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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

2nd December 1875

The Flooding Of An Iron Ore Mine

The following is a full report of the elaborate judgment delivered by Barons Cleasby, Pollock, and Amphlett, in the High Court of Justice at Westminster Hall, on the 22nd ult., in the celebrated case of Smith v. The Parkside Mining Company.

Mr. BARON CLEASBY: We will now dispose of the case of Smith v. Fletcher, which was argued last Friday upon a motion to enter a verdict. I do not think it is necessary to state how the question arose before us, if we had taken more time to consider the matter we should have done so, but we are disposing of it now, as if we had done so at the time. It is necessary to consider in this case what the real question in the case before us was, because, no doubt, upon the result, what was complained of was the flooding of the plaintiff's mine; other questions might have arisen of more difficulty than the question which we have to dispose of at the present moment. Probably, it would have put this case on a higher ground, and have raised questions such as were disposed of in the judgment of Mr. Baron Bramwell and other serious questions that might arise in this case, but we have it now before us, I think, upon a mere technical question, which I will proceed to consider. The case is divided into two parts, and it will only be necessary now to consider one. One was the effect of certain water which got into a hole called Paddy Murray's Cut from the bursting of a bank which had been constructed by the defendants, and the other was the effect of water which got into the same place, but not in any way connected with any particular work constructed by the defendants. As regards the second head of damage, it was got rid of in the course of the argument, and we may consider that out of the case altogether, and we have only to deal with the first (namely), the water which got into this place from a cut or an artificial watercourse, I may call it, which had been constructed by the defendants, and from there being, no doubt, an exceptional overflowing, the water got into that place. Now, the way, in which the question arises is this, the plaintiff's case is that he had a mine, that the defendant had also a mine above the plaintiff's, and the depth of his mine is not so great. The consequence of that is, no doubt, that the plaintiff must receive, without complaint, any water coming from the defendant's mine that may be said to have originated there, and if the defendant caused water to get into the plaintiff's mine he must take it as one of the necessary effects from the position of his land. Therefore, he cannot claim anything, the water having got through in the ordinary course. Then, what he says is this, you, the defendant, penned back the water into your mine so as to flood my mine. He says you improperly did so. The way in which he alleges it was done improperly is this; there had been a natural watercourse flowing over the defendant's mine, and in course of the defendant's mining operations, being desirous, I suppose, to take as much of it as he could in coming so near the surface, it is quite obvious that he could not do so in such a way as to stop the flow of the natural watercourse altogether. It became essential to him, therefore, if he intended to go so near the surface as to interfere with that, either to carry the water over that by some artificial arrangement of boxes or things of that sort, or he might, without complaint, perhaps, being the riparian proprietor, divert the stream from its ordinary channel so as to clear his land. What he did was this — to preserve the stream, as he was bound to do, he constructed, we will say, one diversion, there were in reality two, but it is not necessary to consider that, but instead of allowing the water to pass along at its level and in its natural course, he, in order to carry on his mining operations, further diverted it, carrying it to a higher level and carrying it round. The diversion so constructed by him formed, artificially, necessary, I suppose, from the nature of the ground with certain banks to keep it up, there being a considerable quantity of water, exceptional as it was said, burst, and the water from this artificial stream, which the defendant had constructed, got into this hole, which, in reality, the defendant had made, called by the name that I have mentioned, and in that way, as a matter of course, it got into the defendant's mine, and so into the plaintiff's mine. So the plaintiff traced the flooding of his mine, we may say as a matter of fact, to the construction of this diversion, which was insufficient to carry the water. There you appear to have, I should say, clearly a prima facie case. You have altered the course of the natural stream, and done that in such a way, there being a flood of water, which would have gone along the natural stream, as from the insufficient provision got into the mine. Then we come to what raises the real question in this case. The way in which the defendant sets up an answer to that which would appear to be a very good prima facie case, is the answer suggested by something that took place in the Exchequer Chamber when this case was before them. The defendant says this, or must be taken to say this, in this district, which was a mining district, in the case of mines adjoining each other there was an ordinary, reasonable, and well — known custom of good mining which justified him in doing this, and that the flooding was not caused by this being improperly done. Now, that was a question which had to be considered originally at Carlisle when the question was tried. Now, on what does this depend? It depends on this, whether what he did was justified by the custom of good mining, and was the result attributable to that — I mean attributable to his not being justified in what he did by the custom of good mining. Upon that matter so brought before us we are entitled, so far as any question arises which is not found distinctly by the jury, to deal with it as a question of fact for ourselves, but we are not to depart from the finding of the jury upon those questions which were distinctly