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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

23rd July 1908

Whitehaven Colliery Explosion

Mine Inspector's Report

Mr. J. B. Atkinson, Government Inspector of Mines for this district, has just issued his report in the form of a Blue Book, concerning the explosion of fire damp and air which occurred on November 26th last year in the Whitehaven Colliery Company's William Pit, by which five men were killed and seven injured. The Inspector states that the explosion occurred about 1.50 p.m. in a stone drift known as No. 6, or Taffy's Drift, which was being driven from intake airway and endless rope haulage road leading to the Lowca and Countess districts of the undersea workings in the main band or seam of the William Pit. At the inquest the verdict of the jury was as follows :— "The jury are of the opinion that the five men lost their lives in No. 6 Drift, William Pit, by an explosion of gas, but how it occurred there is not sufficient evidence to show. But they are also of opinion that there was not sufficient ventilation. 623 persons were employed underground in the pit.

Evidence was given at the inquest that when the hand fan was working the ventilation was satisfactory, but that during the fan man's absence on Sundays, from about four a.m. to ten p.m., gas accumulated next the face of the drift, and it was usual before restarting work, or even attempting to reach the face of the drift, to work the fan for an hour or so. The same conditions prevailed on one occasion when the fan broke down and had to be sent to the surface for repairs. Evidence was also given that even when the face was clear of gas it was not unusual to find it next the roof at a considerable distance back, and this condition, Mr. Atkinson observed after the explosion and when the pipes had been renewed. Previously a small hand fan had been in use, and evidence was given at the inquest prior to the installation of the larger hand fan men had been affected by the fumes from the explosive used, and in some cases had to be helped from the face. But it was stated the explosive then in use was geloxito, the fumes from which are more noxious than from saxonite. When there had been a cessation of work in the drift for several hours and no fan in attendance it appears to have been assumed by the deputies that gas would be present at the face, and they did not attempt to make the statutory examination until the fan had been worked for some minutes and the gas cleared away. One of them stated at the inquest that before working the fan on a Sunday night after the usual stop he found on examining the air issuing from the pipe that it was charged with firedamp.

The Inspector goes on to describe the effects of the explosion and the efforts made to rescue the men. The bodies of the persons who had been near the face were reached about 7.20 p.m. on the day following the explosion. They lay together behind an empty tub, which was derailed at the out-by end. Burns, the shot firer, lay between the tub and the right side of the road, his face was next the floor and was covered by his hands. Hanlon and Rowe were lying across the road against the inner end of the tub, and it was observed that Rowe's short trousers were round his ankles. These persons were severely burned, their hair was nearly all singed off, and strips of skin were hanging loose. Unfortunately no doctors saw the bodies, but from what Mr. Atkinson and others observed there was a pinkness suggestive of carbonic-oxide poisoning, and the face of Rowe had a singularly placid expression which is characteristic of such cases. The death of a canary in a situation were the lamp-flame was hardly affected, and the appearance of the bodies of the victims of the explosion who were next the face, pointed to the presence of carbonic-oxide in the after-damp. When an inflammable or explosive mixture of fire-damp, and air in which there is an excess of fire-damp, that is more than ten per cent. by the volume of the mixture, is ignited, it is stated that carbonic-oxide, as well as carbonic acid gas, is one of the resultant gases, and this condition (an excess of fire-damp) must apparently have prevailed over some portion of the drift. An extinguished safety lamp (No. 753) lay on its side near the bodies, and a locked circular shot box containing three cartridges of saxonite, was under Hanlon's body. Two yards nearer the face was the battery lying on its side with the cable uncoupled but with the detachable handle still on. An extinguished safety lamp (No. 829) lay on its side within a foot of the battery. The cable extended from the battery to the face and was permanently fixed to the balks supporting the roof. Eight yards from the empty tub was a loaded tub standing on the rails. On the end of the empty tub slight spots of what appeared to be coke were observed, and the general colouring for 100 yards back from the face was perceptibly blacker than further out.

