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8th May 1906 Law ReportHouse of Lords(Before the Lord Chancellor, Lord MacNaghten, Lord Davey, Lord Robertson, and Lord Atkinson.) Butterknowle Colliery Company (Limited) v. Bishop Auckland Industrial Co-Operative Flour and Provision Society (Limited). This was an appeal from a judgement of the Court of Appeal (Lords Justices Vaughan Williams, Romer, and Cozens-Hardy), dated July 15, 1904, affirming a judgement of Mr. Justice Farwell's, dated February 1, 1904, and made in an action in which the respondents were plaintiffs and the appellants were defendants. The respondents are the owners of certain lands, about four acres in extent, and situate within the chapelry of Hamsterley, in the manor of Wolsingham and county of Durham, and of certain houses and other buildings standing thereon. The appellants worked certain mines of coal subjacent and adjacent to the respondents' lands ; and in or about the month of February, 1902, the respondents' lands subsided, and the buildings thereon were damaged in consequence of such workings. The respondents inter alia claimed — (1) A declaration that the appellants were not entitled as against the respondents to work their mines so as to lower or depress the surface of the respondents' lands, or so as to injure any of the respondents buildings standing thereon ; (2) and injunction to restrain the appellants from working their mines so as to lower or depress the surface of the respondents' lands, or so as to injure any of the respondents' buildings ; (3) damages by way of compensation for the subsidence and the injury caused to the respondents' buildings. The appellants justified their acts (inter alia) under the provisions of an Act of 31st George II., entitled, "An Act for enclosing and dividing the moors and commons within the chapelry of Hamsterley, in the manor of Wolsingham and county of Durham," and an award thereunder. The Act, after reciting that there was a large tract of waste land situate within the chapelry of Hamsterley, containing about 7,000 acres, and that the Bishop of Durham was lord of the manor of Wolsingham, it was enacted that the commons and waste grounds therein mentioned should be enclosed, allotted, and divided as therein mentioned, pursuant to an award to be made by the persons therein mentioned. And it was also enacted that immediately after finishing the allotment, and the execution of the award, all right of common in, over, and upon the commons or moors should be for ever extinguished. And it was further enacted "that the said Lord Bishop of Durham, his successors, and assigns shall and may from time to times and at all times hereafter have, hold, and enjoy all mines and quarries of what nature or kind soever lying and being in and under the said moors and commons so to be divided and enclosed as aforesaid (other than and except such quarries of stone as are hereinafter mentioned), together with all convenient and necessary ways and wayleaves, and liberty of laying and repairing wagon ways and others ways in, over, and along the same, or any part thereof, and of searching for, winning, and working the said mines and quarries, and leading and carrying away the coals, lead, minerals, stones, and other things to be gotten thereout, and making drifts, levels, watercourses, erecting and using fire engines, and other engines, pit-rooms, and other usual liberties as fully and freely as he or they might or could have had and enjoyed the same in case this Act had not been made, and that without making or paying any satisfaction for so doing." Then it was provided that "whereas great inconveniences may happen and damage be done to particular persons by reason of the searching for, winning, and working the mines and quarries within and under their respective allotments by the said Lord Bishop of Durham, his successors and assigns, without making or paying any satisfaction for so doing." A summary method of adjusting such questions should be provided by inquiry before a justice or justices of the peace, who were thereby "empowered and required to examine and inquire into such complaint or complaints in a summary way, either by examination of witnesses upon oath, or, being of the people called Quakers, upon their solemn affirmation (which said oath or affirmation the said justice or justices is and are hereby empowered to administer), or by such other evidence or proof, ways, and means as to him or them shall seem requisite and expedient in that behalf, and finally to assess, settle, and determine the damages sustained by such person or persons as aforesaid, which damages shall be paid and borne by the occupiers of the several other allotments lying and being in such and the same township in which the allotment or allotments in which such damages shall be committed, shall lie according to the respective yearly values or rents of such allotments in such proportions and shares as the said justices or justices shall direct or appoint." "Provided always, and it is hereby enacted, that it shall and may be lawful to and for the owners and proprietors of the shares and allotments for the time being at all times to win, work, get, and take stones in their several allotments, and also to get and take stones in the common quarries to be set forth as hereinafter mentioned, and also for the space of one year next after the execution of the said award in any other of the said allotments for necessary or convenient buildings and reparations, and for erecting of walls and fences in and upon the same. And be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that the said Commissioners and their successors, or any three or more of them shall and may, and they are hereby authorized and empowered to lay out, assign, or allot such part or parts of the said commons or moors hereby directed and appointed to be enclosed as they shall think fit and proper in the most convenient places for common quarries, for the purposes aforesaid, and also for common watering places for cattle." The award made under the said Act was dated April 13, 1760. The respondents lands were the lands, or part of the lands, allotted under the Act and award to Christopher Jackson. