18th February 1875
Important Local Mining Cases
Court Of Chancery — Thursday February 11th
(Before Vice-Chancellor Hall:)
[From Our Special Reporter]
Dixon V Burneat
In this case Mr. Dickinson, Q.C., Mr. Lindley, Q.C., and Mr. Whitworth (instructed by Messrs. Atkinson and Collins, solicitors, Whitehaven), appeared for the plaintiff, and the Attorney General, Mr. Karslake, Q.C., and Mr. Robinson (instructed by Messrs.
Lumb and Howson, solicitors, Whitehaven), for the defendants.
Mr. Dickinson, in opening the case, said the plaintiff was the owner of certain mines which were worked by the defendants under an agreement for a lease, and he moved for an injunction to restrain them from working the mines (following the words of the
agreement) "otherwise than in a workmanlike manner, so as to obtain the greatest quantity of ore which can reasonably be obtained, from extracting any pillars or masses of ore near to certain shifts, known as Nos. 2 and 3, and from otherwise working
and carrying on the same so as to fill up or otherwise injure any of the pits and shafts made and sunk, or to be made and sunk, or render them in any wise unserviceable for working, or prevent the same from being delivered up at the expiration of the
term agreed to be granted by the agreement in a good and serviceable condition, and in good repair." The nature of the case was shortly this. The mines in question were iron ore-mines, and there was a contract to work them in a proper workman-like
manner, and a particular contract to leave uninjured all shafts and pits that should be sunk. The allegation was that the defendants, in working the shafts, or at any rate some of them, were taking away so much of the pillars of ore in the neighbourhood
of the shafts as ought to be left for their support, and by that means the shafts would crumble and fall in. The iron ore lay in heaps or packs at different distances and depths, and it was of the utmost importance to the plaintiff to be able to
persevere in the search for ore down to the full depths of the pits already sunk, and lower still, according to a fair exercise of his judgement and knowledge of the property. The defendants met the case by saying that in working the mine it was
necessary to sink from time to time "exploring" shafts, that when ore was discovered, permanent shafts were sunk, and then the exploring shafts were left to take care of themselves. That had been done in two cases, and the result was that the
exploring shafts had crumbled in, so that if the plaintiff wished to get to the same spot again he would have to sink a new shaft, with all the disadvantage and additional expense of going through loose rubble instead of through solid earth. The
defendants contended that the course they had adopted was consistent with good mining, and with obtaining the utmost quantity of ore in a fair and workmanlike manner. They also said that if they were bound to leave all the shafts, they could, at the end
of the term, restore all the exploring shafts, and give them up in a condition that ought to satisfy the plaintiff. To a certain extent that was true. If ore was left for the purpose of supporting shafts, so much would not be removed as if the working
was on the principle of removing everything. But that must be consistent with the clause in the agreement — that in taking away as much ore as ought to be taken, regard was to be had to the necessity existing, for making the shafts. But the point
that governed the whole contract was that it was specially agreed that "all shafts" were to be left. The defendants called attention to a clause at the end of the agreement to the effect that the lease to be executed should contain all the
covenants and stipulations and agreements usually contained in leases of iron ore in the neighbourhood, and they proposed to show that leases granted in the neighbourhood contained covenants that would not involve the leaving the temporary or exploring
shafts. But there was a positive agreement to leave "all."
The Vice-Chancellor: There may be a covenant to leave all shafts; but the defendants contention, as I understand, is that having regard to the fair construction of the contract it does not include that description of shaft that would, in leases in the
neighbourhood, be the subject of an exception or special provision.
Mr. Dickinson: That is exactly the proposition which they will submit; but I shall, I think, be able to show that it is the practice to leave "exploring" shafts. The word "exploring," however, is a mere invention of theirs; for a
permanent shaft is as much exploring as the others, and what they call an exploring shaft ought to be as permanent as the others.
The Vice-Chancellor: Would not this part of the case be met by having the lease settled at once?
The Attorney General: There is only twelve months of the time left. The real object of the suit is to have the iron ore left until the lease has run out.