left to them. It appears to me, I must say, the conclusion to be drawn from the finding of the jury, which we are not ourselves to come to any conclusion at variance with, is this, that what the defendant did, and the way he did it, was not justified by the ordinary and reasonable custom of mining in the district, and that the flooding was caused, I do not say at the present moment wholly, but the flooding was caused by his not having done it in that manner. In the first place the general question was put to the jury — to what was the flooding owing? Was it to the act of the defendant or from natural causes? The answer to that is, "By an act of the defendant's." That is a general answer to the question put in a general way. That seems to negative altogether the fact that the flooding arose from natural causes, and would not have arisen without the act of the defendant. That is a judicious way of putting it in the first instance; the jury answered the question in that way. It ought to be borne in mind, I think, in dealing with this case, that we have not the advantage which the jury had when these questions are brought before us. It will be remembered that I asked if there was a model upon a small scale, in fact an exact picture of the condition of things showing where the natural channel went, where the diversion went, how the diversion was constructed — because in a case like this it is very much res ipse loquitur. Really the jury had this, they had had a view of it, at least six of them had, and we have had the greatest possible difficulty in dealing with it, as to the diversion with reference to the lie of land and how the flooding took place. We have had no such advantage. They have had such advantage, and upon this first question they say the flood was attributable to the act of the defendant. Now, then, we come to the question put, and which raises distinctly what I considered to be the question which eventually the parties tried. Was what was done by the defendant in the ordinary, reasonable, and proper mode of mining? We must take the answer of the jury as it is. It may not be as completely found as it might be, but they say, "Yes, if the diversion of the stream had been properly executed," I can only read that as having this effect. The custom of mining justified the diversion of that mining stream to a higher level, but of course we can see that it could not justify his doing it in any way. Therefore to that question they say, "Yes, if the diversion of the stream had been properly executed." That involves almost the finding which results from the answers to the two other questions — that the diversion had not been properly executed according to the custom of good mining, because in answer to the third question, "Was the stream in its diverted course more like to overflow in time of flood, and would its overflow do more damage to the plaintiff than if it had been allowed to flow in its former channel." It is a most important answer with reference to what has taken place to — day, and with reference to what may take place hereafter. Probably they say, "The stream in its diverted course would be more likely to overflow, and so do more damage to the plaintiff," so that the defendant does not do what he ought to do, according to the finding of the jury. He does that which is more likely to cause flood than the original condition of things. I cannot help feeling that throws upon them the burden of taking care. If it be more likely to overflow, every precaution should have been taken that could fairly be taken to prevent it. I do not think it necessary to read the answers to any other questions except that the jury evidently dwell upon the condition of the new channel. And we cannot help saying, although we are bound by the answers, yet we must interpret them when we look at the real condition of things, it was impossible for the jury, in such a matter as this, to arrive at any other conclusion, because here is a natural stream taking its natural course; it is diverted to a higher level, and penned back again. The effect of that is, that it is obliged to go further and to have a sharper bend the further you go, and the effect of that we know when dealing with water. The effect was in this case the water is brought by the diversion to the bend where it must turn round in order to come again to the original course. There was a considerable bend that would pen back the water. There you have it penned back to a considerable height, and then it necessarily begins to overflow, not being able to get away; and when it begins to overflow of course it washes away the bank, and so causes the damage. I cannot help seeing that that consequence was traceable to the manner in which it was done, and taking that into account it required not merely the same capacity, but the exercise of great caution and care to insure that a channel diverted in that way, with these bends and turns, should be as effectual as the original channel. The result appears to be that upon the finding of the jury the defendant has improperly brought into the plaintiff's mine a quantity of water by an artificial channel improperly constructed by him. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to the consequences arising from that water being brought into his mine from a channel so improperly constructed. I do not think it is necessary to go into any other matters discussed in this case. It is not a case of vis major at all, because here the jury attribute it to the improper construction of the new channel. Therefore there is an end of the application of the case of Nicholls v. Marsland, or any case of that description. It appears to me on these grounds the verdict which the jury found, having viewed the place, is not only consistent with the evidence, which is really not the matter before us now, but it is a verdict which, taken in connection with the evidence, is conclusive of this case. As to the legal position of the parties, it shows that the plaintiff has a right to complain in respect of this diversion of the stream, executed in a manner in which it was, so as to bring a quantity of water into their mine. Therefore it amounts to this, that the rule to enter a verdict must be discharged.