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England were the successors in title to the Lords Bishops of Durham and lords of the manor of Wolsingham, and as such entitled, subject to the Act and award, to every right and interest which the said Lords Bishops had, and to every right and title of the said Lords Bishops under the said Act and award, and the appellants worked the mines of coal subjacent and adjacent to the respondents' lands under a lease granted to them by the Commissioners. The appellants' workings under the respondents' lands and adjacent lands (which were also allotted under the Act and award) caused the damage to the respondents' lands complained of in the said action. It was not alleged by the respondents that the appellants' workings were in any sense whatever improper, except in the sense that they in fact damaged the respondents' property without any legal right. The Courts below held that the respondents were entitled to damages for the subsidence ; but the appellants contended that on the proper construction of the Act they were entitled to work the mines to the same extent as if the Act had not passed, and therefore to work them so as to let down the surface. The arguments were heard on March 5 and 6 last, when the House took time for consideration. The case is reported 20 The Times Law Reports, 675 ; L.F., 2 Ch., 419 ; 73 L.J., Ch., 635. Mr. Neville, K.C., Mr. Danckwerts, K.C., and Mr. MacSwinney were for the appellants ; Mr. Upjohn, K.C., Mr. Cave, K.C., and Mr. Schwann for the respondents. The Lord Chancellor. — My Lords, — In this case the plaintiffs claim that the defendants are not entitled, as against them, to work the defendants' mines so as to lower or depress the surface of certain lands in the parish of Hamsterley or so as to injure any of the plaintiffs buildings standing thereon, together with an injunction and damages. And the defence in substance is that the defendants are entitled so to work their mines under the terms of an Inclosure Act of 31st George II. The facts material to a decision may be summarized as follows :— Prior to the Inclosure Act, the Lords Bishops of Durham, who are the defendants' predecessors in title, were lords of the manor of Wolsingham. Certain commoners had rights of common of pasture over the commons, moors, or waste lands of the said manor, and, except for the pasturage rights, no persons other than the Lords Bishops of Durham had any rights in respect thereof. The mines and minerals belonged to the lords of the manor, who had full power to work them, subject only to the commoners' rights of pasturage. Accordingly the Lords were at liberty to work their mines so as to lower the surface, provided that they left sufficient pasturage to satisfy the rights of the commoners. Under these circumstances an Inclosure act was passed in the 31st year of George II, under which the commoners' rights of pasturage were extinguished and the common was divided into allotments, which were apportioned among the various commoners. The lands in question in this action are the lands or part of the lands allotted to Christopher Jackson in pursuance of the Inclosure Act, and Christopher Jackson was the predecessor in title to the plaintiffs. Under the same Act the rights of the lords of the manor to the mines and minerals were dealt with in two clauses upon the construction of which the determination of this case must depend. It is not in dispute that the mines have been worked so as to cause damage to the land by lowering or depressing the surface, nor is it disputed that the defendants' workings were quite proper and in the usual method of working, except in the sense that they in fact damaged the plaintiffs' property without, as is alleged, any legal right to do so. Before examining the clauses in this particular Inclosure Act it is necessary to consider the effect of previous decisions. Many authorities have been cited in argument. Two of them are upon this very Act and those clauses. In the first of these, "Blackett v. Bradley" (L.J., 31 Q.B., 65), the Court of Queen's Bench held that the surface was entitled to support. In the second case, "Gill v. Dickinson" (5 Q.B.D., 159), the Court held the contrary. We cannot derive clear guidance from the authorities. The numerous other decisions to which we have been referred are undoubtedly of value. I do not propose to travel through them. It will be sufficient to state propositions which they appear to have established. Whenever the minerals belong to one person and the surface to another, the law presumes that the surface owner has a right to