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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

16th December 1875

Important Local Mining Suit

In The Court Of Appeal, Lincoln's Inn

Dixon V Burnyeat

Wednesday, December 8

Counsel for the plaintiff:— Mr. Dickinson, Q.C., Mr. Millward, Q.C., and Mr. Whitworth, for defendants, Mr. Cotton, Q.C., Mr. Karslake, Q.C., Mr. W. F. Robinson, Q.C., and Mr. Frederick Thompson.

This was an appeal by the Salter and Eskett Park Mining Company (the real defendants in the case) against a decision of Vice-Chancellor Hall, and was argued by counsel on 7th, 8th, and 9th inst., before Lord Justice James, Lord Justice Mellish, and Mr. Justice Blackburn. After hearing counsel on both sides, their Lordships proceeded to deliver the following judgment on the construction of the agreement originally entered into by the parties to the suit:—

Lord Justice James: We will dispose of the question of the construction of the agreement first of all. I am not at all inclined to agree with the opinion, which the Vice-Chancellor has expressed in this case with respect to the construction of the clauses of the agreement, which we have got before us. The important words are that there is to be a covenant to this effect, "and also at the expiration or other sooner determination of the said term, to deliver up all the pits and shafts to be made and sunk in or upon the said lands in a good and serviceable condition, and in good repair, without filling up or otherwise injuring the same, or rendering them in anywise useless or unserviceable for working." Now the contention on the part of the plaintiff that that extends to every pit and to every shaft which may at any time have been made during the term, whatever may be the value of it, of the usefulness or uselessness of it, for any purpose whatever connected with the working of the ore. The contention on the other side is that the word "all" is to have a qualified, and, as they suggest, a more reasonable interpretation, having regard to what the nature of the property was, and the object of the parties to the agreement. Authorities have been cited to us to show that in documents of this kind between parties, the word "all" does not always mean all — it means all" putting a reasonable interpretation upon it. There are, I think, some words in the beginning of this agreement which will tend to show that you cannot follow literally every word used in a document of this kind, because there is, for instance, the original licence with which the thing begins enabling them to work, which is in these terms full liberty to carry away ore and so on, "and for that purpose to open pits and quarries, and erect engines and other conveniences, and to make level watercourses and drains, wagon ways, railways, and other ways, in or upon any part or parts of the said lands." Now, nobody would contend under that that a man would have a right to go into the parlour of a farmer's house and sink his pit or shaft there. Some such case as that was referred to in Shepherd v Touchstone. Now, the property in question, which was the subject matter of this agreement, consisted of hematite iron ore of a particular kind, namely, hematite iron ore, which exists not in stratified veins or strata, like the clay or iron ore found in Staffordshire or Wales, or like coal, but which exists in great thick masses called pockets, which fill up some fissures in the limestone rock, and the mode of working which we have had described to us which is to get as much ore as possible by sinking a shaft upon the pocket or near the pocket, which is the ultimate thing you do in the solid limestone rock, and thence by means of ordits obtaining the whole of such ore in the deposit. That is the ordinary mode of working. That being so, there being this amount of ore which was supposed to be there, nobody knowing exactly to what extent the ore existed, the lessor granted to the lessees a licence to take all the ore which in fact they could get under the land. The object of the lessor was to obtain as large a rent as possible from the ore, and the object of the lessee was to get as large a quantity of ore as he possibly could from the property. That being so, first of all, the licence is granted. Then there are all the usual powers necessary for working; and then that is followed by this clause, that the lessee not only pay to the landlord the rents and so on, but also shall pay to the tenants, for the time being, reasonable compensation, "and shall diligently prosecute their search for iron ore, and when found to work and carry on the mines in a workmanlike manner, so as to obtain the greatest quantity of ore which could be reasonably obtained." So as to obtain the greatest quantity of ore which could be reasonably obtained. Now, I construe the word "reasonably," as reasonably as regards the requisition upon the tenant. The landlord