The Vice-Chancellor: Would not the proper course be, without making an order at present, to take a reference to settle the lease?
The Attorney General: What your Honour suggests is really the hearing of the cause.
Mr. Dickinson: A certain time must elapse before that can be done. We have evidence that two of the shafts are at this moment in imminent danger. There is plenty of ore for them to go on with without taking that which is immediately in the
neighbourhood of those shafts; and if they will undertake not to come, until the case is settled, within a certain distance of the shafts, so as to leave them as at present, I am willing to accede to the suggestion. It may take a fortnight or three
weeks; and the undertaking cannot hurt them.
The Attorney General: What my friend wishes us to undertake — not to remove any portion of the iron there — would make thousands of pounds difference to us.
The Vice-Chancellor: Mr. Dickinson says you would not in fact be damnified, as there is plenty of iron elsewhere.
Mr. Dickinson: There is no doubt about that.
The Attorney General: We would rather rely upon the opinion of our own engineers than upon Mr. Dickinson's.
Mr. Dickinson: They do not say the contrary. There is none of their mining engineers who says that they could not be fully occupied in working the mines to the fullest extent elsewhere.
The Attorney General: It will save my friend trouble if I say that I can give no undertaking whatever.
Mr. Dickinson: Then I must ask for the injunction. I only asked for the undertaking for the purpose of preserving the thing as it is until the question can be decided by settling the lease in chambers.
The Vice-Chancellor: You are in this position, Mr. Dickinson, that if I should be against you upon the injunction, you will not have the indulgence of having the case brought on earlier than it would otherwise be.
Mr. Dickinson: I must run the risk of that, of course. It does not alarm me much.
The Attorney General: A temporary interruption of my works is the whole danger of this suit.
Mr. Dickinson said there was no evidence of that. At any rate, the evidence was clear and distinct, and uncontradicted, that there was a danger of the crumbling in of the two shafts. There were five shafts, but it was only necessary to refer to Nos. 2,
3, 4, and 6. With regard to No. 2 shaft, when they get down to a certain distance, they went off right and left by certain drifts, or eyes, from which the iron was worked. In working onwards from the shaft they left as much as was required for support,
but on coming back again they removed it. In that way they got the whole. They would go on and on, horizontally, until they got to the extreme verge, and would not require to touch the pillars until they came back. What the plaintiff asked was, that
until the matter was decided the thing would remain in status quo. The question could be easily and speedily disposed of, for there was really no point to decide except the settling of the lease. The same observation applied to No. 3 shaft; but in
regard to that shaft the matter was somewhat less pressing. Seeing that the defendants would not give an undertaking until the matter was decided at the hearing, he had no other course than to ask for an injunction. The agreement in question was dated
1856. It was an agreement for a lease for 21 years, which would therefor expire in 1877. There was a dead rent reserved, and a tonnage rent, and other provisions, and the defendants agreed to take the said mines and veins of iron ore for the above term,
determinable on certain conditions. The defendants were to diligently prosecute their search for iron ore, and, when found, to work and carry on the mines in a workman like manner, so as to obtain the greatest quantity of ore that could reasonably be
obtained. There were some other ordinary clauses; and it was provided that at the expiration or other sooner determination of the term the defendants were to deliver up all the pits and shafts to be made and sunk in a good and serviceable condition and
in good repair, without filling up or otherwise rendering them in any wise useless or unserviceable for working. It was also agreed that a lease and counterpart should, if required by either of the parties, be prepared, and there was the usual clause of
re-entry and such other covenants, stipulations, and agreements as were contained in leases for iron mines in the neighbourhood. It was also stated that the defendants had in 1854 entered into possession, and the plaintiff by arrangement between himself
and the co-lessor had become entitled to the rents. The allegations set forth that the defendants were in possession of the mines, and that they had failed to carry on the mines in the manner stipulated, that they had carried on the working in a
negligent and insufficient manner, they had allowed divers of the pits and shafts made and sunk to fall in, and that it would be impossible for the defendants at the expiration of the term agreed to be granted to deliver up the pits and shafts in good
and serviceable condition and in good repair without filling up or otherwise injuring the same or rendering them useless or unserviceable for working. In order to carry on the mines in a workman-like manner, it would be necessary to sink vertical shafts
from the surface of the land under which the mines were intended to be worked and out of such vertical shafts to drive horizontal workings called heights or "eyes." It was shown, however, by the bill, that the mines under the Salter Hall
estate had been worked partly by shafts made or sunk by the defendants in that estate, and partly by shafts made or sunk in the adjoining estate, called Eskett Park estate. All the shafts had been sunk by the defendants' company in or previous to 1869.
