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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

23rd February 1911

Whitehaven Pit Fire

Home Office Reports

Dust And The Spread Of The Explosion

Laxity Of Organisation Alleged.

Both Employers And Men Reported In Default.

The official report on the causes and circumstances of the explosion and fire at the Wellington Pit of the Whitehaven Colliery Company has been presented to the Home Secretary by Mr. Redmayne, Chief Inspector of Mines, and Mr. Samuel Pope, barrister, whose inquiry into the disaster, held concurrently with the Coroner's inquest at Whitehaven, occupied eleven days in November, and December last. The report was issued on Thursday as a Blue-Book. It contains reports by Mr. Redmayne and by Mr. Pope, and also statements prepared by Mr. J. B. Atkinson, Inspector of Mines, and Professor Galloway, of Cardiff; and there are three large plans appended showing (1) the workings and air-courses; (2), the place where each of the entombed men was found, with the names of all the men; (3), a plan and section to the site of the fire.

The disaster occurred on the night of May 11th, last, and caused a loss of 136 lives, only five men of the shift in the pit escaping. The workings were under the sea, from three to four miles from the shore line. The fire that followed the explosion hemmed in the workings. Rescue parties with breathing apparatus arrived at the pit 27 hours after the explosion, but none of the entombed men were brought out alive. To extinguish the fire the workings had to be sealed up, and the last of the bodies was not got until January 20th.

Mr. Redmayne's Report.

The Inquiry.

Mr. Redmayne, in his report first describes the proceedings at the inquiry, as to which he says :— It was determined to hold the inquiry concurrently with the Coroner's inquest, with the idea that the combination of the two investigations would result in a saving of time and expense, and be to the convenience of all the parties concerned.

The smoothness attending the working of the two inquiries must be attributed to the wisdom, discretion, and courtesy of the Coroner, Mr. Edward Atter. The holding of the two inquiries together was in my opinion thoroughly justified by events.

Whitehaven Colliery.

Mr. Redmayne next gives a description of the colliery.

The present owners of the colliery, Messrs. Bain & Co., (Mr. J. D. Bain, Colonel Bain, and Mr. J. S. Simpson) have leased the colliery from Lord Lonsdale for a term of 31 years from August 1888.

The colliery comprises three mines, viz: Wellington, William, and Ladysmith Pits. The Ladysmith Pit is not connected with the Wellington Pit; there was an old road, but it is closed. The William Pit and Wellington Pits are connected by a road which comes roughly under the West Pier and joins the Wellington Pit return airway. This road is used by the men for travelling from Wellington Pit to William Pit.

The section of Wellington Pit shaft shows the Bannock Band seam at a depth of 180ft. 3in; the Main Band seam at a depth of 611ft 10in; the present winding eye at a depth of 750ft. 7in; and the Six Quarters seam, at a depth of 872ft. 7in. At Wellington Pit, as at the other pits, it is the Main Band which is at present being worked, which is the best seam at the colliery. The seam is a thick one, there being no less than 10ft. 1in, of coal to 1ft. 3¾in. of metal; a total height of 11ft. 4¾in.

The Wellington Mine, first worked in 1843, is worked by three shafts namely, the Wellington downcast shaft, 9ft. in diameter, sunk to a depth of 894ft; the pump-shaft, also a downcast, 8½ ft. in diameter, and of the same depth; and the upcast 12ft. in diameter, but sunk only a little beyond the Main Band seam. There is also an entrance into the mine, known as the Bearmouth drift, a highly inclined road, which passes by the Duke Pit (an Old Shaft) and comes out to the surface near the Ginns end of the Coach Road. A certain amount of fresh air goes down it into the mine, and some men travel by it. Coals are wound at the Wellington shaft, which is fairly dry. The Main Band seam is reached by means of a stone drift. From the pumping shaft, water is pumped to the surface from the Six Quarters level.

Besides the Wellington shaft, there were means for raising the men at the pump shaft, but not at the upcast. The Duke Pit is an old shaft which was cut off from the workings some time ago, but at the surface there is a fan, and fan and shaft are available for use should anything go wrong with the upcast shaft or fan.

The coal seam dips away under the sea at a moderate average inclination of about 1 in 20; so that at the in-bye extremity of the main intake road, which is 3¾ miles from the bottom of Wellington Pit, it is 1386ft. under the sea bed, and practically the whole of the workings are under the sea. The furthest in working place in the mine, viz., the extremity of the 6th North District, is slightly over four miles from the shaft bottom. I know of no mine in the United Kingdom or abroad the workings of which extend for so great a distance away from the shaft.

System Of Working.

The system of working is to drive roads rectangularly to form pillars (called "whole" workings), and afterwards — sometimes not until the formation of a district has been completed, sometimes while it is in process of formation — working off the pillars (called broken or robbery workings), and allowing the roof to fall as the coal is worked out and the support removed.

The mine is divided into several districts, but at the time of the accident coal was being worked in only three of these, viz., the 3rd, 5th, 6th North ways, the junctions of which with the main road are respectively — 2¾, 3 1/8, 3½ miles distant from the bottom of the Wellington Pit as measured along the main intake, which is also the main haulage road of the mine. The total daily output of coal from the mine was from 800 to 850 tons, 40 per cent of which came from 3rd North, 13 per cent from 5th North, and 46 per cent from 6th North. The 6th North was being worked in the whole; in the 3rd North, both whole working and the removal of pillars was being prosecuted.