Proceeding, the Inspector draws conclusions from the following circumstances: Although the jury did not so find, it was not disputed that the flame originating the explosion arose from the firing of the blown-out shot in the coal seam, and as already indicated, there may be some suspicion as to the nature of the stemming or whether it was stemmed at all. The cause of the explosion was undoubtedly firedamp, which must have been present in considerable quantity, and it is difficult to conceive how it had escaped the notice of persons in the drift. If fire-damp had issued in considerable volume from the face, either due to the boring of the holes or to the effects of the shots fired as was suggested by some of the witnesses at the inquest, it could hardly have escaped the notice of the men working there or of Burns, the shot-firer, and the evidence of Evans proved that face was clean after the sumping holes were fired. Again, if the gas issued from the face, it might have been expected that the explosion would have been more violent in the air-pipes down which it could be carried by the air current, and that some at least of the pipes would have been burst open rather than flattened. Had there been an explosion mixture both outside and inside the pipes it is possible that they might have been flattened, as the resistance of such pipes to internal disruption is much greater than to external flattening.

At the point where the drift caused the fault some difficulty had been experienced with the roof, and on one occasion a considerable fall of stone had taken place here for which, it was stated by the contractor at the inquest, from 60 to 100 tubs had been filled away and lofting put in, and that some time after another fall took place on the lofting; beyond the fault where the 17-inch coal seam formed the roof of the drift open fissures were observed in it, and Mr. Atkinson found gas lodging here after the explosion when none could be observed in the lamp flame at the face. The question of the fire-damp exuding through fissures possibly extending to the old workings in the main band above was considered, but it was stated at the inquest that the creep had probably closed those workings, that in any case there was direct access from them to the return airways, and that if fissures existed the flow would naturally be from the drift up them and then into the return airway rather than that gas should come down them into the drift. It was further stated that more blackdamp than firedamp had been observed in the vicinity of the old workings. The runaway tubs had not damaged the air pipes or other arrangements connected with the ventilation, and they had blocked the entrance to the drift, especially in conjunction with the falling barometer. The door at the bottom of the drift, as already stated, opened with the concussion of one of the shots, and according to one witness stood party open for from five to ten minutes. This would reduce the air coming down the tubes considerably if the fan was also standing, but not probably to any great amount if the fan was working.

The drift was being driven in virgin ground charged with fire-damp, and although a sudden fall in the barometer has more effect on the issue of gas from unventilated and abandoned workings or goaves from the solid strata, yet it has some effect in the latter case, and where the ventilation is feeble the effect is more pronounced. It was clear that when the fan was not being worked the ventilation was not sufficient to clear away the normal issue of gas, and when the fan was being worked, which would always be, to some extent, an intermittent operation, the margin was not sufficient to meet the issue of an extra quantity of gas which in the present case was largely due to the fall of the barometer, assisted by the effect of the runaway set of tubs, by the direct of the blown-out shots, and by the accompanying opening of the door.

It seems probable that from the combined effect of these causes a quantity of firedamp was present, in the drift, principally near the roof, and gradually moving forward was ignited by flame from the last shot and had not up to that time shown itself at the face, although it is only reasonable to assume that it must have been present over Burn's head when he turned on the current the last time at a distance of 50 yards from the face. Whether Burns knew (as it was proved he did know earlier in the shift) that gas lay next the roof near the battery must remain a mystery, but the suspicion must remain that he was aware of the presence of the gas and relied on the presumed safety of the permitted explosive. It is usual to ventilate stone drifts by a split of air which, after leaving the drifts, passes into the return airway, so the mode of ventilating in this case was unusual. The reason for its adoption was the fact that access to a return air-way was not available, as was the case with No. 5 drift, where pipes were used to convey fresh air to the face, which then passed up the drift and direct to the return air-way, and here it was stated that no difficulty had been experienced as regards gas, which, however, would be largely due to the fact that the drift dipped instead of rising to the face.