says that you shall get all that you can get, and all that you can reasonably get; of course, not at an unreasonable expense, or in an unworkmanlike manner as far as you are concerned; but you shall get all that you could be expected reasonably to get, in order to produce me that which I want — that is to say, the largest amount of royalty rent. You start with that, and demise the whole property, and a covenant to get all the lessee can get. That is followed by the clause in question, that is to say, a man says he is to deliver up all the pits and shafts in a good and serviceable condition, and in good repair, without filling up or otherwise injuring the same, or rendering them in anywise useless or unserviceable for working. I may observe, in passing, that Mr. Karslake said you could not read the word "all" there as absolutely all, because there was another clause by which the landlord might call upon you to fill up some, and you could not have two covenants, one to give up all of them, and another to give up some of them. I do not know that there is much in that point, but Mr. Karslake did draw our attention to it. Then there are these words "pits and shafts." They are to be the pits and shafts of which you can predicate that they are to be in a good and serviceable condition. They are to be things of which you can predicate that they are not useless or unserviceable for working. If a thing is absolutely useless, and unserviceable for working in itself, if the pit from its very nature is a pit which has exhausted everything which can be got out from it, it would be a very difficult thing to say that it ever was in a good and serviceable condition when it has been reduced to a mere hole in the ground, and useless for any practical purpose whatever. It is not reasonable to suppose the parties intended that a mere hole could be useful or serviceable. I am assuming for this purpose that it is shown to be a mere hole in the ground. Then, the contention on the part of the defendants is this — they say we are obliged to get out all — we are obliged to get all we reasonably can get — we are prevented from filling up or otherwise injuring the pit, or from rendering it useless or unserviceable for working; but in the course of working we have come to the walls of a shaft which we have sunk into the mass of ore itself, and which consist entirely, or in the part which we are now desirous of working, consist entirely of the iron ore. The shaft is supported by iron ore all round it, which supports the surface also to some extent; we are in this position that we are obliged to work the iron ore, or all we can reasonably get, there is some we can reasonably get in the ordinary and due course of working — we have got to it and should take it, but if the result of the ordinary course of working, and not by doing anything else than what would be done in the ordinary course of working, is that a pit or shaft collapsed? and if that is the natural result of the ordinary and workmanlike mode of working, then I really have not done anything which is filling up or otherwise injuring the same, or rendering them in anywise useless or unserviceable for working, and we have not done anything that can be fairly said to be that, because we have simply got the ore which we were obliged to get, and the getting of which was followed as a necessary result by the filling up of the shaft. That being so in the construction of the agreement, the ore was got, which it was the intention of both parties should be got, because I cannot accede to Mr. Dickinson's argument that there was anything here the parties contemplated should be left, that is to say, that the lessor was making a stipulation with a view to securing that there should be some ore left for him to get at the expiration of the lease. I am satisfied that that was not in the contemplation of the parties here, and never is in the contemplation of parties to such an agreement as this. In the one case you will have the ore all got which is for the benefit of the lessee, and which does give the lessor the benefit which he originally stipulated for in the shape of the rent and royalties, and which in that event has rendered the pit or shaft absolutely useless and a mere hole in the ground. Was it intended that the man should be obliged either to leave the ore ungot, or to leave that in a good condition when, according to the hypothesis I am assuming now, that the fact is made out it was absolutely useless and worthless for any purpose whatever to any human being. I am of opinion that that is not the meaning of the clause taken together, and that if it can be shown — which depends in a matter of fact — that the particular shaft in question was, in due course of working, about to collapse by reason of getting the ore in the ordinary and workmanlike manner, that is not a violation of this agreement, taking the whole of it together.