In a fourth district, Saltom, though no coal working was being carried on, the management had for the last four years been engaged in proving a fault, and having found the seam, were driving two drifts to the coal; but at the time of the explosion they were making a permanent road there and preparing for electrical haulage.

The system of haulage was by means of an end-less rope, 11,000 yards long, carried from the surface down the shaft and along the underground main haulage way to a point just opposite the 3rd North way end, where it drove some sheaves (known as the "friction gear") from which other ropes were carried into several districts, so that the movement of one of the ropes cause the movement of the others. The tubs attached to the haulage rope were run in sets of 20. The speed of the main rope was about 3 miles an hour; that of the subsidiary ropes, 1½ miles an hour — that is, when coal was being hauled, but when men were being conveyed in or out-bye, the main rope worked at a speed of from 5 to 6 miles an hour. The haulage of the coal near the coal face was by "hand-putting," there being no horses or ponies in the mine. In the 3rd North, the hand-put coal was conveyed to the 3rd North, endless rope by means of two self-acting inclined places or "brakes" down which sets of 20 tubs at a time were run, pulling up an equal number of empty tubs. In the 3rd North there was in addition to the brakes, a "dilly" road, in which a rope acted in the same way as the brake ropes except that there was only one full tub going down and balancing an empty tub coming up. Along the haulage road there were wires for signalling and telephoning.

All separation doors between the intake and return were locked, the officials and deputies being provided with keys for unlocking them, but in the case of extreme emergency, the doors could have been broken down without difficulty. A miner might well hesitate, however, before taking a step so drastic. A type of lock is therefore to be recommended, which is capable of being opened from the return side without the use of a key. Locks of this kind are in use as some collieries, e.g., the Charlaw and Sacriston Collieries in Durham.

There are small feeders of water on the main haulage road, which make that road rather damp for short lengths.

The seam itself would be described as dry, and the robbery workings would be distinctly dry and somewhat dusty also; but in the 6th North the coal did not make dust. Dust from the screens on the surface is carried down the mine with the intake air, and extends in-bye for 800 to 900 yards, so that this dust did not get into the area affected by the explosion. Dust also was shaken out of the tubs in their transit from the face to the shaft. Conclusive evidence was forthcoming at the inquiry to the effect that a good deal of dust was produced in the mine. That there was no systematic watering or clearing up of dust was very clearly shown. The 3rd North haulage road was the dustiest in the pit and was dry throughout.

Ventilation.

Mr. Redmayne proceeds to describe the system of ventilation, which is by means of a fan exhausting the upcast shaft and inducing a current down the downcast shaft of from 50,000 to 55,000 cubic feet. A "split" was taken off the current to ventilate Saltom district; another was taken off the 3rd North way-end, to ventilate that district; and the remainder passed in-bye to the 6th North, the 5th north being ventilated with the return air from the 6th North. Between the shaft and the 3rd north way-end there was a leakage of over 41 per cent; and when the great distance is considered, which the air current has to travel from the points of measurement made in respect of the 3rd and 6th North splits it will be realised that a very considerable further leakage must have taken place, and that only a very small quantity of the total volumes of air reached the face of the workings, i.e., the part of the mine where the firedamp is chiefly generated and the workmen are mostly engaged. There is in all coalmines a considerable amount of leakage of air from the intake through separation-doors, stoppings, and air-crossings, in the passage of the air current from the shaft to the various district slits, but the leakage in this case was excessive.

Scheme Of Ventilation Not Well Chosen.

Taking into consideration the gassy character of the mine, I am of opinion that the scheme of ventilation adopted by the management was not well chosen. Thus the ventilation of the 5th North district with the return air from the 6th North was bad mining practice, for, as one might be expected, it often contains gas. The management appeared to attribute the loss of current to the difficulty of isolating the intake, to the extreme length of road that it had to traverse, and the number of old workings that the main intake passed through. In fact they considered the ventilation of the 6th North district so unsatisfactory, that on February 13th, 1909 they laid part of it idle and did not restart it until they had improved the ventilation. That they were evidently aware that the ventilation of the mine was unsatisfactory is evidenced by the fact that they had been engaged of late years in making the main road more air-tight, which had effected an improvement; and they had just commenced on a large scheme of re-organisation of the ventilation, which would have been completed with a month of the time of the accident. The re-organisation scheme consisted in erecting a Sirocco fan in the return at the point named the "fan-site," and driving the same by means of a steel wire rope carried from Saltom, where the electrical driving plant was stationed. The effect of this fan would have been very greatly to augment the ventilation, and in its introduction, the management was, in my opinion, well advised.

Ventilation Not Adequate.