They had driven heights or eyes from some of the shafts. In order to keep these shafts in good condition it was necessary, and according to the terms of the agreement, to leave in the heights or eyes near to such pits or shafts pillars or masses of ore
of sufficient strength to support the surface of the land under which the mines were being worked. If such pillars or masses of ore were extracted the surface would subside, and the shafts would be driven out of the perpendicular, and afterwards would
entirely close up. At the commencement of 1870 all the shafts were in a working condition, but the company had neglected to leave in the eyes pillars in proper positions, or in sufficient numbers, and immediately after the surface of the land began to
subside, and some of the shafts twisted out of the perpendicular, and had fallen into an unserviceable condition. This was particularly the case with shafts 2, 4, and 6, up and down which it was not safe for workmen to go, and it became evident that
shafts 4 and 6 would eventually collapse. Accordingly, the defendants in 1871 commenced to sink a "Turner" shaft. Shaft No. 4 collapsed in 1872, shaft No. 6 collapsed at the commencement of 1874, and shaft No. 2 remained twisted from the
perpendicular, and, but for continual repairs, would have collapsed long ago. By reason of the collapse of No. 6 a large quantity of ore at the bottom of the shaft, which could reasonably have been obtained by reason of such shaft, had been buried, and
could not now be obtained unless by sinking a new shaft in the Salter Hall Estate, where, on a parcel of land, the Company, in 1873, discovered, by means of boring, the existence of veins or deposits of iron ore or spar at a distance of 75 fathoms from
shaft No. 3. Those veins were of considerable thickness, and could be worked by driving from No. 3, but no attempts had been made to get any of that ore. For some time past the Company had only been working from three shafts, namely shafts No. 2 and 3
and the "Turner" shaft. From shaft No. 2 the Company had been, for some time past, and now were, extracting ore or pillars near the shaft, which had become damaged to such an extent as to make the workmen incur great risk in travelling up and
down, and if the company persevered in this course, the shaft would close before the expiration of the term granted, and it would be impossible for the defendants to restore the same to a good and serviceable condition, and to deliver it up according to
the terms of the agreement. Ore was also being extracted from shaft No. 3, and the "Turner" shaft, especially at the second height, and No. 3 had already twisted to a considerable extent out of the perpendicular. The maintenance in good
repair of shafts Nos. 2 and 3, more especially No. 3, which was the pumping shaft, was essential to the future working of the ore in the estate. A correspondence had ensued between the plaintiff and the defendants, and in September, 1873, the defendants
were warned of the injury which would result to the shafts on account of the way in which the mines were being worked, but the defendants had continued to work the mines in their own way, and the injury which had been anticipated had already partially
taken place. The mode in which the defendants stated their case at that time was by a letter, in which they professed that they would be able to leave the pits in a good and serviceable condition, without attempting at that time to draw any distinction
between the pits which they desired not to leave and the pits which they did not object to leave. He would state as a matter of fact, that if the defendants had worked the ore round by the bottom of shaft No. 6 as they ought to have done, a greater
quantity could have been obtained. If that was so, he ventured to say there was a clear case made out for an injunction. There had been a contract to obtain the greatest quantity of ore that could be obtained in a proper manner; the quantity of ore had
to be obtained by digging down the pits and working from the shafts by which these depths were arrived at. The ore which was to be obtained did not stop at the particular depth to which the defendants had sunk the shafts. He maintained, and he would
undertake to prove, that ore was to be obtained of considerable value at a lower depth than the defendants had reached. The plaintiff also desired that the existing shafts should be kept in a proper condition, so that, by means of sinking them still
further and working them properly, they would be able to obtain the ore which was there, and which could not be got from the ground unless the shafts were left, except at a considerable expense.