Lord Justice Mellish: I am of the same opinion. We are to construe this agreement, of course, as it would have been construed on the day when it was made. We are now to look, not at what the landlord would consider his interest a year before the 21 years' expire, but what he would consider his interest at the time when he was letting his mine for 21 years, and it is obvious that the main thing the landlord thinks of at that time is the largest quantity of mineral that may possibly be got, so as to give him the largest amount of royalty during the term, and, at the same time, it is usual to make provision so that the mines may be left in a workable and serviceable state at the end of his lease, in order that the landlord may then be able to let them again at the same or at an increased royalty either to the same or other tenants. Then, having that object in view, this clause is inserted, which is the first one we are to interpret, "To carry on the mines in a workmanlike manner, so as to obtain the greatest quantity of ore which could be reasonably obtained." In my opinion, that not only authorised but it obliged the tenant when, after sinking shafts in the pocket, he had got all the ore that could be got from the pocket, he was obliged by that agreement, and ought to be obliged by the covenant in the lease, then to sink outside shafts, in order that he might get the pillars. It so happened that this agreement having been made in the year 1856, no ore was discovered at all until the year 1866, so that the lessee instead of having 21 years had only 11 years during which to get the ore. Let me assume for one moment that the ore had been discovered immediately after the agreement was made, and that the lessee had been working in 1856 and that instead of being in the year 1875 this question had arisen in the year 1865, then what would have been the landlord's state? Assuming that the three shafts which are sunk in the pocket itself had all been worked out, and not half the pocket had been obtained, then the question would arise whether the lessee is to stop, and possibly he may get some mines on better terms elsewhere, and he minded to stop altogether and go away. Then the lessor would say for ten or eleven years I shall not have a farthing royalty, then the lessee would say, "It is true that half the mineral is still left in these mines, but I cannot get it without sinking new shafts outside, and if I sunk new shafts outside, and try to get out the pillars by them then I shall break down the old shafts, and that will be a breach of my covenant to keep up all the shafts, and you cannot oblige me to break up my own covenant to keep up all the shafts, and therefore, for the next ten or eleven years, you shall remain without any royalty at all." I do not think that could have been the state of things. I am of opinion that the landlord might say that is a perfectly plain breach of your agreement to obtain the greatest quantity of ore that can be obtained. According to the argument of Mr. Millward and Mr. Dickinson, it does not say the greatest quantity that could be obtained, but the greatest quantity that could be reasonably obtained, and it is not reasonable looking at your interest, that the shafts should not be all left, and that you should not get any royalty for the next ten or eleven years. I do not think that is reasonable at all. The word "reasonable," in my opinion, is a qualification upon what the tenant agrees to do. This is a part of the covenant with the tenant, and the tenant says, "I will work and get all the ore that can be got, but I must put a qualification on that, because that will put the burthen on me, and therefore it is a qualification of something which the lessee binds himself to do, and therefore he does not say I will absolutely get all the ore, but only ore that can be reasonably got." I am not to be bound to get the ore if I can only get it at a dead loss, and in a way that a lessee ought not to be bound to get it, but all that ore which can be reasonably got I will get. It appears to me quite clear that, if having done what all sides admit to be perfectly right in the first instance, having sunk a shaft in the pocket itself, and got all that can be got from that, he might then say, "If I am to get all the rest, there is only one way of getting it, namely, to sink a shaft outside and run levels into the pocket, which will take the pillars and necessarily destroy the existing shafts." That is the construction of the clause, in my opinion, as to working in a workmanlike manner, so as to get the greatest quantity of ore which could be reasonably obtained. Then the question is whether that is altered by the agreement about the shaft. Whatever that agreement may be literally taken to be, in my opinion, it would be sacrificing the substance and essence of the agreement to what is, comparatively speaking, a very minor point. It is obvious that these clauses respecting the leaving the shafts in repair, and not filling them up or otherwise injuring them, have for their object that the landlord may have serviceable shafts so as to work the minerals which happen to remain. It is not the object of them to preserve any mineral ungot during the lease. The object of the agreement is that the lessee may get the greatest quantity of ore he can get during the lease, and then leave it in a serviceable condition, so that the landlord may get what may remain. In my opinion it is no part of the object of the parties to prevent the lessees getting anything they reasonably can get. I think it must be confined by construction to those shafts which will be useful for the landlord in working the mines when the mines come back to him, and that it does not oblige him to keep up a shaft which has become useless, and still less to prevent him, for the purpose of keeping up the shaft, getting the minerals which it was the object of the agreement should be got. In my opinion this clause must be so worded as not to interfere with the previous clause about taking the greatest quantity of minerals which can be got by means of the working of the mine.