Now it will be observed that stoppings are shown in two roads leading from the two areas of goaf respectively in the 3rd North; these roads constitute connections between the 3rd North and the old workings to the rise, and it was considered that unless these were stopped off the ventilation of the mine would be adversely affected by the suck on the old workings, and I quite agree that that would be so, but I think a mistake was committed in erecting these stoppings before the scheme of auxiliary ventilation was complete and the underground fan ready to start, for these roads acted as the means of carrying out what is known as "ascencional ventilation;" that is to say they acted as "gas taps" to the goaves, the current passing through them, small though it undoubtedly was carrying away the firedamp collecting in the goaves. The mine would come under the designation of "fiery." It may be taken, that under normal conditions at the mine that the air current in the main return contained about two per cent. of firedamp. This might point to either a "fiery" (gassy) colliery, or an insufficiency of ventilation and I am of the opinion that it was indicative of both. Blowers of gas, thought they had taken place from time to time, were not of common occurrence. The ventilation was not, in my opinion, adequate within the terms of General Rule 1 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act. As the report book in which the statutory examinations are entered was kept in the office at the surface, a considerable time elapsed between the time of making the inspection and the entering of the report. The better plan from the safety point of view would be to bring the foreshift deputies down the pit two hours in advance of the men, and to keep the report book at the meeting station, so that it can be written up very shortly after the inspection has been made and so that it would be easily accessible to the workmen, duplicate reports being brought or sent to the surface. This is the system adopted at many well-managed collieries, and it answers satisfactorily in every respect.

According to Special Rule 67 of the code in use in Cumberland in respect of the deputy, it states that "he shall travel from time to time such air courses as the manager or under-manager may direct." The deputies at Wellington Pit did not periodically travel the return airway from their particular district outbye or inbye, though it is certainly desirable that the deputies at all mines should be well acquainted with all the main roads of the mine in which they work.

Tobacco, Pipes, Matches, Caution Boards.

Precautions were taken to prevent the introduction of tobacco pipes and matches into the pit by placing a notice at the pit-head informing the workmen that tobacco pipes and matches must not be taken beyond that point. But some considerable distance inbye along the main intake a similarly worded notice was placed which detracted from the value of the notice placed at the surface.

It might have been thought that after such an awe-inspiring disaster at Wellington Pit explosion particular care would have been exercised on the part of the men in respect of carrying matches underground, but I am sorry to say that during the holding of the Inquest and Inquiry a workman, who was on the 18th November employed in the William Pit was convicted of having matches in his possession underground. There is, however, no reason whatever to suppose that the explosion was in any way due to men having matches underground — no matches were found on the bodies of the victims of the disaster.

Gas And Withdrawal Of Workmen.

When a place was stopped for gas the time at which it was stopped and the time at which it was restarted was not recorded nor is it possible to discern from the reports whether anyone was withdrawn from a place on account of gas or other danger. The only entries of gas occurrences were those in the daily reports of deputies and overmen, all of which reports are contained in a single volume or official report book. No "withdrawal" book was kept.

Mr. Redmayne quotes extensively from the evidence on this point of the reporting of gas and the withdrawal of men. He adds that he could not say the mine was understaffed in respect of deputies, compared with many other coal mines in the country.

No Complaints From The Men.

On the other hand, Mr. Redmayne notes that Mr. J. B. Atkinson, the Inspector of Mines for the district, has never received any complaint from the men, individually or collectively, as to any difficulties in respect of gas or as to insufficiency of ventilation, and that witness said they did not complain to local Union leaders of the presence of gas. The workmen had quarterly inspections of the mine, and the inspection occupied about four days on each occasion. The last inspection prior to the date of the explosion was on the 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 30th March, 1910, when John Mulholland and John Thomas Mather reported that they had "found all safe working order." I cannot find, adds Mr. Redmayne, from an examination of these reports (of workmen inspectors) going back to June 27th, 1899, that any occurrence of gas has been noted and hardly any complaints have been recorded.

Narrative Of The Disaster.

Mr. Redmayne then proceeded to give a narrative of the disaster, and of the attempted rescue operations, and this occupies many pages of the report. The evidence was that "everything was in first-class condition," except that there was very contradictory evidence as to whether men were warned of gas near the "dilly," and Mr. Redmayne found it impossible to say whether there was or was not gas there, though as the place had been off since the 10th May it would be a likely place to find it.

Graham's Scheme.

As to the exact time when Graham put forward his proposition to proceed by the South Back Dip to get past the fire at the friction gear, Mr. Redmayne says that is not of particular moment, as the fact remains, and it came out in evidence, that they were conversant with this alternative scheme, considered it, and discarded it. Further discussing this scheme, Mr. Redmayne says that in his opinion when Henry arrived it would not then have been possible to carry out more than the first stages of the scheme; but supposing the rescuers had managed to get all the stoppings in and to pass behind the fire, it would in all probability have been a matter of a few minutes only before those of the stoppings nearest the fire would have caught fire, the rescue party would have been cut off and a still greater loss of life would have resulted. Had Graham's scheme been adopted by Henry, and sanctioned by Steele and Blair, the management would very justly have laid themselves open to criticism for not having adopted the direct method of approach to the fire, with the idea of extinguishing it, which was the method they did follow.

How And When The Men Died.

Commenting on Dr. Harris's evidence and on the other evidence on these points, Mr. Redmayne says :—

All the persons working in the 3rd North and the friction gear were undoubtedly killed outright. As to those on the inbye side of the 3rd north way-end — the 5th and 6th North men — I have not the slightest doubt that they did not long survive the inception of the fire at the friction gear. The air passing over the fire would carry smoke and carbonic monoxide into the workings on the inbye side of the fire, for the short circuiting of the ventilation by the blown-out air crossings would not prevent a considerable "split" traversing the inner part of the mine. The effect of this would be to kill all the men on the inbye side of the fire in a very short time — a few hours at most after the fire had reached its height — as carbon monoxide is cumulative in its effect, and air containing only ½ per cent — of this deadly gas, if breathed for a few hours is fatal, and the air would soon be vitiated far beyond this point. Their death would be painless.

