18th January 1883
Ponsonby V. Hartley
An Egremont Law Suit
In the Chancery Division, on Monday (before Mr. Justice Pearson), the case of Ponsonby v. Hartley came up. This was a summons taken out by the plaintiffs in the action asking for the production by the defendants of certain documents, including plans of
the Howbank estate at Egremont, in the county of Cumberland. — Mr. Robinson, Q.C., with whom was Mr. Bruce, appeared in support of the summons, and Mr. William Pearson, Q.C., and Mr. Phipson Beale appeared in opposition. — Mr. Robinson, in
making the application, stated that the defendants objected to produce the documents asked for on the ground that this was an action for the recovery of land in their possession, and that the documents in question related solely to the defence of their
title, and not to others in dispute in the action. he nature of the claim was this: The plaintiff, Miles Ponsonby, was the Lord of the Manor of Egremont, in the county of Cumberland, and that manor comprised certain lands called generally by the name of
Howbank, being the piece of land in dispute. Howbank contained 35 acres of land, and was surrounded by lands that were formally wastelands of the barony, but in 1779 they had been enclosed under the authority of an Act of Parliament. In the year 1779
the Howbank lands were divided into four distinct tenements, and were then held by Mrs. Catherine Grayson and Mr. Isaac Scott respectively. By indenture of 22nd January, 1779, and the 10th day of March, in the same year, Mrs. Grayson and Mr. Scott
became the possessors of the land known as Howbank, but the Lord of the Manor reserved to himself, his heirs, and assigns the right of getting and working the mines and minerals of the said lands. Recently the plaintiff let the mines and minerals under
the lands in question to the two plaintiffs David and John Stirling Ainsworth, for a term of three years, afterwards to be extended to twenty-one years. The plaintiffs, as tenants of the ore, took steps to work the mines by causing a borehole to be
made, when they were interfered with by the defendants, and prevented from doing so. The defendants were those who had become vested in the title of the lands enfranchised to Mrs. Grayson and Mr. Scott, and they were co-partners carrying on business
under the style of the Gillfoot Iron-ore Company. What the plaintiffs wished to make out was that they were only exercising their rights obtained under the Lord of the Manor; that the defendants had no right to interfere, and therefore ought to be
restrained from doing so by the Court, and ordered to pay the costs. — Mr. Justice Pearson: What is really the question between you? — Mr. Robinson replied that it was whether Howbank of 1882 was the same Howbank as that of 1779, and the
defence was that the defendants were in the right, and were in possession of their own property. The book of plans, which the defendants refused to produce, was a book of plans of Howbank in the year 1796, which would clearly show the land that was
enfranchised to Mrs. Grayson and to Mr. Scott; and he contended that he was entitled to look at that book of plans, because it was relevant to the issue to be tried, and the rule of the Court was that all relevant documents must be produced unless the
defendant was protected from such production. The real question was one of boundary only, and, under all the circumstances, he submitted that plaintiff was entitled to what was asked for. — Mr. W. Pearson, on behalf of defendants, contended that
the summons ought to be dismissed on the ground that it was an action for recovery of land by virtue of a legal title, which was similar to an ejectment suit. — The learned counsel had not concluded when the court rose, the case being adjourned
until Tuesday.
(Specially Reported.)
The hearing of this summons was resumed on Tuesday, when
Mr. WILLIAM PEARSON, Q.C., on the part of the defendants, continued his argument to the Court, contending that the plaintiffs never had any interest whatever in either the surface or minerals beneath which was in possession of the defendants. The
plaintiffs sought by their action to get possession of that part of the property, which defendants swore they were rightly in possession of, and it seemed to him (the learned counsel) to bring the case within the class of cases, viz seeking to recover
possession of land by virtue of a legal title. That being so, he submitted that defendants were not bound to disclose anything to the plaintiffs for the purpose of proving their title. Further, the defendants stated that the documents sought for
related solely to their own title to land in their own possession, so for that reason he submitted that the plaintiffs were not entitled to succeed upon the summons. — Mr. Justice PEARSON: As I have heard the late Vice-chancellor Knight-Bruce say,
"On paper your defence is perfect." — Mr. W. PEARSON remarked that it would be a very serious thing if a person in possession were to produce all the documents relating to his land. — Mr. Justice PEARSON said that, supposing he were
to make an order for the production of the documents, he should limit it to as much of the deed as gave the names of the parties to the parcels of land, with liberty to the defendants to seal up all the rest. — Mr. W. PEARSON pointed out that the
names of the parties to the deed indicated the order of dealing with the estate, and a solicitor or counsel knew at once, as soon as the parcels were disclosed, what the devolution of title was. Consequently they would not require, except with regard to
covenants, anything more than the names of parties or parcels coupled together, to see where there was any flaw in the title. — Mr. Justice PEARSON: I do not see how any flaw can arise, as it is more than 100 years old. — Mr. WILLIAM PEARSON
said that was not the question; the defendants were in possession of the surface, and they averred they were also entitled to the minerals also. — Mr. Justice PEARSON: Do you assert you do not need derive title under the enfranchisement deed?