Mr. BARON POLLOCK: I am of the same opinion that there is no ground for disturbing this verdict. The motion was made on two grounds; first, that the verdict was against the evidence, and I may say myself, having tried the case which occupied two whole days at Carlisle before a special jury, six of whom had the opportunity of seeing the locus in que, and all of whom apparently understood thoroughly the subject matter, that I see no ground whatever for coming to any other conclusion than that at which the jury arrived. The second ground, and the much more important one, on which the learned Solicitor General moved was on the terms of the reservation which was made at the time to the Court, to draw inferences of fact, and to dispose of any questions that the Court should think ought to have been left to the jury. And upon that it was argued that an unfair inference had been taken from the answers given by the jury to the questions put to them at the trial. That in point of law the plaintiff had done nothing, and had not succeeded in establishing his case against the defendant. Now, with regard to that part of the case, it is material to remark that although there was but one act done by the defendant of which the plaintiff complains, there were two independent results which followed from that — one result was, as it was alleged by the plaintiff's witnesses, that by the old channel being diverted, there ceased to be a channel at the old spot, and the channel that was at the old spot had acted as a catch — water to catch the water coming from the west; that water coming from the west, in the absence of the channel, overflowed into Paddy Murray's Hole, and hence into the plaintiff's mine. As to that, really there was very slender evidence given at the trial, very little indeed was said about it, or any argument. It is very clear to my mind the jury did not intend to include any damage resulting from that in their verdict. Therefore it must be taken that if there was any damage the plaintiff is entitled to recover that. Now comes the important question in the case, and that is, whether there is any reason for disturbing the verdict with regard to the finding of the jury as to the improper construction of the new diverted cut. Now, as to that, in the first place, it is as well here to observe that what was said by the Court of Error with regard to the nature of this action was fully justified by the evidence which was given at the trial of the case when the whole evidence was gone into. At the first trial it was stopped short by the learned Judge, and he thought that the principles laid down by this Court and afterwards by the House of Lords in Fletcher v. Rylands applied. The water from Paddy Murray's Cut was water apparently penned up by the defendant not taking it over by boxes or anything of that sort; but the evidence in this case was that although water found its way into Paddy Murray's Cut it was not the case of intentional penning up. The water found its way into Paddy Murray's Cut through there being a breach in the bank of the new diverted watercourse, whence it flowed down into Paddy Murray's Cut, and thence into the plaintiff's mine. One has to enquire then, was there any cause of action clearly and properly disclosed in respect of the finding of the jury. The first and great contention held at the trial was, that that flood was not the result of that, but was the result of what we call natural causes from an exceptional amount of water, in consequence of an exceptional flood. As to that the jury, according to my view of their finding, negatived that. Witnesses were called to speak to the fact that it was inevitable, and other witnesses to speak to its being an exceptional flood, in such a manner as to represent what one may call a counter case to that of the plaintiff's by saying what would have caused it. They went so far as to say that it was an exceptional flood, and that suddenly the plaintiff's mine might have been flooded, although the cut had been properly made; because that question was involved by the finding of the jury that whatever was done upon that occasion was not from natural causes, but it was through an act done by the defendant. The act was the making of a new channel, and making it in an improper manner. It is necessary here to enquire into the question of whether that making of the new channel comes within the rule that was laid down in Baird v. Williamson, 15th Common Bench, and within the principles laid down in the Court of Exchequer Chamber in this very case of Smith v. Fletcher, because this point was not taken at all by the learned counsel for the defendant. Probably it might be necessary to consider that answer in case it should become important in any other case, but it was also taken as if it was admitted that if the act that was done by the defendant was an act which, if done in an ordinary, reasonable, and proper working of their mine, which is the language used in the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber in Smith v. Fletcher — if that was so, then the defendant was absolved from it, because he had done only what he was entitled to do, and the jury have found in one sense what the defendant did, he did it in the reasonable and proper working of the mine. But they have found also that they could only have done that if the diversion had been properly executed, and as they had already found that the damage accrued to the plaintiff by reason of the diversion of the stream and the condition of the new channel — chiefly by the diversion of the stream and the condition of the new channel, and also that the stream in its diverted course would be more likely to overflow so as to damage the plaintiff, they have in effect found the real and substantial cause of the flowing of this water into Paddy Murray's Cut, and the reason of the evil was the insufficient construction of the watercourse, which, if properly constructed, the defendant had a right to make. That being so, all the damage that follows, if there is damage, the plaintiff in law is entitled to recover — the grounds on which that damage is recoverable was dealt with by my brother Cleasby, and I do not think it necessary to say one word more upon that. It is upon that ground that the plaintiff is entitled to retain his verdict. So far from myself being dissatisfied in any way with the course taken at the trial, it seems to me the matter was thoroughly investigated, not only upon the law, but I also think that substantial justice has been done between the parties.