Of the chalked messages left by the doomed men, Mr. Redmayne says :— It may well be supposed that the 6.30 was 6.30 a.m. on Thursday, and that the 7.30 was 7.30 the same morning, and as the men (supposing they had been alive, which is incredible) would hardly wait until four o'clock in the afternoon to write another message, it is thought that four o'clock refers to four a.m., and was the first written of the three "timed" messages.

Cause And Force Of The Explosion.

As to the cause of the explosion, Mr. Redmayne says, after quoting from Mr. Atkinson's and Mr. Blackett's evidence on these points, and referring to that of Professor Galloway, there can be no doubt that it was initiated by the ignition of fire-damp in the neighbourhood of the goaf in No. 3 North. This gas, he says in a foot-note, may have been in part or entirely derived from a seam of coal, under one foot in thickness, which existed a little depth below the Main Band, but which at the inbye edge of the goaf would be brought some little way above the Main Band level by the fault forming the eastern boundary of the 3rd North District; this seam was noted for being very "gassy." As to the source of ignition, "one can not say, one can only surmise." The evidence afforded by lamps is nearly always of a doubtful nature on account of the violence to which those in the area of force are subjected. That the explosive force did not go far beyond the friction gear, nor into the return air-ways, was accounted for by wet places in the main haulage road in and out-bye of the friction gear, and the comparative absence of coal dust in the return air-ways and the humidity there which would render innocuous such dust as there might be.

Mr. Redmayne's Conclusions.

Mr. Redmayne's conclusion and recommendations are as follows :—

The explosion was initiated by the ignition of fire-damp, and the explosion was carried by means of coal dust. There is no evidence to enable me definitely to locate any one precise spot as the originating point and although there is every probability that it is attributable to a safety lamp, which may have been either in perfect or defective condition, there is not sufficient evidence available to enable any one safety lamp to be indicated.

No precautions seem to have been taken in case of the weighing of the goaf — a feature which pre-sages a fall of roof and which with such a roof as that in question would be an incident fraught with very great danger to those in the neighbourhood of the coal. In similar circumstances the man in the neighbourhood should be cautioned and told to withdraw in the event of pronounced weighing, and I would suggest that it is most desirable that those working in the neighbourhood of similar goaves should be provided with electric lamps in place of old safety lamps.

The Rescue Efforts.

Three alternative methods of getting past the site of the fire and of so rescuing the entombed miners have been considered, and I am of opinion that when the under manager arrived at the fan site the scheme which he adopted was the one which offered the best prospect of success. I am also of the opinion that the subsequent proceedings were in every respect properly and most energetically carried on at very great risk to the lives of those concerned in them. I consider it most unfortunate that Henry (the under-manager) was accompanied in-bye by so few helpers, and that so much time was lost on the way in-bye — chiefly, it must in fairness be said, owing to the efforts made happily successful, in restoring Walker and Gregory at Benk's Turn. Had he and his fellow rescuers proceeded straight in-bye I believe that the incipient fire at the friction gear would have been successfully combated and the whole of the men in the Fifth and Sixth North rescued.

The almost total failure of the rescue operations constitutes a convincing argument in favour of the provision at every colliery of trained rescue brigades and means of summoning them at short notice.

A Second Main Intake Road.

Had there been a second main intake air road into the mine at a sufficient distance from the main haulage road, this road would in all probability have been available as a means of access to the entombed miners. The Back South Dip was too near to the main haulage road to serve this purpose. At some large collieries a separate intake road is provided as a travelling road, and is a wise provision.

Grave Danger Of Coal Dust.

The precautions against the accumulation of coal dust were of a haphazard and unsystematic character. No doubt the fact that shots were not fired in getting the coal bred in the minds of the management a sense of security in this respect, but had the haulage road of the Third North been systematically cleared of dust and damped with water the explosive blast would not have travelled this road — at any rate to the extent it did — and so would not have reached the friction gear. I can only repeat here what was said by Mr. R. D. Bain and myself in our report on the explosion at West Stanley Colliery (February 16th, 1909) :—

"We are anxious to emphasise the impression made upon us in investigating this and other explanations, that unless the grave danger which exists at many collieries owing to the presence of coal dust is attacked with much greater earnestness in the future than it has been in the past disasters of a similar character will occur from time to time."

Had water mains been in use along the main road — as should be the case in all dry and dusty mines, those where watering does not disastrously affect the floor — there is great probability that the spread of the conflagration might have been prevented even when Henry reached the scene of the disaster, and the fire ultimately extinguished, but the probability is that the explosive force at the friction gear would have sufficed to have broken the pipes and prevented the initiation of the fire.

The Ventilation Inadequacy.

I am of opinion that the ventilation of the working face was inadequate for the needs of the mine, having in view the gassy nature of the coal. I think this inadequacy was largely due to the excessive leakage from the air current in its course from the shaft to the working face, and not to any want of ventilating power at the surface, any increase of which would not have materially affected the face ventilation. Further, that this leakage was due to errors on the part of a former management, and that the present management had made considerable efforts to improve matters, which efforts were being continued at the time of the explosion. This inadequately cannot in my view, therefore, be wholly attributed to the existing management. Nevertheless, the system of ventilating the Fifth north district with Sixth North air was an instance of bad mining practice, and pointed to a want of proper appreciation of the dangers attendant on such a practice.