— Mr. W. PEARSON: We do not admit it. — Mr. Justice PEARSON: But do you deny it? I cannot see how you can, because it seems to me that from the insertion of the enfranchisement deeds in your schedule of documents that you do derive your
title from them. — Mr. W. PEARSON said they neither admitted nor denied it, and therefore put the plaintiffs to the proof. — Mr. Justice PEARSON: Assuming the plaintiff Miles Ponsonby is the legal successor of the Lord of the Manor of 1779,
do you assert that assuming the locus in quo was part of the land comprised in the enfranchisement deed, the plaintiff is not entitled to the minerals under it? — Mr. W. PEARSON said he could only answer that in one way, by stating that the
defendants had traversed the plaintiffs' statement; they had not asserted, nor did they deny, that if included in the enfranchisement deed, the plaintiff was entitled to the minerals. With regard to the question of the locus in quo they
maintained that the plaintiff had not or never had any interest in either the surface or the minerals, and that the documents related only to the defendants' title and did not in any way tend to support the title of the plaintiffs. — Mr. Justice
PEARSON pointed out that previous to the year 1779, according to the plaintiffs' statement, the title of the plaintiffs and the defendants was a common one, as there was no conveyance of the minerals in that year that the minerals were ownered from the
surface, and the title was common between them. The title would be the usual title of the Lord of the Manor, and the moment it became severed the tenant became a freeholder, therefore, up to 1779 there was one common title, which would appear on the
court roll. After 1779 all the conveyances would be separate and outside the Court altogether. — Mr. W. PEARSON submitted that the Lord of the Manor was only entitled to see the enfranchisement deed. — Mr. Justice PEARSON: Suppose the
parcels are accurately defined in the conveyance from A. to B. and not in the enfranchisement deed, what then? — Mr. W. PEARSON replied that the Lord of the Manor would not be entitled to a copy of the conveyance from A. to B. — Mr. JUSTICE
PEARSON: That is a strong proposition, and the arm of the law is very weak there. He knew a good deal about the court rolls and also this particular property, and he therefore knew that the acreage was as inaccurate as it could possibly be, in fact that
it was absolutely impossible at the present day to get any evidence as to what a Cumberland acre really was. Between a Cumberland and a statute acre there was often a difference of two-thirds, three-quarters, and half. Taking a case, suppose A. was
limited to one acre — which might mean a great deal more — and afterwards assigned half of that to B., but there was no other definition of the matter, though there was formerly an assignment from Z. to A. showing the boundary; what he wished
to know was, supposing a dispute rose between A. and B. was the Court to say that B. must not look at the assignment from Z. to A.? Mr. W. PEARSON thought his lordship was rather assuming in the first place there was some description in the deed
identifying the property in another way to that of the Court rolls. — Mr. JUSTICE PEARSON remarked that if that were not so the deed would be absolutely useless. He thought there was no doubt that the deeds contained some information that would
assist the plaintiff. Mr. W. PEARSON submitted that the plaintiff's title must depend entirely upon the title to the manor. There was nothing, which could lead his Lordship to a reasonable certainty that these title deeds or other documents would show
the plaintiffs' title with regard to the locus in quo. Under all the circumstances he submitted that the summons ought to be dismissed with costs. — Mr. ROBINSON having replied, and contended that the plaintiff was entitled to the
production of the documents, his LORDSHIP delivered judgement. He said the summons in this case was a very important one, being for the production by the defendants of certain plans, deeds, and documents, admitted to be in their possession by their
affidavit of documents. A hundred years ago or more one Miles Ponsonby was stated to have been lord of a manor in the county of Cumberland, the manor comprising, amongst other property, that called Howbank, and in 1779 a lady called Grayson was one of
the tenants of Howbank. In that year Miles Ponsonby enfranchised Howbank to Mrs. Grayson, reserving to himself the mines and minerals thereunder, with full right to work them. The present plaintiff Mr. Miles Ponsonby, considered that he succeeded to
all the rights of his predecessor, and he commenced, a short time since, to exercise his rights to get the mines and minerals under Howbank, upon which he was interrupted by Mr. Hartley on the ground that he had no right to the mines and minerals.
