4 in. in which the cage could rise above the banking level before the detaching hook came into operation and the "Guardian controller," therefore, had only this distance in which to arrest the cage.

A careful examination of this controller on the day after the accident revealed the following facts : (1) The end trip plate on the controller was set to engage with the moving nut at four-thousandths of an inch beyond its normal travel, a cage movement of about 1-4 in. above the pit bank. (2) The worm shaft on which the nut travelled, due to wear or faulty adjustment, had an end play of nearly one-tenth of an inch, which, owing to the arrangement of the bevel drive, was always at the same end. This end play had to be "taken up" before the nut actually moved the trip shaft, thus allowing a cage movement of 2 ft. 10½ in. (3) The movement of the trip shaft necessary actually to release the pawl, was 3/32 in. — representing a further cage movement of 2 ft. 9½ in.

The cumulative effect of these items alone is that the cage would rise 5 ft. 9½ in. before the pawl was folly raised, and when it is considered that, in addition, the movement of the thin wire rope and the falling of the brake weights occupied approximately half a second, during which time the cage would move several more feet, it becomes obvious that under the prevailing conditions the apparatus could not effectively operate before the detaching hook was opened and the winding rope released. The detaching hook, when inspected after the accident, appeared, apart from slight damage probably sustained by falling down the shaft, to be in good condition, but an examination of its complement, the catch-plate, showed its condition to be gravely defective.

The centre hole of the catch-plate, according to evidence given by the manufacturer of the hook, should have been circular, and of 4 5/8 in. diameter. In actual fact this hole at its smallest diameter measured 5¾ in., and at its longest diameter 6 in., while the spread of the jaws of the detaching hook, when opened as after an overwind, measured only 5 13/16 in.

The Inspector says the size of the hole in this catch-plate would be quite sufficient to account by itself for the failure of the detaching hook to hold, as was demonstrated by tests made after the accident. In two other respects the fittings were so arranged as to prejudice the proper working of the hook. In the first place, the supporting wooden beams to which the plate was attached were so close together that the hook, should it ascend exactly at right angles to them, had not sufficient room to pass freely into the plate, and there was a possibility of the operating wings of the hook striking the beams. In the second place, a wooden cover above the plate was neither judiciously placed not properly fitted. It consisted of two horizontal doors opening from the middle, with a piece cut away from each part to leave an opening through which the winding rope could run. Reinforcing pieces of wood placed round this opening made up the thickness of the cover to 2 in. These doors were so close to the plate that the detaching hook, on coming into operation, would strike against the edges of the rope hole and thus a risk of the action of the hook being impaired was present. The probability of this occurring was increased by the fact that the doors were not hinged but were kept in place by nails.

Recommendations.

As the result of the Inquiry, the Chief Inspector has made the following recommendations :—

(1) That the persons to make the examinations required by Section 66 (a), (b), and (c) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, should be appointed in writing, and that such appointments should state the particular items which each such person is required to examine.

(2) That the examinations mentioned in (1) should be made by persons who are especially informed with regard to the particular apparatus they are required to examine.

(3) That in those devices to prevent over-winding which depend on the travel of a nut on a worm shaft to bring them into action, the ratio between that travel and the travel of the cages in the shaft should be very much less than was the case at Brownlee.

(4) That all such apparatus should be tested from time to time by starting the winding engine away in the wrong direction when one cage is resting on the keps at the surface level, steam being admitted to the engine as if about to wind persons.

(5) That a minimum distance between the detaching hook and the detaching plate when a cage is resting on the keps should be fixed for all headgears.

(6) That should wear occur on the perimeter of the centre hole of a detaching plate, that plate should be considered to be defective and be at once renewed. It follows that the daily examination of the detaching plate should include the use of callipers or a gauge such as that which is in use at Knowton Colliery.

(7) That catch-plates should be of such dimensions as will allow the beams or girders supporting them to be fixed such distance apart as will afford ample clearance for the detaching hook to pass between them.

(8) That a series of keps should be provided in all headgears for supporting the cage automatically should it be raised 4 ft. or more above the unloading level.

(9) That on every detaching hook and detaching plate there should be such distinguishing marks as would prevent the use of hooks and plates unsuited to one another. In addition, the diameter of the centre hole in every detaching plate should be stamped upon that plate before it leaves the makers' works.

Controllers are in a different category from detaching hooks and from safety-lamps, and in concluding the Chief Inspector says that a controller suitable for one set of circumstances may not be suitable for another, but thinks that a committee consisting of representatives of the parties concerned should be appointed to draw up a specification embracing the minimum requirements with which every controller to be used in connection with an engine for lowering or raising persons in shafts should comply. It is of no use, however, to install such apparatus unless proper attention is given to it thereafter. An apparatus, not only when it leaves the makers' works and is installed at a shaft, but also throughout its working life, should comply with such a specification as suggested, and to accomplish this the important factor is maintenance.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Walker, Henry    H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page



Related Articles

Pub.
Date
Article (Newspaper)
10 Apr 1926  Shawfield Winding Accident (The Science and Art of Mining)

Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Shawfield, Brownlee No. 2 Pit
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page

 

 

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