Mr. BARON AMPHLETT: In this case there appear to me to be three questions we have to consider, namely, what is the proper legal result of the finding of the jury coupled with an additional finding, not inconsistent with those findings, which we may think, from the result of the evidence, may be correct, because it may be those findings justify a verdict for the plaintiff; or it may be argued that they justify a verdict for the defendant; or it may be said that the findings are not sufficiently clear and explicit to justify a verdict for one or the other, and therefore there must be a new trial. Now, in considering these questions, I think it will be advisable, in the first instance, to state the view that I entertain, speaking for myself, of the law of the case, because I think it will be found the law of the case is tolerably clear, and the only difficulty is to apply the facts of the case to that law. Now, I apprehend that since the decision of this case in the Exchequer Chamber, we must consider that the law of the case is settled. It might, at the least, be a difficulty which we need not go further into in discussing whether the defendant was entitled to work his mine in any way which suits his convenience, provided he did it in an ordinary, reasonable, and proper working of the mine, notwithstanding that the working of that mine imposed serious damage to the plaintiff's whose mine was on a lower level. It was long ago established that a mineowner on the higher level would have the right to work under ground in an ordinary, reasonable, and proper working, although the effect of it would be that what was previously to his working it, a hard substance of mineral, became a receptacle of water which would find its way by the force of gravitation into the plaintiff's mine on a lower level. The doubt entertained apparently by the learned judge who presided at the first trial was, that that rule did not apply to the working of a mine on the surface, but it would rather refer to a mine at some distance below. As I understand him he thought that if the mine was worked at the surface so as to leave an open space or reservoir, although it was worked in the ordinary, reasonable, and proper manner, that that fell within the rule which has been mentioned by learned brother in Fletcher v. Rylands. The Exchequer Chamber differed in their decision upon that finding only, and the law of it appears to me necessarily to follow with regard to an underground working. I cannot see why the plaintiff is entitled to complain any more of an open working at the top, which is a mine at the surface, than he is of an underground working, supposing both one and the other were done in the ordinary, reasonable, and proper working of the mine. Another question arises with regard to the diversion of the stream, and I think I may take the finding of the jury to be this; and I think, without the finding of the jury, as a matter of law I should have no doubt upon it, that where there is an overflooded stream that flowed from a mining property inasmuch as that stream would otherwise prevent the working of the mine, the mineowner would have a right to divert that stream by proper means, either by boxes in the old channel, or by diverting the stream into another position by the side of his mine, he would have a perfect right to do that, if he could carry the water as effectually in every respect as the old channel would. No doubt a serious question might have been raised whether he might not have continued the old channel without repairing it, that is to say, whether he was obliged to keep up the bed of the old channel. The case before Vice-Chancellor Hall, which I am very far indeed from dissenting from, held the contrary, and although the plaintiff in that case, in any mine on a lower level could not have complained of the surface of the ground being broken, in other respects they might complain, if the body of the natural stream was allowed to fall, so as to let in the water from that stream into the defendant's mine, and from thence to the plaintiff's; but nothing fell from the Vice — Chancellor in that case, and as far as I know nothing has fallen from any branch of the Court to say this, that a mineowner might not divert the stream, always provided that he did that in an ordinary, reasonable, and proper way. The question then would arise, what is a reasonable, ordinary, and proper way of diverting the stream? Is it to be said that the mineowner, the defendant in this case, was obliged to provide a channel much more capacious and more effectual in carrying off the water than the old channel? That appears to me to be most unreasonable; in point of fact, it would be saying you cannot divert the stream at all. We all know there may be exceptional floods, as there was in this case, and it would be impossible in any way to make a channel that would be large enough, capacious enough, and effectual enough to carry off the whole of the water. If therefore in this case, — in fact, the jury had found, that the diversion of the channel had been as effectual as it was, as capacious and effectual, by means of a turn it might not be so effectual as to carry off the