Thereupon Mr. Ponsonby instituted his action against Mr. Hartley, the purport of which was to obtain an injunction against Mr. Hartley to restrain him from interfering with the rights he alleged that he had. A statement of claim had been delivered in
the action, a statement of defence had been put in, and this was a summons to require the defendants to produce the documents mentioned in this affidavit of documents. The defendants agreed to produce certain documents, but they said, with respect to
the others, that they were documents, which supported their own title only and did not tend to support the title of the plaintiffs. It was argued further by counsel for the defendants that inasmuch as this was an action of ejectment for the recovery of
land, the defendants could not be required to produce any of their title deeds, and that the plaintiffs must recover by force of their own title and by their own evidence. He would deal with the last objection in the first place, because if that were
available it went to the root of the whole summons, and the summons would have to be dismissed. But was this an ordinary case of ejectment, and did the rule established by the court apply to the present case? Where A. brought an action to recover
blackacre against B., and A. claimed the fee simple the title of A. was adverse to and exclusive to B's title, and it being impossible that two titles to the fee simple can co-exist, the court had laid down a rule that in such a case A. bringing an
action of ejectment should not be entitled to enquire into B's title deeds. In such a case as that the rule was plain and clear, and he should abide by it, but where B. being in possession of the surface of blackacre, and A. claimed only the mines and
minerals lying under, it was plain that A's title was not adverse to or exclusive of B's title, and the two titles might co-exist, and be proved, to a great extent, by the same evidence. The present case fell under the illustration he had just given,
because the plaintiff admitted the defendants' title to the surface, but claimed the mines and minerals only; therefore he must hold that the rule respecting ejectment actions did not apply in this case. The other objection was that the defendants had
sworn, in the ordinary form, that the deeds which they had scheduled in the second part of their affidavit of documents were deeds that supported their own title, and did not tend to support the title of the plaintiffs; and it was contended that he (his
Lordship) was bound to rely upon that affidavit as being sufficient, and entitling defendants to refuse to produce the deeds asked for. The case he had here was this, that in the year 1779 there was a deed of enfranchisement under which certain
property, not accurately described by its boundaries, was enfranchised to Mrs. Grayson, and he came to the conclusion that the real dispute between the parties was parcel or no parcel, and therefore he had to consider whether the deeds in question might
or might not reasonably be held to throw light on plaintiffs' contention that the mines and minerals were reserved to the Lord of the Manor, the plaintiff's predecessor in title.
Looking at all the circumstances, he could come to no other conclusion but that the deeds would contain a definition of the parcels in question; therefore, he must order the deeds made previous to the year 1779 to be produced to the plaintiff, but at the
same time, in order to prevent doing anything that might be mischievous to Mr. Hartley, and of no benefit to the plaintiff, he would order the inspection to be confined to the names of the parties and the description of the parcels, including any maps or
plans that might be drawn upon the deeds. If the maps and plans were in a book with others those not relating to the matter to be sealed up. The costs would be costs in the action. An order was accordingly made for the delivery, by the defendants, of
those deeds and documents that were in existence prior to the year 1779.
Newspaper transcript kindly provided by
West Cumbria Mines Research.
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Names mentioned in this article
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| Name | Age | Occupation | Notes |
| Ainsworth, David | | | |
| Ainsworth, John Stirling | | | |
| Beale, Phipson | | | |
| Bruce, — | | | |
| Grayson, Catherine | | | |
| Hartley, — | | | |
| Pearson, — | | Justice | |
| Pearson, William | | Q.C. | |
| Ponsonby, Miles | | | |
| Robinson, — | | Q.C. | |
| Scott, Isaac | | | |