The Vice-Chancellor said that the defendants had been acting under advice, and held that the results alleged by the plaintiff would not be produced by their mode of working.
Mr. Dickinson said that with regard to No. 2 shaft, there was not only a probability, but a certainty, that, if the pillars were removed, it would collapse. The defendants admitted this, but said they had a right to work the mine as they were now doing,
and that they had another and better shaft by which they preferred getting the ore. If there was reason, however, to anticipate that large quantities of valuable ore could be obtained below the level to which No. 2 shaft was now sunk, and if there was a
reason to believe that the shaft would by and by be filled up, the defendants were acting in direct opposition to the terms of their contract, which stipulated that no shaft should be filled up by means of which the plaintiff desired to continue the
working. There seemed, according to the evidence, to be hardly any question of fact in dispute between the parties; the whole case depended on the construction of the agreement. The defendants were asking to have a right to do in the meantime that
which would make a decision even if in the plaintiffs favour, perfectly useless to them. The only attempt the defendants made to meet that was by the statement that they could, if necessary, make another shaft; but that shaft would have to be made
through some loose rubble, which would not only make it difficult of construction, but would expose the plaintiffs to the greatest expense and trouble in keeping it in repair after it had been constructed. In such a case as that where there was a
distinct question to be tried between the parties, and where the decision would be, as it must be one way or the other, that the property should be preserved in the meantime, the Court usually accelerated the hearing of the case in order that as little
damage as possible might be done to either party, and to protect the party who suffered from the injunction being granted, by giving the usual undertaking as to damages. The necessity for protection was urgent.
The Vice-Chancellor: It is part of the defendants' case that if the shaft is filled up they can open it again.
Mr. Dickinson said no doubt it could be opened, but it would have to be made through the loose rubble with which it was filled up, and it would be impossible to maintain a shaft so made except at great expense, and danger to the miners. Such a
restoration would be a pretence and a sham, and not a reality. The evidence proved that that would be the case, nor was there any contradiction of that by the defendants. There ought to be something like reason exercised in these affairs; and the
reason one would suppose was almost unanswerable that, during the short time which would elapse before the point was determined, the property should at any rate be preserved, so that the injury which was anticipated should not happen.
Mr. Whitworth then proceeded to read several affidavits in support of the allegations of the plaintiff, stating that the present mode of working the mine was injurious and unsafe. A number of affidavits was also read by Mr. Robinson, on behalf of the
defendants, stating that the method adopted was the proper one, and that it was not customary to leave exploring shafts. Other affidavits, in reply, were likewise read by Mr. Whitworth.
Mr. Dickinson, continuing his address, denied the assertion made in one of the affidavits that the clause as to leaving all the shafts had crept into the agreement by mistake, and stated that the owners of an adjoining mine had made a similar stipulation
with their lessees. It was clear from the evidence that there was plenty of ore to be worked without extracting the pillars in question. There was obviously a question to be decided, and it was evident that between the present time and the decision of
the cause there was ample ore for the defendants to go on working at without injuring the plaintiff's property by taking the pillars required to support the shafts.
The Vice-Chancellor: That depends upon when the cause is heard.
Mr. Dickinson said he had no fear of "arrears" or "remanets;" and if necessary His Honour would allow the hearing of the cause to be advanced.
The Attorney General: You would not adopt His Honour's suggestion.
Mr. Dickinson: I declined to do so unless I was protected.
The Attorney General: Then you went for your injunction.