support unless the language of the instrument regulating their rights or other evidence clearly shows the contrary. In order to exclude a right of support, the language used must unequivocally convey that intention, either by express words or by necessary implications. For the same presumption in favour of a right of support which regulates the rights of parties in the absence of an instrument defining them will apply also in construing the instrument when it is produced. If the introduction of a clause to the effect that the mines must be worked so as not to let down the surface would not create an inconsistency with the actual clauses of the instrument, then it means that the surface cannot be let down. Illustrations are numerous in the reports. Words, however wide, that merely authorize the getting of all the minerals have been held not to authorize so getting them as to let down the surface. Where power is given to get the minerals on paying compensation for damage done to the surface, the Court will still scrutinize the compensation clause. Are there any rights belonging to the mineowner on the surface (such as a right of making roads) to which the compensation clause may refer ? If the compensation clause is capable of being satisfied by reference to acts done on the surface, then, though it may be wide enough to cover also damage done to the surface by taking away the support, still it must be confined to damage done on the surface, and the inference that support may be taken away on payment of compensation will not be drawn. Again, Courts have asked whether the compensation is manifestly inadequate for such an injury as letting down the surface, and have commented upon the absence of any provision for compensation. Either of these circumstances has supplied Judges with a reason for so cutting down wide language in a grant of minerals as to imply a condition that the surface shall be supported. The process of reasoning in such cases seems to be that parties must not be supposed to have intended what would be unreasonable and unjust. I think that in each of them a clause providing for a continuance of support would not have been inconsistent with the actual clauses. The most extreme instance of the solicitude displayed by Courts of law for the maintenance of the right of support is to be found in the case of "Love v. Bell," decided in the House of Lords in 1884. In that case the waste of a manor was enclosed under an Inclosure Act. All rights of common were extinguished and the commoners received allotments in exchange. Before the Act was passed the lords of the manor owned the minerals and were entitled to work them so as to let down the surface, provided they left enough of the surface undisturbed to satisfy the commoners' rights of pasturage. Under that Act the minerals and other royalties were reserved to the lords, "in as full, ample, and beneficial manner to all intents and purposes as they could or might have held and enjoyed the same in case this Act had not been made," provided that if they should work the mines under any allotment, or use ways, &c., over any allotment, they should make "satisfaction for the damages and spoil of ground occasioned thereby to the person or persons in possession of such ground at the time or times of such damage or spoil," not exceeding £5 yearly for every acre so damaged or spoiled. In the face of these facts and enactments, the House of Lords held that the lords were bound to support the surface. Lord Selbourne explained that the clause enabling the lords to work their mines as fully as if the Act had not been passed did not mean they could disturb the surfaces as they had been able to do when the land was common waste. Just as the maxim Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas required them to leave sufficient pasturage when the commoners' rights were to have pasturage, so it now required them to leave support when the commoners' rights had been commuted for allotments. He also held that when the Act provided compensation for damage it meant compensation for damage by working the mines with only the usual powers — that is, without letting down the surface. Both these conclusions were essential to the decision at which the House of Lords unanimously arrived in "Love v. Bell," and it seems to me are binding upon us. I now come to the clauses of the Inclosure Act with which we have to deal in the present appeal ; and I am of opinion that the respondents are entitled to support because the language of the Act admits of an interpretation which preserves that right. I find a clause authorizing the lords to do a number of things such as work the mines and quarries, use the surface for wagon ways or other ways, making drifts, levels, and water-ways "as fully and freely as he or they might or could have had and enjoyed the same in case this Act had not been made, and that without making or paying any satisfaction for so doing." Mr. Neville pressed us to give full effect to these words. He said if the Act had not been passed the lord had the right to let down the surface provided he left sufficient unbroken land to satisfy the old commoners' right of pasturage. That is so ; and I might be entitled to assent to Mr. Neville‘s argument if I were not bound by the authority of "Love v. Bell." The construction placed upon particular words in one instance does not necessarily prejudice their