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: I am of the same opinion. I take it that in constructing an agreement like this, we are to look to the words the parties have used, and see what those words mean, but not in the same way, or to put the same construction as we should put upon the same words if they were used in an Act of Parliament, but we are to apply the words to the subject matter before us, and see what was the intention of the parties which those words express when they are used in such a manner, and with reference to such a subject. Now, here in 1856, the parties must be taken to have understood and known thus much the hematite iron ore they were engaging to work, that it lay in pockets, that the usual and reasonable mode of working it was to drive a shaft into these pockets, and to take away from that all ore which they could take away by means of that shaft, but necessarily leaving a certain quantity of ore at the bottom where the shafts had been driven into the ore itself, which they could not remove from that shaft, for from the very nature of things if you remove that when you are working the shaft would fall down on the heads of the workmen and kill them. It could not be removed by means of the shaft, and when all the other ore was removed round the shaft, that shaft must be left supported by these pillars so far as it was concerned. Now, these pillars and supports are large and valuable, as it appears. I am taking all the facts that the parties must have known, which I think are almost agreed on between the parties here. Being large and valuable, to leave them there could not be reasonable, and accordingly I take it is agreed on all sides that the reasonable and workmanlike manner in which it is done, when they had got out all they can in a reasonable manner from the pocket itself, is to drive another shaft down outside the pocket, through the limestone rock, and from thence by means of ordits to remove these pillars, the necessary consequence of which is that the shaft falls down. That I take it both parties must have known was the ordinary course of working. Then they enter into an agreement by which the lessee stipulates for a royalty rent. He wishes naturally to have his royalty rent as large as possible; he was never thinking of any stipulation that should come in to say there should be mineral left for the sake of leaving minerals. His object was to get as much mineral out as possible, and to get as large a royalty rent as he could be got. He first begins by saying that they shall "diligently prosecute their search for iron ore, and when found to work and carry on the mines in a workmanlike manner, so as to obtain the greatest quantity of ore which could be reasonably obtained." I think it is clearly not disputable that if that had stood unqualified by anything that followed, it would show that they were not only entitled but bound, unless it was too expensive as compared with the result obtained, to drive a shaft down and remove the pillars, as soon as they had got through that shaft all the ore they could get through, except those parts which are necessary to keep the shaft standing as long as it was used. I think they would not only be entitled but bound to do that. But then comes the further proviso that at the end of the term they "shall deliver up all the pits and shafts to be made and sunk in or upon the said lands in a good and serviceable condition, and in good repair, without filling up or otherwise injuring the same or rendering them in anywise useless or unserviceable for working." If that means when you have driven a shaft in, and it stands upon the pillars, though everything is taken away for which that shaft can be used, you are still obliged to keep the pillars there, in order to hold the shaft up for no earthly object so far as the shaft goes, because the shaft is useless, but for a collateral purpose, that as prices have now risen, and can get a higher royalty than before for I suppose that is really at the bottom of the whole thing. I will insist that these pillars shall be left, that is putting a construction upon it which would produce a result which I am confident the parties at the time did not contemplate. It would not be a reasonable result. The main object is that all the ore is to be got, and that the royalty to be paid shall be as large as possible, and it is only a minute matter that the shaft is to stand when the shaft itself is no longer useful or serviceable, and then the clause means that they shall not be bound to deliver that up in repair. Mr. Dickinson has argued that that is inconsistent with what follows, that at the end of the term it is required that they should level and fill up all such of the pits and shafts as they may be so requested to fill up and level. I think it quite consistent. The first clause is that they shall deliver up the shafts which are still, notwithstanding the ore which has been worked out in workmanlike manner, useful and serviceable, you shall deliver up those in good repair, and you shall deliver up the whole of the premises demised, and those which are out of repair, or which the landlord thinks are not required to be kept in repair, you shall fill up for the purpose of making the surface level. That does not affect it. Taking that view of it, I apprehend that the covenants should be framed differently from what the Vice-Chancellor has done, so as to work out that intention, but how it is to be done will depend a good deal upon the questions of fact which probably we must hear tomorrow.

