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  Disasters - Names Return to Index Disasters - Names  
/ \
Date:  16th March 1938
Colliery:  Ravensworth
Company:  
Cause:  Explosion of firedamp
Lives Lost:  1
Category:  

Description

An explosion of firedamp occurred on 16th March in the Towneley Seam at Ravensworth Colliery, Durham, causing burns of the face, arms and hands of an electrician; the injuries proved fatal. The locus of the explosion is shown in Figure 7. The system of ventilation and the damage done by the explosion are indicated.

A heading was being driven to make connexion with an upcast shaft which was in course of being sunk from the surface, and an electrically-driven heading machine was in use.

A short circuit having developed in the flexible cable, it was taken to the surface where the now deceased electrician fitted a new length of cable to the pommel. He took it into the mine and arrived at the face of the heading when no other workmen were there. When he inserted the plug into the socket of the starting switch and closed the switch an explosion occurred, and he was later discovered making his way to the shaft in the dark, having left his electric safety lamp behind.

Subsequent investigation by Mr. J. A. B. Horsley, Electrical Inspector of Mines, and Mr. T. A. Rogers, Junior Inspector, disclosed that the ignition was caused by a defective switch. This switch was purchased as flameproof some years ago but did not carry a Buxton certificate.

An interlock device was provided, the object of which was to prevent the switch being closed until the pommel of the flexible cable had previously been properly inserted into its socket and to prevent the pommel being withdrawn until the switch had been opened. The switch was defective in that, due to wear of the parts, it could be moved far enough to close the circuit before the plug was right "home." Continued movement of the switch handle expelled the plug and broke the circuit. In these circumstances, inflammable gas ignited at the pommel was not confined within the enclosure and ignited inflammable gas external to the switch. The pommel could not be entered its full distance into the socket because the electrician, when making the earth conductor of the flexible cable on to it, had failed to turn off the end of the conductor close to a holding bolt, and the nut on the bolt could not slide far enough along a groove provided in the socket.

Firedamp had not been found in the place previously. A deputy fired two shots in the ripping at 7p.m. and left at 7.30 p.m. without finding any indication of firedamp, and three workmen who left the place at 9.45 p.m., each having used a flame safety lamp throughout the shift, had observed nothing unusual. The explosion occurred at 10.30 p.m.

The arrangements to ventilate the heading were needlessly complicated. An electrically-driven boosting fan, capable of passing 20,000 cubic feet of air was in place in the return airway close to the new drivage, and here was at hand a ready means of ventilating the place. A stopping with a door in it could have been built in the return, outbye of the stenton, making connexion with the intake, and air-tubes extended to the face of the heading. There would have been little traffic through the door of a stopping so placed, and constant ventilation could have been maintained.

Such a stopping was built, but another was erected inbye of the stenton and an auxiliary fan placed there, capable of passing 1,000 cubic feet of air per minute, forced air to the face. The door in this latter stopping had to be opened and shut frequently and there was always a danger of it being left open.

It is very evident that at the time the explosion occurred the ventilation was defective; there must have been a considerable accumulation of firedamp.

Coal dust played no part in this explosion; the place was wet and in addition had been well treated with gypsum dust.

The owners removed all switches of the type involved in the explosion from their mines.

I have to offer the following observations :—

(a) Mechanics and electricians who go underground to do any work should be instructed that they must not pass the station fixed by the manager under Section 63 of the Coal Mines Act unless and until permission to do so is given by the deputy.

(b) All electrical apparatus installed at the face in a mine in which safety lamps are required to be used should carry the Buxton certificate of flameproofness.

(c) Ventilation systems should be as simple as possible and dependence on doors should be reduced to a minimum.

(d) Auxiliary fans should be used only if absolutely necessary.

Source: 

1938 Mines Inspectors Report



Fatalities



 
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