construction when in a different setting. But the principle laid down by Lord Selborne in that case lay at the root of the judgement ; and it amounted to this, that when the nature of the commoners' interests is changed by an Inclosure Act, such as this, his right to support changes also (unless otherwise provided), so that the owner of minerals must work them in a way not to damage the extended interest which the commoner has acquired under the Act. If that principle was applicable in the case of "Love v. Bell," I cannot see how it is to be excluded in the present case. Mr. Neville next pointed to the last words in the clause — viz., "and that without making or paying any satisfaction for so doing." Now, what does "so doing" mean ? It means, in my opinion, doing any of the things which the clause authorizes to be done. One off them is winning and working the said mines. But there are also other things authorized in the same clause. Some of them are things in connexion with working the mine which must be done upon the surface, such as making wagon roads, and the provision that the mineowner shall not make any satisfaction is capable of being applied to damage which the working may thus cause to the surface without letting it down at all. The meaning may be, and I ought, therefore, so to read it, that the lord is not to pay for any damage done to the surface by exercising his right of winning and working — that is to say, his right of winning and working so as to leave the proper support. It does not excuse him from paying the damage if he so wins and works as not to leave support. It is quite true, as urged by Mr. Neville, that the clause I have already criticized ought to be read with the following clause, which prescribes that other persons are to make the satisfaction which the lord is exempted from making. To my mind, the latter clause strongly favours the construction which I put on the former. It requires the occupier of adjoining allotments to make good the damage done to any allotment by the exercise of the lord's rights, including the right of winning and working coal, and authorizes a distress on their goods and chattels in the event of failure to pay. This is an absurd enactment if it applies to such damage as that which might be caused by subsidence. Why should occupiers with a temporary tenancy pay for permanent injury ? What must have been the kind of compensation contemplated by the authors of the Act when they prescribed a distress on the goods and chattels of an allotment occupier as an appropriate means of levying the amount ? On the other hand, such a provision might be suitable enough in a case of trifling damage, or even in case of quarries being opened, which, though they ruin the surface, do not extend over a great space. I do not dwell upon this subject, because Mr. Justice Farwell has exposed in his judgement the ludicrous consequences which would flow from the construction urged upon us by the appellants. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that the judgement of Mr. Justice Farwell, as of the Court of Appeal, is right, and ought to be affirmed. Lord MacNaghten. — My Lords, I agree with the judgement that has just been delivered by my noble and learned friend on the woolsack. Your Lordships have heard a most able and exhaustive argument, in the course of which, if I am not mistaken, every known case bearing on the relative and respective rights of surface owners and the owners of the minerals beneath the surface was cited and discussed. But, after all, it must, I think, be taken that the law has been ascertained and settled beyond question by the more recent decisions in this House, of which it is only necessary to mention "Davis v. Treharne" (1881, 6 App. Cas., 460) ; "Dixon v. White" (1883, 8 App. Cas., 855) ; "Love v. Bell" (1884, 9 App. Cas., 286) ; and "The New Shariston Collieries (Limited) v. the Earl of Westmorland" (1900, reported [1904], 2 Ch., 443). The result seems to be that in all cases where there has been a severance in title and the upper and the lower strata are in different hands, the surface owner is entitled of common right to support for his property in its natural position and in its natural condition without interference or disturbance by or in consequence of mining operations, unless such interference or disturbance is authorized by the instrument of severance either in express terms or by necessary implication. This presumption in favour of one of the ordinary and most necessary rights of property holds good whether the instrument of severance is a lease or a deed of grant and reservation or an Inclosure Act or award. To exclude the presumption it is not enough that mining rights have been reserved or granted in the largest terms imaginable or that powers and privileges usually found in mining grants are conferred without stint or reserve, or that compensation is provided in measure adequate, or more than adequate, to cover any damage likely to be occasioned by the exercise of those powers and privileges. Nor is it enough, in the case of a lease, that the lessee is bound to work out the minerals or to work the minerals in a prescribed manner, or in the case of an Inclosure Act or award that the lord, in whose favour the mines are reserved or regranted, may be authorized to work the minerals and enjoy the property as fully and freely as if the Inclosure Act had not been passed. The