Mr. Dickinson said the defendants were quite justified in getting as much ore as they could, provided they did it in accordance with the terms of the agreement, and without injury to the landlord's property. With regard to shafts No.3, the twist and the
breaking in that had occurred in it had taken place on the West Side, and it was precisely on that side that the pillars had been removed. No injury had been done on the north side. If the present method of working continued it was evident that No. 2
would be rendered entirely useless, and No. 3 partially so.
The Vice-Chancellor: Has not all been removed from No. 3 that can be removed?
The Attorney General: All but a small portion.
Mr. Dickinson: It was said that the rest could be removed within a short time, but the plaintiff asked that it should not be removed. Below No. 3, as well as below No. 2, there was ore which the owner wished to get, and which he would be prevented from
getting by those shafts (as he was entitled to do), unless, indeed, they could be restored in a satisfactory manner. It was absurd, however, to suppose that a shaft through loose rubble could be made and maintained except at a greater expense than
through solid earth.
The Vice-Chancellor: Is it supposed that shaft No. 3 is to be worked lower down?
Mr. Dickinson: Unquestionably.
The Attorney General: At present we do not know. Your plan shows the termination of the pocket of hematite there.
Mr. Dickinson: No, it shows the termination of the fault.
Mr. Karslake: There is no suggestion as to working below.
Mr. Dickinson: My friend has not attended to the evidence as to the hematite in the adjoining estate. We know that we have from all these shafts obtained ore at different levels.
The Vice-Chancellor: The defendants might say whether they mean to work, or propose to work, below where the shaft is sunk or not.
The Attorney General: We are in the mountain limestone.
Mr. Dickinson: That is not an answer to His Honour's observation.
The Attorney General: We claim the right to go lower if we think it advisable to do so. There is no obligation on us to go lower.
Mr. Dickinson: Yes, there is; there is an obligation to go lower if there be ore lower down, and if by proper workmanship that ore can be got out. The defendants said; "We have only two or three years to run, we will go on working what there is,
and then we will leave you to get as you can what remains." That would be right enough unless there was a stipulation to the contrary — a stipulation which practically said, "During your lease you may get the utmost you fairly can, but
you shall leave to your landlords or your successors (if you do not take a renewed lease) the means of getting what is below, and getting it by the shafts you have sunk and which you have contracted not to fill up or injuriously affect." Seven
eighths of the ore raised had been raised through those shafts; and it was preposterous to suggest that they should not be continued, or that they should only be restored in the way to which has already been referred. He was surprised that any
difficulty should exist in a matter so plain; and he almost thought that there must be some fallacy in his argument, which he had not discovered. — [Mr. Karslake: Very likely.] — The agreement was that not only should there be the ordinary
clauses in the lease, but the particular stipulations in question, and he did not see how they could be set aside. He ventured to submit that he had established enough to entitle him to an injunction till the hearing of the cause. The defendants were
evidently to have the whole truth laid before the Court; for it appeared upon the affidavits that when the plaintiff's witnesses went down shaft No. 3 for the purpose of examining it, they could not induce the men to lower and raise them slowly, their
instructions being to do it quickly, so that an opportunity was not afforded to make a careful investigation. There was also an intention to mislead the Court as to the cause of the twist in No. 3 shaft. There was clearly a reasonable ground for
preserving the status quo. If any injury should be done by an interlocutory order there was the usual undertaking as to damages. With regard to the power of getting damages from the defendants, they were a limited company, and the capital was all paid
up except about £2,000. Under all these circumstances he confidently asked for an injunction.
Mr. Whitworth followed on the same side. He contended that the balance of convenience was on the side of restraining the defendants from continuing as at present. In the event of their being successful in the cause, they would still be able to carry
away all the pillars, and they would therefore eventually lose nothing. The loss, however, to the plaintiff would be considerable, since the cost of sinking a new shaft was put at about £20,000. He further maintained that the suggestion as to
restoring the shaft was no answer to the plaintiff's complaint, there being a covenant to keep them in repair during the whole term off the lease.
This concluded the plaintiff's case.
The Vice-Chancellor (before calling upon the defendants) said: I suppose, Mr. Attorney-General, you are willing to have an immediate reference to settle the lease?