The present management, in my opinion, also committed an error of judgment in erecting the stoppings on the rise side of the Third North district at the point A, B, on the plan (the north and south extremities of the goaf are the points referred to) before the auxiliary ventilation scheme was complete. An alteration of such an important character in the ventilation should have been carried into effect at one time, and that when the pit was not at work.

Its Bearing Or Otherwise On The Explosion.

As to the bearing or otherwise of the inadequacy of the ventilation on the occurrence of the explosion — this question is not very easy to answer. With a goaf of the character of that in question, where the room was composed of a bed of strong rock and the waste likely to remain open for a long period, gas was bound to collect therein unless the waste or "goaf" was swept by a sufficient ventilating current, or drained by "ascencional ventilation," and when the roof fell the gas was bound to be driven out with a great force on to those working the coal in the neighbourhood.

As to inspection of working places, withdrawals, and reporting, he agreed with Mr. Pope's conclusions. Although the form of the reports agreed with the statutory requirements they are not in accord with what one expects to find at a well managed colliery. There appears to me to be a very strong argument in favour of the whole of the forms for official reports at collieries being of a uniform character such as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of State.

Lamps And Matches.

Considering the dangerous nature of mining and the liability to ignitions of gas and coal dust, and in view of the general rule which prohibits anyone having matches in his possession in a mine in which safety lamps are used, it should in my opinion be made compulsory on the part of the management to search all persons entering such a mine for matches.

Mr. Redmayne further urges the desirability at mines where safety lamps are used of keeping a daily record of lamps used and of the men using them, of their return, and of any injury a lamp had received during the time it had been used.

In conclusion, Mr. Redmayne acknowledges the courtesy of the management in readily providing him with all the information which he desired, and extended the same acknowledgment to counsel and solicitors, and to Messrs. Richards and Smith, who acted for the Miners' Federation, and who all conducted their respective cases with conspicuous ability.

Mr. Pope's Report.

Legal Aspects: Management And Men Both In Default.

Mr. Pope reports on the legal aspects of the case as presented at the inquest. The investigation at the inquest, he says, was thorough and complete. I am satisfied that all the evidence available and relevant in connection with questions of fact was tendered and heard. This extension of opportunity to any one who had any material evidence to give was referred to by Mr. T. Richards, M.P., at the inquest in the following terms :— "When I say that on no occasion have we ever met with a coroner who has given us not only greater fairplay, but greater latitude to bring out anything and everything that we desired to bring before the jury, I think that will be giving you a commendation the very highest it is possible for me to give."

The following matters having reference to the ordinary working of the colliery must be taken to have been established by the evidence.

(1) The entries in the Daily Report Book referring to gas had reference only to such accumulations of gas as had necessitated some working place being stopped or men withdrawn.

(2) The overmen and deputies did not as a general practice report gas which they were able to clear before the workmen entered the place or which could be cleared in a few minutes whilst the men stood down from their working places.

(3) The Daily Report Book kept in accordance with General Rule 4 did service for all entries required both under General Rule 4 and General Rule 7 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1877, and their own Special Rules 42, 56, and 62.

(4) No separate Withdrawal Book for recording the conditions which had necessitated the withdrawal of workmen was in use.

(5) There was a difference in the practice of certain of the overmen and deputies in connection with their examination of the working places before the commencement of a shift and finding gas, and the sending of the men forward to those working places.

(6) Men knowingly would enter places and commence work when the presence of gas was indicated by the fireman's mark; also men would continue working ("endeavour to finish the shift out") notwithstanding the prevalence of gas did not on their own initiative, obey the instructions of Special Rules 112, 113, 148, 151, 168.

A few quotations from the evidence of the overman, Mr. Graham, and from that of Mr. Blair, the assistant general manager, and other witnesses. He disagrees with the contention that "inflammable gas" in Rule 4 means gas in such quantity that it is inflammable. The word "inflammable," he says, must be taken to mean a description of the kind of gas, and not of the amount or quantity of such gas. Further the word "danger" cannot be read in that Rule as standing unqualified. The expression used is "other source of danger," which I take to mean that which originates and gives to danger, and refers to the presence of the inflammable gas, without reference to its quantity. I take the view that it is of the utmost importance that all gas, however small in quantity, should be recorded for the information of the management, and I am distinctly of opinion that the law requires this to be done. I must therefore report that there was a contravention of General Rule 4 by the overman, and deputies and of their own special rules relating to the reporting of gas.

I consider that the Daily Report Book, as used for reporting withdrawals, was not in a form sufficient to satisfy the statute, and that the reports of the withdrawals therein were not made in a manner to satisfy the statute. I must therefore report that General Rule 7 has not been complied with.

Rules Knowingly Disregarded With Impunity.