As already stated, the flame did not reach the engine plane, which contained coal dust (due to the carriage of the coal against the air current), in considerable quantity both on the floor and as fine dust on the upper surfaces of the road and on the timber and girders, the flanges of the latter affording a convenient place for its deposition. This dust was raised in dense clouds by the explosion, and, as already stated, caused much inconvenience to the persons exposed to it, and had the flame reached the haulage road the loss of life would have been very great, as probably the whole morning shift, amounting to 180 persons in-bye of the "friction-gear," would have lost their lives.

The following breaches of the Coal Mines Regulation Acts, 1887 and 1896 (adds the Inspector), appear to have been committed :— (1) Breach of general rule 1, section 40, of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, in respect that ventilation was not constantly produced in No. 6 drift so as to dilute and render harmless noxious gases: (2) breach of general rule 4, section 49, of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, in respect (a) that on some occasions the competent person (the deputy) did not inspect that part of the mine situated beyond the station at the entrance to No. 6 drift to make a true report as to its state before allowing workmen to pass such station: (b) that workmen were in the habit of passing such station before the competent person had made the prescribed examination. These breaches refer to the practice after the interval on Sunday: (3) breach of general rule 12 (d) section 49, of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, as amended by section 5 (3) of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1895, in respect that the provision that "only clay or other non-inflammable substances shall be used for stemming" was not observed as regards one of the holes; (4) breach of general rule 12 (g), section 49, of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, in respect that shots were fired in No. 6 drift while inflammable gas had been reported to be present in the ventilating district in which the shots were fired at the last four inspections under general rule 4, and such gas was not reported to be cleared away, and the explosive used was not of such a nature that it could not inflame gas.

The breach of the rule on the part of the deputy in allowing workmen to pass the station on the Sunday nights before they had made the statutory examination of the drift has some justification as regards the men required to assist in working the fan. It was not the fault of the deputy that gas was allowed to accumulate, and they took advantage of the only means of removing it by working the fan. Their wisest course would have been to have taken advantage of general rule 7 (withdrawal of workmen in cases of danger), which, although not strictly applicable to the case, as there were no men to withdraw yet prescribes a course that would have relieved them of any responsibility: they should have first examined the drift and made a true report as to its state, then allowed the persons necessary to work the fan to come past the station, and when the drift was clear of gas have reported again to that effect and allowed the remainder of the workmen to pass the station. In any case they were clearly not justified in allowing the body of the workmen to pass the station until the drift had been found by them to be in a safe condition.

Newspaper transcript kindly provided by
West Cumbria Mines Research.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Atkinson, John Boland    H.M. Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Burns, Alfred   26 Shot Firer  Deceased, Individual Page
Evans, Evan    Miner  
Fitzsimmons, William Vincent   22 Miner  Deceased, Individual Page
Hanlon, William   30 Miner  Deceased, Individual Page
Kennedy, Joseph   22 Miner  Deceased, Individual Page
Rowe, James   24 Miner  Deceased, Individual Page



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Whitehaven Colliery  Whitehaven Colliery
William Colliery  William Colliery



Related Articles

Pub.
Date
Article (Newspaper)
18 Nov 1907  The Colliery Explosion at Whitehaven (The Times)
18 Nov 1907  Latest News, The Whitehaven Colliery Explosion (The Times)
27 Nov 1907  Colliery Explosion at Whitehaven (The Times)
28 Nov 1907  The Colliery Explosion at Whitehaven (The Times)
28 Nov 1907  Gas Explosion In William Pit, Whitehaven, Five Men Killed And Seven Injured (Whitehaven News)
28 Nov 1907  The Whitehaven Colliery Explosion, Latest News (The Times)
28 Nov 1907  Colliery Disaster At Whitehaven, Explosion In William Pit, Five Men Killed And Seven Injured (Cumberland Pacquet)
05 Dec 1907  The Gas Explosion At William Pit, Whitehaven, The Inquest (Whitehaven News)
09 Jan 1908  The Explosion At William Pit, Whitehaven, The Resumed Inquiry (Whitehaven News)
23 Jul 1908  Whitehaven Colliery Explosion, Mine Inspector's Report (Whitehaven News)

Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Whitehaven, William Pit
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page
Report Page  Text of the official report into the incident

 

 

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