The Attorney General: I do not see any difficulty in that; but is there any case for it?
The Vice-Chancellor: The rights of the plaintiff, as it appears to me, depend very much upon the form in which the lease is settled.
The Attorney General: Of course, if your Honour has that feeling, I am bound to recognize it. If this had been the hearing of the cause, I should have confidently asked your Honour to dismiss the bill, except so far as it sought a decree for the
perfecting of the lease. I was, however, particularly anxious to call your Honour's attention to the fact that what is now complained of was going on as early as 1870. At first I was surprised to find that anything was introduced into the present
motion for an injunction with reference to shafts Nos. 4 and 6, one of which had already fallen in from this improper working in 1872, and the other in 1874; but it occurred to me that the reason why reference was made to those cases was for the purpose
of showing that the effect of withdrawing the pillars would be to let this shaft fall in. Well, if that is the object for which it is brought in, how comes it that when, in 1873, they were perfectly well aware that these pillars were being removed, and
knew from the experience of 1872 what the effect would be —
The Vice-Chancellor: Of course all that has received a good deal of consideration from me already; and it was with reference to what weighed with me in that part of the case that I submitted to you whether, if I did not grant the injunction now, you
would submit to have the lease immediately settled.
The Attorney General: There is one other remark I would like to make. Of course I felt certain that many of these matters would receive your Honour's consideration while the argument was progressing. Your Honour will not forget that this is an
agreement for a lease with a dead rent of £100 a year. Nothing beyond that dead rent was paid for twelve years down 1867 or 1868. By the exploration of 1868 a royalty began to be paid, and from that period to the present time not less than
£5,000 a year has been derived from the mine. The result of the explorations we have made has been that, according to their own showing, £45,000 has been received in the way of royalties. These royalties they have received, and have given
receipts for them every half-year, knowing that they were produced by the improper working that they are complaining of. What I should have submitted was, that whatever might be the case at the hearing, there could be no case whatever for an injunction
in the meantime, seeing that they have been taking the reward of the very things they are complaining of. At the same time I am desirous of meeting fairly and in a straightforward way your Honour's suggestion. What appeared to me was this. There has
been a recognised course of working for a long time, and a very large profit has been the result. By means of our exploration a large mass of valuable ore is ready to be brought to bank at a comparatively small expense, and they want to step in and say,
"You shall not do it." With regard to the balance of inconvenience, it is entirely in the way of interfering with us until the case is heard, and for this reason: if we are restrained from removing the ore, you have no means of compensating
us; you cannot tell what we might have removed. But as far as they are concerned they have abundant means of being recouped. By the provisions of the agreement we are obliged to keep accounts of the workings, to render monthly accounts, and to show
with great accuracy what ore we extract; therefore if we extract any ore that the Court decides we ought not have removed, the damages can easily be assessed. As to our being only a limited company, I dispute that proposition. The agreement is with a
certain number of individuals, as to whom there is no suggestion that they are not fully competent to meet any demand. I should submit that there is no case for an injunction. I do not content that at the hearing of the cause there may not be a decree
for specific performance of the agreement for a lease; but I would suggest that that should not affect the question of the costs of this application, because it is thoroughly unjustifiable.
The Vice-Chancellor: The motion may be ordered to stand over (as in the case Hilton v. Lord Granville), or the costs may be made costs in the cause.
The Attorney General: Do I understand your Honour to treat this as the hearing of the cause, and to make a decree for settling the lease?
The Vice-Chancellor: I could not do that unless you were both agreed.
Mr. Dickinson: There are other parties interested.
The Attorney General: I only appear for the Company, who are under-lessees.
The Vice-Chancellor: I should think there would be no difficulty. The case could stand over for the other parties to be served.
The Attorney General: Two of the persons have died, and their executors would have to be consulted.
The Vice-Chancellor: I do not think there would be any difficulty in their assenting. With regard to the specific performance there appears to be no defence to that.