As to the practice of the overmen and deputies in regard to gas and that of the men themselves Mr. Pope comments upon the evidence of men that they had been sent to work in gas by the deputy, and that the deputy had chalked "gas" on a shovel to warn them when they went to their working places. This allegation, he says proved in part to be true, but no reliable evidence could be obtained from any of the men as to the amount of gas they would find on such occasions. If the writing on the shovels was understood by the men to be, as deputy McDonald said, that they should not go in and commence to work till the day shift deputy came to remedy the place, the men, from their own account flagrantly disobeyed those instructions. Certain witnesses made statements that on many occasions they had worked in gas — that they at times would "just fettle on," "try and manage the shift out," or "take the risk in order to get coal," the witness in one case significantly adding, "well, there's a good lot of that."

I will only remark upon the foregoing facts that there does not appear to be that co-operation towards maintaining a high standard of efficiency in the common interest which one would like to see existing between workmen and employer in a difficult and dangerous industry.

I have no doubt that the evidence when stripped of the personal colouring of the narrator, presented a true picture, based upon actual experience at some time or another (the witnesses to those facts, with very few exceptions, impressed one favourably for their class), but with all allowances properly made, the evidence only satisfactorily proved that the special rules applicable to the men themselves viz., Special Rules 112, 113, 148, 151, 168 were at times knowingly disregarded by them and with impunity.

I was not at all favourably impressed by the account given by the men of the inspection undertaken by them under General Rule 38, particularly with reference to the examination for gas.

Laxity Of Organization.

My impression of the under manager were in every sense most favourable, but the nature of the evidence viewed as a whole, forces me to the conclusion that he committed or found it necessary to commit, a larger measure of initiation and discretion to his overmen and deputies, excellent, as these men appear to be, than was judicious, particularly where gas was giving trouble.

The most important aspect of the evidence — and to this, in my opinion, particular attention should be drawn — was the proof of what I shall call laxity in the matter of organisation. To this are no doubt traceable

(1) The apparent absence of strict discipline in the mine.

(2) The apparent lack of any uniform line of action to be followed by each and every overman and deputy throughout the pit in cases where firedamp gave indications of its presence in the working places or elsewhere.

(3) The apparent wide discretion and responsibility given to or assumed by the overmen and deputies, particularly with reference to reporting gas.

(4) The keeping of reports in a manner not calculated to present to the management the real condition of the pit in every part at any moment.

No Case For Criminal Proceedings.

Mr. Pope's conclusion is as follows :—

Whilst recording with such comments as I have deemed necessary the matters in which I consider there have been breaches of specific statutory duty, I do not think it was in any way established that there was any connection between the fact of the explosion and these departures from the rule. In my opinion, there is only one possible charge of negligence causing death which could be suggested. It is that the insufficient water in the mine (it being of a dry and dusty nature in the districts principally affected by the explosion) enable the originating explosion to travel over and devastate a large area in the form of a coal-dust explosion, and brought about the deaths of men in parts of the mine well removed from the point of origin. The evidence showed that some watering was done, but that the system was inadequate to prevent an explosion travelling over the mine.

However, no statutory provisions have been made regulating the clearing of dust from the roads or requiring the main travelling roads in the mine generally to be efficiently watered or otherwise treated for the purpose of removing the danger arising from the presence of fine, dry coal dust, nor has science yet determined what is the right or even the most effective remedy to adopt under the varying circumstances found in daily practice. For these and other reasons I am clearly of opinion that there is no case made out or which could be made out sufficiently strong to justify criminal proceedings.

Mr. Atkinson's And Professor Galloway's Reports.

The reports by Mr. Atkinson and Professor Galloway that are appended to those of Mr. Redmayne and Mr. Pope, are the reports that were submitted at the inquest, and the substance of which was then reported.

Newspaper transcript kindly provided by
West Cumbria Mines Research.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Atkinson, John Boland    H.M. Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Atter, Edward    Coroner  
Bain, —, Col.    Mine Owner  
Bain, J. D.    Mine Owner  
Bain, Richard Donald    H.M. Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Blackett, William Cuthbert      Whos Who Page
Blair, Robert R.    Assistant General Manager  Whos Who Page
Galloway, —, Prof.      
Graham, —    Overman  
Gregory, —    Miner  
Harris, —, Dr.    Doctor  
Henry, —    Under Manager  
Lonsdale, Earl of    Land Owner  
Mather, John Thomas    Miner  
McDonald, —    Deputy  
MulHolland, John    Miner  
Pope, —    Barrister  
Redmayne, Richard Augustine Studdart    H.M. Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Richards, T.    M.P.  
Simpson, J. S.    Mine Owner  
Smith, —      
Steele, —      
Walker, —    Miner  



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Wellington Colliery  Wellington Colliery
Whitehaven Colliery  Whitehaven Colliery