The Court then adjourned.

Thursday, December 9.

Mr. Dickinson: Your Lordships decided against me yesterday on the question of the construction of the agreement. It therefore remained for me to show whether the condition of things was not that which one of your Lordships described, namely, that there was a mere useless hole left. With a view to that, I have read the evidence this morning in the hope of saving your Lordships time as much as I possibly could. I am bound to inform your Lordships of the result of that reading, but there are one or two passages in the evidence which I will just call to your Lordships' attention. Upon reading the evidence, I am bound to admit that I cannot say there is proof of the existence in shaft No. 2 of iron ore outside that which we have hitherto been talking of as pillars.

Lord Justice James: No.

Mr. Dickinson: In candor, I am obliged to state that, as the matter stands now, there are only two things which I need call your Lordships' attention to. The defendants, by their answer in the original suit in paragraph 3, state that I took the liberty of saying without this authority yesterday, namely, that, "It is impossible for any one to tell from the surface of the land whether ore lies beneath it or not. It does not lie in strata like coal, and the only way to find it is to bore in various places where it is hoped a deposit or pocket may be, and if ore is found, then to sink an exploring shaft, the size of which depends upon the nature of the discovery and the difficulties which may have to be contended with." Then it goes to the question of exploring shafts, and so on, with which I need not trouble your Lordships. With that statement before him, Mr. Kendall makes an affidavit, which is in the first batch of the affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiff, and there is only one paragraph, I think, which has a direct bearing upon that point. In paragraph 5 of his affidavit, filed on the 25th of June, 1875, he says this, " It is impossible to speak with certainty as to the existence or non-existence of ore in the neighbourhood of shaft No. 2, which has not yet been discovered. The vein which has been discovered is still going down below the lowest point yet worked, or so far as I know, yet proved. There is no saying how much lower it may go, or whether it may not flat out from the vein on either the hanging or lying side of it. Should the existence of ore be proved, then No. 2 shaft, if kept in good condition and properly supported, would, without doubt, be the best shaft to work such ore from, as it would have been the best shaft to work the ore now, being worked by the company 59 above referred to." I shall not trouble your Lordships with the evidence about company 59, because you had it sufficiently before you yesterday, and I cannot carry the case any further. Then with regard to the evidence of Mr. Turner, who has made several affidavits, he was cross-examined, and your Lordships will find his deposition in the batch entitled, "Depositions, folios 310." At the bottom of page 29 he is asked this question, "Perpendicularly downwards can you answer for there being no more ore north, east, and west? — Answer: I think not. — Question repeated. — Answer: I cannot answer yes or no. There is ore left in No. 2 Pit. — Question: And in the Top Height? — Answer: I believe there is a pillar close to the shaft. That is all I can call to mind."

Mr. Cotton: He only refers to the pillar in No. 2.

Mr. Dickinson: Then turning over the page with reference to that point he is asked at line 24, "Will you undertake to say, as a fact, that there is not other ore there besides that pillar? — Answer: No." Therefore, the evidence, which directly bears upon the point, is this, that both parties agree in stating that it is impossible to state from the surface whether there is ore or not.

Lord Justice Mellish: You have not evidence, have you, that they had not taken all reasonable, and proper, and skilful means for the purpose of discovering, as far as they could discover, for, I suppose, it cannot be ascertained positively, whether there was any ore before they proceeded to work from Turner's pit?

Mr. Dickinson: No.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: All that Turner says is I have satisfied myself that it is so, but when you ask me to swear that there is not, I being but a fallible mortal, will not do that.

Mr. Dickinson: Well, my Lord, I should read anything more in my favour if I could find it.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: Of course you cannot make bricks without straw.

Lord Justice James: Nor without clay either.

Mr. Dickinson: The observation I have to make upon that is that there being the pillars there, and there being ore lying dispersedly about, and as Mr. Kendall says, the vein still going down below the lowest point yet worked, or, so far as he knows at all events. I submit on the part of the plaintiff that it would be wrong to have that shaft closed, when it is from that shaft that further ore will have to be proved and worked.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: If that were so I should agree with you but, I think, there is pretty satisfactory evidence that there is none.

Mr. Dickinson: Of course I cannot carry the case any further. Your Lordships in this case are jury as well as judge.

Lord Justice James: What we decided yesterday, whether right or wrong, was that the damage they occasioned by the getting and removing of ore in a workmanlike manner in the due course of working, was to be expected out of the covenant.

Mr. Dickinson: Then I part with that altogether, I cannot carry the facts of the case any further.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: Would it not save the parties from being induced to further litigation if Pit No.2 were expected from the covenant first, as No's. 4 and 6 have been?

Mr. Dickinson: Your Lordship means that the lease should be corrected now.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: Yes, in framing the lease.

Mr. Dickinson: Certainly, my Lord.

Mr. Cotton: It would not be quite in the same way. There would be a declaration that these have collapsed in the proper working of the mine.

Mr. Dickinson: Only one would like to see the clause, as corrected, before saying a word about it. But, in answer to your Lordship's question, I would say that if the thing can be done easily now and settled, I should not suggest that there should be a reference back to the Vice-Chancellor to settle the lease with your Lordship's declaration. With these observations, I will part with that part of the case. Then, my Lords, there is another part of the case, in which the defendants object to the form of the lease as settled by the Vice-Chancellor. There was a great deal of discussion and an amazing mass of evidence with reference to several objections. The great mass of evidence was with reference to what were the usual clauses in leases of iron ore in the neighbourhood.