The Attorney General: I apprehend that that was put into the bill to support the injunction and save costs. Of course, if the application for an injunction is continued, I must have an opportunity of putting in further evidence.
The Vice-Chancellor: If the other parties are served, the lease may be settled at once, and then we might have some arrangement for the cause being expedited. When the lease is settled we shall be in possession of the whole case.
The Attorney General: I should not be afraid of arguing the question, even upon the very words of the agreement.
The motion was then ordered to stand over till Thursday next.
COURT OF THE EXCHEQUER. — FEBRUARY 13th 1875
SMITH V. FLETCHER
Mr. Herschell, Q.C., and Mr. Crompton were counsel for the plaintiff; and the Solicitor-General (Sir John Holker, Q.C.) and Mr. Kay, Q.C., and Mr. Baylis were counsel for the defendants.
JUDGEMENT.
Mr. Baron Cleasby: This was an action against the defendants for flooding the plaintiff's mine. At the trial the verdict was entered for the plaintiff, and there are findings of the jury upon particular questions left to them; but it was arranged that
either party should be at liberty to move, and that the Court were to be at liberty to deal with the whole case upon the findings, and upon the evidence; that is, of course, upon the evidence so far as the findings were not conclusive. A motion was made
some time ago, among other grounds, for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence. After a lengthened and careful consideration of the case, we have come to the conclusion that there is no sufficient ground for disturbing the
findings of the jury, so far as they go; that is one reason. Another reason is, that the judge was not dissatisfied; but still there are questions arising in the case which ought to be disposed of; and the best mode of disposing of them, in order to
enable us to form a correct conclusion, is to grant a rule to enter the verdict for the defendants upon the findings of the jury and upon the evidence: that is, so far as other questions might arise besides those that were actually left to the jury, so
as to prevent the necessity of a new trial; therefore, there will be a rule nisi on that ground.
Mr. Herschell: My Lords, I understand the rule will be to this effect: Rule nisi to enter the verdict for the defendants, on the ground that upon the findings of the jury or the inferences, if any, not inconsistent with those findings, which ought to be
drawn from the evidence, the defendants are entitled to the verdict.
Mr. Baron Cleasby: Yes, I think that is substantially what I said — to enter the verdict for the defendants upon the findings of the jury, and upon the evidence.
Mr. Herschell: Yes; and upon inferences, not inconsistent with those findings, to be drawn from evidence. It was certainly the understanding at the trial that if there was a question which ought to have been left to the jury, and which was not left to
the jury, the Court were able to be at liberty to deal with that question.
Mr. Baron Cleasby: Yes, if the Court can.
Mr. Herschell: That is why I have used the words "the inferences, if any, not inconsistent with those findings, which ought to be drawn from the evidence."
Mr. Baron Pollock: The result would be this: to allow all to be before the Court — the evidence and the findings of the jury — as if it were a special case, and that would probably avoid the expense of the cause going down again.
Mr. Baron Cleasby: I intend to say — and perhaps that is involved in what I said — that the rule is, to enter the verdict for the defendants as to all or any of the causes of action.
Newspaper transcript kindly provided by
West Cumbria Mines Research.
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Names mentioned in this article
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| Name | Age | Occupation | Notes |
| Atkinson, — | | Solicitor | |
| Baylis, — | | | |
| Burneat, — | | | |
| Cleasby, Baron | | | |
| Collins, — | | Solicitor | |
| Crompton, — | | | |
| Dickinson, — | | Q.C. | |
| Dixon, — | | | |
| Fletcher, — | | | |
| Hall, Charles, Sir | | Vice-Chancellor | |
| Herschell, — | | Q.C. | |
| Holker, John, Sir | | Solicitor-General | |
| Howson, — | | Solicitor | |
| Karslake, — | | Q.C. | |
| Kay, — | | Q.C. | |
| Lindley, — | | Q.C. | |
| Lumb, — | | Solicitor | |
| Pollock, Baron | | | |
| Robinson, — | | | |
| Smith, — | | | |
| Whitworth, — | | | |