Related Articles

Pub.
Date
Article (Newspaper)
12 May 1910  Serious Accident At Wellington Pit (Whitehaven News)
13 May 1910  Colliery Disaster, Many Miners Entombed (The Times)
13 May 1910  Terrible Pit Disaster, 137 Men Buried In Blazing Mine, Frantic Women's Vigil (Times & Express)
13 May 1910  Avalanche Of Death, Terrible Scenes, Four Men's Rush For Life (Times & Express)
14 May 1910  The Whitehaven Colliery Disaster, Rescue Measures Abandoned (The Times)
16 May 1910  The Whitehaven Colliery Disaster, Royal Sympathy And Donations (The Times)
17 May 1910  The Whitehaven Colliery Disaster (The Times)
17 May 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disasters (The Times)
18 May 1910  The Whitehaven Colliery Disaster, Experts' Conference (The Times)
19 May 1910  The Whitehaven Colliery Disaster, The Mayor's Fund (The Times)
19 May 1910  The Disaster At Wellington Pit, 137 Men And Boys Closed In By Fire, Appalling Calamity (Whitehaven News)
19 May 1910  Coincidences (Whitehaven News)
19 May 1910  Looking Back (Whitehaven News)
19 May 1910  The Brick Wall (Whitehaven News)
19 May 1910  The Colliery Calamity (Whitehaven News)
19 May 1910  The Inevitable (Whitehaven News)
19 May 1910  Those Who Mourn (Whitehaven News)
23 May 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster, Mayor's Relief Fund (The Times)
24 May 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
26 May 1910  The Wellington Pit Disaster, Further Exploration, Pit Now Doubly Sealed (Whitehaven News)
26 May 1910  A Suggestion (Whitehaven News)
26 May 1910  The Colliery Relief Fund (Whitehaven News)
26 May 1910  The Miners And The Disaster (Whitehaven News)
26 May 1910  What To Do With It (Whitehaven News)
27 May 1910  Whitehaven Colliery Disaster (The Times)
28 May 1910  The Whitehaven Disaster (The Times)
02 Jun 1910  Allerdale Colliery Company's Clifton Pit, Doubling Of The Shift (Whitehaven News)
02 Jun 1910  Dangers Of Coalmining (Whitehaven News)
02 Jun 1910  The Men Out Of Work (Whitehaven News)
02 Jun 1910  The William Pit Men (Whitehaven News)
02 Jun 1910  Stoppage At William Pit, Gas In The Pit, Inspection By Men's Representatives (Whitehaven News)
07 Jun 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
09 Jun 1910  The Wellington Pit Disaster, Further Exploration, Fire Probably Out (Whitehaven News)
09 Jun 1910  The Wellington Pit Disaster, Meeting Of William Pit Men (Whitehaven News)
09 Jun 1910  Mayor's Relief Fund (Whitehaven News)
09 Jun 1910  Pit Lamps (Whitehaven News)
09 Jun 1910  The Analysis Of The Gases (Whitehaven News)
09 Jun 1910  The Unsealing Of The Pit (Whitehaven News)
09 Jun 1910  Whitehaven Pits (Whitehaven News)
09 Jun 1910  William Pit Re-Started (Whitehaven News)
10 Jun 1910  Mr. Keir Hardie and the Whitehaven Disaster (The Times)
13 Jun 1910  The Whitehaven Disaster (The Times)
16 Jun 1910  Wellington Pit Disaster (Whitehaven News)
16 Jun 1910  The Wellington Pit Disaster, Exploring Party Who Descended The Pit On Sunday Last (Whitehaven News)
16 Jun 1910  The Wellington Pit Disaster, Cumberland Miners' Association, Whitehaven Relief Fund (Whitehaven News)
16 Jun 1910  The Progress Of The Pit Exploration (Whitehaven News)
16 Jun 1910  The Sealing Of The Pit (Whitehaven News)
16 Jun 1910  The Union And The Relief Fund (Whitehaven News)
16 Jun 1910  Unthinkable (Whitehaven News)
23 Jun 1910  Whitehaven Pit Accident (The Times)
23 Jun 1910  The Wellington Pit Disaster, Exploration Stopped, Another Conference Of Experts (Whitehaven News)
23 Jun 1910  The Wellington Pit Disaster, Discussion In Parliament, Home Secretary Promises Amending Legislation (Whitehaven News)
07 Jul 1910  The Mayor's Fund (Whitehaven News)
07 Jul 1910  Pit Rescue Work (Whitehaven News)
07 Jul 1910  The Causes Of Explosion (Whitehaven News)
14 Jul 1910  The Mayor's Fund (Whitehaven News)
14 Jul 1910  Wellington Pit Disaster, The Mayor's Fund (Whitehaven News)
21 Jul 1910  Letter (Whitehaven News)
22 Jul 1910  Award of Edward Medals (London Gazette)
28 Jul 1910  Wellington Disaster, The King Edward Medals For 49 Rescuers (Whitehaven News)
28 Jul 1910  An Important Mining Experiment (Whitehaven News)
28 Jul 1910  And "The News" (Whitehaven News)
28 Jul 1910  Dividends And Safety (Whitehaven News)
28 Jul 1910  Hasty Speech, Lame Apology (Whitehaven News)
28 Jul 1910  Judging After Event (Whitehaven News)
28 Jul 1910  The Sealing Of The Mine (Whitehaven News)
04 Aug 1910  The Miners And The Medals (Whitehaven News)
04 Aug 1910  Presentation Of The Medals, Departure From Whitehaven (Whitehaven News)
05 Aug 1910  Award of Edward Medals (London Gazette)
24 Aug 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
20 Sep 1910  The Whitehaven Colliery Accident (The Times)
26 Sep 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
27 Sep 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
28 Sep 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster, Finding Of Bodies (The Times)
29 Sep 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
29 Sep 1910  Re-Opening Of Wellington Pit, Quick Progress, Finding Of Bodies (Whitehaven News)
30 Sep 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster, Fifty Bodies Found (The Times)
01 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster, More Bodies Discovered (The Times)
03 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
04 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
05 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