Lord Justice Mellish: Is there any question remaining now except whether there should be a covenant to keep Turner's pit and No. 3 in repair.

Mr. Dickinson: That is really all that remains.

Lord Justice Mellish: Do they object to that covenant.

Mr. Dickinson: We had grievously apprehended danger to No. 3, but not to Turner's Pit; we, therefore, desire to retain the covenant as settled by the Vice-Chancellor, which is "keeping and leaving." We also desire to keep the proviso for re-entry in the form in which he has settled it.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: That is of practical importance with reference to No. 3 Pit, but it would refer to No. 3 Pit whether there should be a covenant to keep and maintain, as well as to render up.

Mr. Dickinson: Yes, it is possible; and, indeed, I do not know whether it is not probable that other shafts may yet be sunk.

Lord Justice James: That is hardly likely.

Mr. Dickinson: Well, perhaps it is not very likely. The lease has only one year and a half to run, and it is not likely they would incur that expense.

Lord Justice James: I think we are satisfied that the clause to keep and maintain in good repair must be implied in these words.

Mr. Dickinson: I am obliged to your Lordships.

Lord Justice James: A covenant to keep in repair the damage occasioned by the due working would apply to Turner's Shaft or to No. 3, I suppose. I mean the damage occasioned by merely removing the ore.

Mr. Dickinson: No.

Lord Justice Mellish: According to the large plan, which was handed up to us, there was a risk apparently that No. 3 Pit might be affected by taking away some part of the ore.

Mr. Dickinson: I can tell your Lordships how that was. No. 3 Pit, as we contended, was dragging to one side, and there was a report made by Mr. Armstrong, who pointed out to the defendants that there was danger to No. 3 shaft if certain parts were removed. On cross-examination, he said his impression was that there was no longer any danger to No. 3 Pit. It was not the view of the plaintiff's even after that cross-examination.

Lord Justice James: No. 3 shaft has never reached the ore perpendicularly. Has it?

Mr. Dickinson: No.

Lord Justice Mellish: I am not quite certain that if it was deepened it would not reach it.

Mr. Cotton: We say it would not.

Lord Justice Mellish: The plan does not quite show that.

Mr. Cotton: That is their plan, my lord.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: If it is doubtful whether No. 3 would not be injured by removing ore under it — if ore is under it — then in framing the covenant it ought to provide for such a possible, though not an ascertained, state of facts.

Lord Justice Mellish: I think we could hardly decide that beforehand. It would depend upon whether, under the circumstances, it would, according to good working or not. There appear to be large quantities of ore that can be better got from that pit than could be got from Turner's pit. If that was destroyed it would leave Turner's pit the only pit — possibly it may not be good working to let that down, although it is done by taking ore.

Lord Justice James: I think the words we have suggested would meet the case. You would have your covenant to keep the pits and shafts in repair and to deliver them up in good repair, damages occasioned by the getting and removing the ore in a workmanlike manner in the due courses of working excepted.

Mr. Cotton: That is not to be considered as a breach of the covenant.

Lord Justice James: It is like damage by fire being excepted, or an exception in payment of rates and taxes. The better way of doing it is to except it.

Mr. Dickinson: My Lords, it stood in this way with regard to the injunction as to No. 3. The Vice-Chancellor offered me my opinion of having any inquiry as to the present injury to No. 3

Mr. Cotton: He offered to send over an expert.

Mr. Dickinson: Yes. Upon its being agreed to or settled by the judge that there was to be the usual arbitration clause introduced into the deed, elected, on behalf of the plaintiff to rest satisfied with the possibility of recovering damages in respect at No. 3 instead of an injunction. The damages in the covenant would be as to keeping and leaving.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: To keep and leave with the qualification, which has been suggested.

Mr. Dickinson: Which, in fact, amounts to nothing more than reasonable wear and tear, the effects of proper working excepted.

Lord Justice James: Yes.