water. If the jury had found that this diversion of the stream had been done so as to render the new channel as effectual as the old for carrying off the water, I should think they would have very much miscarried indeed if they had not found that was not the ordinary, reasonable, and proper working of the mine. Now, then, the important question is, and the reason I have doubted in this case, I say I have considerable doubts, although I have been able myself to arrive at the same conclusion that my brothers have done, the doubt that I have had in this case has been, whether this was put to the jury, supposing this to be a diversion improperly done, unless the diverted channel was sufficiently capacious for the whole of the water of these exceptional floods, notwithstanding that the original channel would not have taken them off, whether they had or not that in their minds. I think it would appear from their findings, and also I think the jury were very much influenced by it in coming to their conclusion that they had in their minds what has been stated by my learned brother who presided at the trial, who says the case was argued upon that very point; therefore it is difficult to suppose that the jury had not that present to their minds. Now let us see what it was that they found. The particular and most important question is the last question, and the question is, "Was what was done to the defendant's mine, in the ordinary, reasonable, and proper working of their mine?" Now the answer is an argumentative one, but I think it must be held to be also a distinct finding. They say, "Yes, if the diversion of the stream had been properly executed." The finding of the jury was that it had not been properly executed, then finding that it had not been properly executed, do they mean that this stream so diverted was not as efficient as the old stream to carry off the water? You must look not only at one finding of the jury, but you must also look at the other findings, and couple that with the other findings. I do think it does amount to this, that the diversion of the stream was not properly executed so as to be as efficient to carry off the water as the old stream was, because what do you find are the findings upon that point, so far as they are of importance? The first I do not consider important at all. Whether it was done by a really natural cause or anything done by the defendant. Of course it was what was done by the defendant, because it arises from his working the mine; no doubt his act caused it, but did he exceed his legal power? That first question does not seem to touch the point at all. Then comes the next, was the flooding occasioned in whole or in part by the diversion of the stream? Now, the answer is in part and chiefly by the diversion of the stream. I think in understanding the answer to that question you must bear in mind that there were two separate ways in which this injury to the plaintiff was alleged to arise, first of all by the water finding its way over the broken ground to Paddy Murray's Hole, and the other by the bursting of the bank, or rather the overflowing of the bank of the new stream. No doubt there was a conflict of evidence with regard to the manner in which the water found its way into the mine, whether the proper mining precautions had been taken. There was evidence on both sides, and I think the answer of the jury shows particularly as to that part of the case, that they were satisfied the workings had been done in a proper and mine-like way. Then comes the other question which I have alluded to, and then comes the answer, "It was in part and chiefly by diverting the stream." I think the fair result of that answer is, the part they meant, was the part arising from the overflow of the old surface, and the chief part arose from the diverting of the stream. Both of these questions will not go directly to the point, whether they had in their minds the necessity of the channel being sufficient to carry off all the water, but merely sufficient to carry off as much as the old stream. Then comes the next question, which I think is tolerably clear. The question was that this diverting of the stream was not as effectual as the old channel. "Was the stream more likely to overflow in time of flood," and so on. They say "the stream in its diverted course is more likely to overflow." If it were more likely to overflow, we should have wished to have seen a distinct finding of the jury; still it is difficult to know what else it could have meant when they say the diverted course is not so effectual as the old stream had been. Therefore, taking those findings together I think that it does show that in answer to the last question, they held that the diversion of the stream was not properly effectual; meaning that it was not done in an ordinary, reasonable, and proper way of mining. There would then be, as it appears to me, prima facie a clear cause of action if that is the case. I am bound to say, according to my view, there might have been an answer given by the defendant to that claim which he does not appear to have brought forward. If the circumstances had been these, that whether the diverted stream was adequate