06 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
06 Oct 1910  The Re-Opening Of Wellington Pit, Thursday's Good Day's Work, 50 More Bodies Found (Whitehaven News)
06 Oct 1910  A Common Grave And Monument (Whitehaven News)
06 Oct 1910  A Town Of Mourning (Whitehaven News)
06 Oct 1910  A Veritable Way Of Death (Whitehaven News)
06 Oct 1910  Sanitary Restrictions (Whitehaven News)
06 Oct 1910  The Crux Of The Coming Inquiry (Whitehaven News)
06 Oct 1910  The Monument (Whitehaven News)
07 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
08 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
10 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Disaster, Identification Of The Bodies (The Times)
12 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
13 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
13 Oct 1910  Coroners And Juries (Whitehaven News)
13 Oct 1910  The Mining Disaster: Identification Of Bodies (Whitehaven News)
13 Oct 1910  A New Electric Lamp (Whitehaven News)
13 Oct 1910  Coroners' Inquests (Whitehaven News)
13 Oct 1910  Fees For Service (Whitehaven News)
13 Oct 1910  Identification Of Bodies (Whitehaven News)
13 Oct 1910  The Mystery Of The Mine (Whitehaven News)
13 Oct 1910  The Mine Disaster, Thursday's Developments, Futher Exploring (Whitehaven News)
15 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster, Supposed Cause (The Times)
15 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster, Supposed Cause (The Times)
17 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
18 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
19 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
20 Oct 1910  The Mine Disaster, Thursday, 12 Bodies Found (Whitehaven News)
22 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disasters (The Times)
23 Oct 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
27 Oct 1910  Wellington Pit (Whitehaven News)
27 Oct 1910  The Stoppage Of The Pits (Whitehaven News)
27 Oct 1910  The Mining Disaster, Friday's Findings, The Friction Gear Fire And Falls (Whitehaven News)
03 Nov 1910  The Mine Disaster (Whitehaven News)
03 Nov 1910  A Serious Rumour (Whitehaven News)
03 Nov 1910  Wellington Pit (Whitehaven News)
16 Nov 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster, Official Inquiry Opened (The Times)
17 Nov 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
17 Nov 1910  Wellington Pit Disaster, The Inquest And Home Office Inquiry (Whitehaven News)
18 Nov 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
19 Nov 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
22 Nov 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
23 Nov 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
24 Nov 1910  Wellington Pit Disaster, The Inquest And Home Office Inquiry, Thursday's Proceedings (Whitehaven News)
30 Nov 1910  The Whitehaven Disaster (The Times)
01 Dec 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
01 Dec 1910  The Mining Disaster, The Inquest And Inquiry, Tuesday's Proceedings (Whitehaven News)
01 Dec 1910  Discovery Of More Cremated Remains (Whitehaven News)
02 Dec 1910  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster (The Times)
02 Dec 1910  The Wellington Pit Inquiry (Sunderland Daily Echo)
03 Dec 1910  Verdict on Whitehaven Disaster, Officials Absolved From Blame (The Times)
08 Dec 1910  The Mining Inquest, Thursday's Proceedings (Whitehaven News)
15 Dec 1910  Wellington Pit Disaster, Recovery Of Another Body, The Inquest (Whitehaven News)
15 Dec 1910  The Last Of The Bodies Recovered, Mistaken Identification (Whitehaven News)
22 Dec 1910  Whitehaven Colliery Disaster, Colliers' Public Meeting, Petition To The Home Office (Whitehaven News)
22 Dec 1910  Wellington Pit Disaster, Memorial Service, Address By The Bishop (Whitehaven News)
29 Dec 1910  Miners Unions (Whitehaven News)
29 Dec 1910  Pit Explosions (Whitehaven News)
14 Feb 1911  Award of Edward Medals (London Gazette)
16 Feb 1911  Disasters In Coal Mines, Home Secretary And Legislation (Whitehaven News)
16 Feb 1911  Edward Medals For More Whitehaven Miners (Whitehaven News)
16 Feb 1911  Safety Lamps And Coal Dust (Whitehaven News)
17 Feb 1911  The Whitehaven Pit Disaster, Home Office Criticism (The Times)
23 Feb 1911  The Whitehaven Disaster (Whitehaven News)
23 Feb 1911  Whitehaven Pit Fire, Home Office Reports, Dust And The Spread Of The Explosion (Whitehaven News)
03 Mar 1911  The Whitehaven Disaster, Report Of Miners Representatives (The Times)
23 Mar 1911  Wellington Pit Disaster, Mayor's Relief Fund (Whitehaven News)
23 Mar 1911  Exits And Standard Ventilation (Whitehaven News)
23 Mar 1911  Safety In The Mines (Whitehaven News)
23 Mar 1911  The Whitehaven Colliery Disaster, The Inspection Of Mines (Whitehaven News)
13 Apr 1911  The Prospects Of Wellington Pit (Whitehaven News)
18 May 1911  Whitehaven County Court, Colliery Compensation Dependants (Whitehaven News)
18 May 1911  Whitehaven Colliery (Whitehaven News)
06 Jul 1911  The Local Miners' Union And Distress Funds (Whitehaven News)
11 Mar 1933  Pit Disaster Recalled, Death Of Man Who Was Decorated By King (Cumberland Evening News)

Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Wellington Pit
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page
Report Page  Text of the official report into the incident
Memorial Page  Memorial images gallery

 

 

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