Mr. Dickinson: I shall not object to that my lord. Then I was about to mention particularly, upon the question of the proviso for re-entry, that the judge directed there should be evidence gone into. A very great mass of evidence gone into upon the subject of the leases which have existed in the neighbourhood. A great number of leases of a different neighbourhood and of different dates were brought forward by the defendants, and were rejected by the Vice-Chancellor. As to those, which were brought forward on the part of the plaintiff, everyone contained the proviso for re-entry on breach of any or either of the covenants or provisions contained in the lease. Every one contained provisions with respect to the shafts; but the provisions did not always agree. In some there was a covenant to fill up the shafts absolutely. In others there was a covenant to fill up, if required by the lessor; and I think in three of them there was a covenant to keep and leave in repair. That is the condition of the leases. I have the copies of the leases here, but I have carefully gone through them myself again this morning, and I am sure I am correctly describing the result. Then, upon that and upon the construction of the argument, and upon the Vice-Chancellor's expression of his own judicial knowledge of what has been the common practice in introducing clauses into leases, he said that his experience was that the keeping and leaving should co-exist. And that the proviso for re-entry, except under specific contract to the contractor, should extend to each or any of the clauses. Now, my Lords, I do not know that there is any other question upon which I have to address the Court, except the question of costs. The original bill of the plaintiff was a bill, the character of which has been fully explained to your Lordships over and over again, and your Lordships know it well. The answer which was put in to that bill raised two issues. The first issue was that upon which the greatest amount of evidence almost has been gone into.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: Which was the first issue?

Mr. Dickinson: It was this my Lord, not as my friend, Mr. Cotton, has argued it now, that a shaft which had been used for a long time, and in order to support which pillars of ore should be left, which pillars of ore could be more beneficially got from another shaft outside, but the case raised by the answer was that these particular shafts which the plaintiff sought to protect were not permanent shafts at all, and never were intended to be permanent shafts, but were there as temporary or exploring shafts. That took the plaintiff and his witnesses by surprise, because they had never heard in their neighbourhood of temporary or exploring shafts. It was a term which they knew as being used in another district where the ore was lying nearer to the surface, and there a shaft was sunk for the purpose. In this district where the ore lies deep no exploring shafts were sunk, but the existence of the ore was tested by boring, which is making a hole of only about 2 inches in diameter. There was a great amount of evidence with regard to that, and very heavy costs incurred in respect of it. The second issue raised in the original suit, and upon which a great mass of evidence was gone into was this: — That the agreement did not express the intention of the parties. When they had got to a considerable extent in the suit they filed a cross bill, which is not now before your Lordships, which was dismissed with costs. Independently of that a great part of the costs of the original suit were caused by that issue being raised, and evidence was gone into upon the subject.

Mr. Cotton: I do not think that that is the case upon the affidavits.

Mr. Dickinson: The result of it is this: that what the Vice-Chancellor did was to dismiss the cross bill with costs. He gave us the costs, except so far as the costs had been increased by our contention with respect to No. 3 pit; that is how it was raised.

Lord Justice Mellish: Then were you to pay those costs?

Mr. Robinson: Yes, they were to pay them; one was to be set off against the other.

Mr. Dickinson: Yes, my Lord; we were to pay the costs as far as they were incurred by our contention as to No. 3, and we were to have the costs of the rest of the suit.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: The Vice-Chancellor, in effect, said that the victor was to have the costs, one was victor as to part and one was victor as to the rest, and each was to have the costs of that part in which he was victorious.

Mr. Dickinson: That is it my Lord. Whatever the result of it, the order of the Vice-Chancellor as to costs I submit should not be disturbed. Certainly I would venture to say, after what has occurred, that the costs of the separate appeal now before your Lordships.

Lord Justice James: This appeal is under the old practice.

Lord Justice Mellish: The first appeal is, but the additional appeal is under the new. I suppose there was no additional costs occasioned by that.

Mr. Cotton: No, my Lord, only a piece of paper containing the notice of motion. I think I can explain about the first and second issues if your Lordships desire me to do so.

Lord Justice James: I do not know Mr. Cotton, whether you have anything to say against this. You having succeeded substantially in the suit will be entitled to the costs of the suit — reversing the position of the parties here — except costs of, and occasioned by the contest as to the usual clause of re-entry, and the usual covenants stipulated and agreements, and as to the costs of the contest, that the contract did not express the real argument between the parties, and that you should pay those costs to the other side, they being set off against your costs.

Mr. Cotton: I should like to say one word upon that matter. As far as I know, the only evidence on the question as to the reformation of the agreement was the evidence of Mr. Holder, who proposed the lease, which was a matter in the cross suit, of which we had to pay the costs.

Lord Justice James: Then you will not have to pay for it now. Was that affidavit flied in both suits?