or not, even if the diverted stream was not adequate, still the floods arising from the exceptional rain would have been so great that they would have overflowed into Paddy Murray's Cut, notwithstanding the channel had never been disturbed, and notwithstanding the new channel was equally as effectual as the old. If that case had been made by the defendant, it appears to me that he might have had an answer to the cause of action if I am right in saying that the new channel need not have been more capacious or effectual than the other channel. If it was a great flood which would have washed over the banks both of the old and new channel, and got into Paddy Murray's Cut, it never could be that there would be any damage attributable to the defendant, notwithstanding their cut might have been inefficient. The answer would be if the cut had been efficient there would have been no damage to you of which you could complain. Now, I cannot find any evidence distinctly brought forward by the defendant as to that, and I think that you might possibly infer, a not improbable thing, that the question was not put distinctly to the jury. It appears that the defendant's counsel was invited by the judge to suggest any other questions to put to the jury, and he did not suggest that question for them. Therefore, being strongly of opinion that if the question had been put, and that if the verdict of the jury had found that as much damage would have been done if the diversion had never been made, I think, that question not being put, and the learned counsel not asking that that question should be put to the jury, we must assume for the present purpose, that the question would not have been answered favourably to the defendant. I think for these reasons, with the exception of the answer to the fourth question, which I am going to say a word upon, it would be tolerably clear that the verdict ought to be entered for the plaintiff. Now, the question is whether the answer to the fourth question makes any difference, and would authorise either a new trial or a verdict for the defendant, and the answer on that point was this, the question was — Was the flooding occasioned, not by the insufficiency of the channel, but by the result of the exceptional rainfall? The answer was the rainfall was exceptional, but the new channel was insufficient. If the answer had stopped there and said the rainfall was exceptional, I think it would have required and authorised a verdict to be entered for the defendant. For this reason I do not say an exceptional rainfall brings the case within the principle of vis major, or of the cases cited on that subject. I do not think it does, but attention was drawn to the language of the learned judge in summing up, who very clearly and most satisfactorily stated the law with regard to vis major. He stated the law in this way, that the exceptional rain must be one so excessive that no reasonable man could be considered liable to guard against it. With that interpretation of the learned Judge when it was put to the jury whether it was the result of exceptional rainfall, I think it must mean an exceptional rainfall within the interpretation of those words, because otherwise the question would be meaningless. The question must have been put in view of raising the point as to vis major. Therefore, I think, taking the word "exceptional" in that sense, and with the interpretation of the learned Judge, if the answer had been that the rainfall was exceptional, and it had stood there on the authority of the cases that have been cited, and other cases that may be found, a verdict ought to have been entered for the defendant. Then it goes on to say "but the channel was insufficient." I must confess at first sight I thought what they meant was that the channel was insufficient to carry off an exceptional rainfall. But I don't think, in the way it is put in the question put to the jury, and in the answer, that that is a fair interpretation of the answer. I think they meant to say the rainfall was exceptional, but they couple it with this, that the channel was not sufficient, not in the sense that it ought to have provided for every species of flood, but it was not as efficient as the old channel. If that is so, I think the argument of vis major falls to the ground. Therefore, upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the verdict ought to be entered for the plaintiff. As to the damage I say nothing, that will be left to the arbitrator. The question for him will be what was the damage that accrued to the plaintiff from the diversion of the stream, and its having been improperly executed.

Newspaper transcript kindly provided by
West Cumbria Mines Research.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Amphlett, —, Baron    High Court Justice  
Baird, —      
Bramwell, —, Baron    High Court Justice  
Cleasby, —, Baron    High Court Justice  
Fletcher, —      
Hall, —    Vice Chancellor  
Pollock, —, Baron    High Court Justice  
Rylands, —      
Smith, —      
Williamson, —      



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Parkside (Iron Ore)  Parkside (Iron Ore)


 

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