difficulty of applying such an hypothesis to the altered condition of things brought about by an Inclosure Act has, as it seems to me, led this House to treat the provision in which it is found, and of which it would seem at first sight to be the keynote, as a dead letter for any practical purpose. Although provision for compensation is not of itself sufficient to show that the mineowner, working in the usual and proper manner, is at liberty to let down the surface, the absence of any provision for compensation is some indication that the ordinary rights of the surface owner were intended to be left untouched. On the other hand, the presence of a provision for compensation which is obviously inadequate or plainly inappropriate if applied to damage by subsidence is cogent evidence to prove that subsidence was not contemplated. The only case in this House which is not altogether in harmony with recent decisions is "The Duke of Buccleuch v. Wakefield" ([1870] L.R., 4 H.L., 377). Whether all the refined and somewhat subtle distinctions which the noble and learned Lords who decide "Love v. Bell" were able to discover between the Duke of Buccleuch‘s case and the case before them are, or are not, wholly satisfactory, the way in which the Duke of Buccleuch's case was treated shows that it must be regarded as standing by itself, and outside the line of authorities embodying and illustrating the law. Such being, in my opinion, the state of the law at the present day, I do not propose to trouble your Lordships by any reference to cases in the Courts below preceding "Davis v. Treharne." They are certainly not all consistent with the law as now established. They have all been considered in this House. Each has had its due weight in contributing to the result. And it seems to me that a minute and more careful study of cases where the language of the instrument to be construed is not quite the same, or where, if the language is the same, the decision is not binding on this House, is more likely to prove an embarrassment than any help to a right conclusion. I may, however, observe in passing that in my opinion the case of "Consett Waterworks Company v. Ritson," which was cited in the Courts below and in this House from the shorthand notes, can no longer be regarded as an authority. In the present case the provision for compensation in the Act 31 Geo. II., c. 31, is absurdly inappropriate if applied to injury or damage occasioned by letting down the surface. And there is nothing, as it seems to me, in the other provisions of the Act, construed by the light of the recent decisions of this House, tending to show that injury by subsidence was in the contemplation of the parties concerned in the arrangement intended to be affected by the Act, or within the scope of the enactment. I think the appeal fails, and ought to be dismissed with costs. Lord Davey (whose judgement was read by Lord Macnaghten). — The general principles upon which questions of this kind are to be decided may be considered as settled. It cannot now be disputed that where the surface is in one owner and the minerals in another the latter cannot work the minerals so as to destroy the surface. The rule has been clearly enunciated in this House so recently as 1900 in the case of "The New Shariston Collieries Co. v. Lord Westmorland" ; but I do not know that it is better stated anywhere than in a case which is not often cited, of "Roberts v. Haines" (6 E. and B., 643, and 7 E. and B., 625). If there is no provision for giving compensation for the injury done to the surface it is almost conclusive that the Common Law rule was intended to apply. But it is not so clear that if there be a provision giving such compensation it is sufficient to exclude the Common Law rule. I see from the judgement of Lord Justice Vaughan Williams in the present case that I am supposed to have laid down new law on this point in the New Shariston case. It was not my intention to do so, and I do not think that what I said bears that interpretation. I did not intend to say more than I understand to have been said by Lord Blackburn in "Davis v. Treharne" (6 App. Cas., 460, at p. 467). If the words mean that the owner of the coal may take away the whole coal regardless of the consequences on making compensation for the injury done, the law will give effect to such a bargain or enactment ; but, as Lord Blackburn says, a clause saying that the coalowner shall make compensation for damage done to the surface does not itself afford a strong argument for saying that he may destroy the surface, as there may be other injury to the surface in connexion with the working of the coal to which the compensation will be applicable. On the point now before your Lordships the cases run very fine, and the question for our decision must ultimately depend on the proper construction of the words of the statute. No doubt there is some difficulty in reconciling Lord Hatherley's decision in "The Duke of Buccleuch v. Wakefield" (L.R., 4 H.L., 867) and "Bell v. Love" (9 App. Cas., 289), but the words in the Acts in question in the two cases are not the same, and Lord Selborne in the latter case was able to distinguish them. I am prepared with your Lordships to follow the reasoning of Lord Selborne, and I think we ought to give judgement for the respondent. Lord Robertson and Lord Atkinson concurred.
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