Mr. Robinson: There was an order to read it in both suits.

Mr. Cotton: As regards the evidence, besides that of Mr. Helder, on that point it was simply this: We contended that the reference in the case was (and your Lordships have so held), to leaving pits, which in the ordinary and proper course of working would not collapse. We had evidence to show that that was the ordinary course of working at that time, and that is what was acted upon by the parties, because as to 4 and 6 the Vice-Chancellor was in our favour.

Lord Justice James: I say we give you all the costs, except the excepted parts.

Mr. Cotton: Except the costs of the evidence to show that the intention of the parties was not that which the agreement expressed. That was in the other suit, and they got the costs of that.

Mr. Whitworth: I think Mr. Helder's affidavit was taken in Dixon v Burnyeat.

Mr. Justice Blackburn: I do not know what the practice in Chancery is, but at Law it would be this, that when a witness has been called in both suits, you do not get paid double. There may be some little additional costs in consequence of it being used in the second suit, which might be properly allowed but that would be a matter for the taxing master to determine.

Mr. Cotton: Yes, I should think so. We have been ordered to pay the costs as to that part of the case which refers to the rectification of the agreement.

Mr. Dickinson: You had to pay the costs of the cross suit.

Mr. Cotton: Then I might say one word, my Lord, as to the evidence with regard to usual clauses. I should venture to submit that we ought not to be bound to pay all those costs. There have been a great mass of questions besides what your Lordships have had to answer in evidence, as regards the leases which were gone into. We never objected to a great many of the matters which was introduced.

Lord Justice James: This was the substance.

Mr. Cotton: As to assigning without license.

Mr. Dickinson: You objected to that.

Mr. Cotton: Yes, if you contended that we had forfeited by letting the company work, as was done.

Lord Justice James: There will be a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to a covenant to keep in repair, and that the covenant as to keeping and delivering up in repair is to be with this addition; "Damage occasioned by the getting and removing of ore in a workmanlike manner in the due prosecution of the work excepted." Then the injunction of course will go. The plaintiff must be ordered to pay to the defendants the cost of the suit, except the costs of and occasioned by the contest as to the usual clause of re-entry, and as to the usual covenants, stipulations, and agreements, and as to the contest that the written contract did not express the real intention of the parties, which costs must be paid by the defendants to the plaintiff, to be set off the one against the other, and according to your account they ought to be not very heavy, Mr. Cotton?

Mr. Cotton: Of course there will be no costs of the appeal.

Lord Justice James: No.

Mr. Cotton: And the deposit will be returned.

Lord Justice James: Yes.

Mr. Cotton: I do not think there will be any difficulty now in settling the order.

Lord Justice James: No, you can settle it yourselves.

Mr. Dickinson: Mr. Whitworth and Mr. Thompson will meet together and settle it.

Mr. Cotton: I understood that both the covenant to give up at the end of the term and to keep in repair are to except any damage caused by pits.

Lord Justice James: The words will be these: Damage occasioned by the getting and removing of ore in a workmanlike manner, in the due prosecution of the working excepted.

Mr. Dickinson: I understand it, my Lord.

Mr. Robinson: Then shaft No. 2 will be excepted altogether.

Lord Justice James: We do not except that; there is nothing done about that.

Mr. Cotton: Only it was suggested by one of your Lordships that it would be better, now that the evidence is before us, in order to prevent future litigation, to declare that No. 2 had collapsed in the due prosecution of the working.

Lord Justice James: I do not know about that; they do not agree to that.

Mr. Cotton: I should be quite willing to meet them here or elsewhere upon that point.

Lord Justice James: I do not think there will be any further litigation upon that subject, not of course excepting the House of Lords.

Newspaper transcript kindly provided by
West Cumbria Mines Research.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Blackburn, —    Justice  
Burnyeat, —      
Cotton, —    Q.C.  
Dickinson, —    Q.C.  
Dixon, —      
Hall, Charles, Sir    Vice-Chancellor  
Helder, —      
James, —    Lord Justice  
Karslake, —    Q.C.  
Kendall, —      
Mellish, —    Lord Justice  
Millward, —    Q.C.  
Robinson, W. F.    Q.C.  
Shepherd, —      
Thompson, Frederick    Solicitor  
Touchstone, —      
Turner, —      
Whitworth, —    Solicitor  



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Eskett (Iron Ore)  Eskett (Iron Ore)


 

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