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Christopher Thompson
A serious and unusual accident occurred at the No. 2 (second outlet) shaft of Pelton Colliery, Durham, at about 8 a.m. on the 28th June. Three persons, including the Undermanager, were killed. The shaft was 7 ft. 6 ins, in diameter, and sunk to the Busty Seam at a depth of 182 yards. There was one inset at the Hutton Seam level 106 yards from the surface. It was formerly a pumping shaft and fitted up as the second outlet from the mine about three and a half years ago when the colliery was acquired by new owners and re-opened. No mineral had ever been wound there and the shaft was not ordinarily in use. The shaft was equipped with one single-deck cage 4 ft. 6 ins, long, 2 ft. 10½ ins, wide, and 5 ft. 9 ins, high, which ran on two rope guides, one at each side, and in the middle of the cage, each rope passing through two slippers at the top and bottom respectively. The guides were clamped on the headgear, and kept taut by cheese weights in the sump. The winding engine, which was ancient, was a single-cylinder horizontal type geared with one reduction. The engine was balanced by means of an eight-feet diameter flywheel. The brakes consisted of two mild-steel hands operating on each side of the rope drum. A similar brake operated on the flywheel. The rate of winding was slow, being only about 130 feet a minute at maximum speed. At the time of the occurrence the mine was idle, only officials and horsekeepers being employed. For some days the engineer had worked the winding apparatus at this shaft. On Sunday, 26th June, the shaftman examined the shaft and reported it in good condition it was used the following day without incident. The platform at the Hutton inset was supported by a heavy H section girder let into the shaft at both ends immediately below the floor of the inset. This girder was 6 ft. 8 ins, long, 17 inches deep in the centre and 13 inches at each end. The width of the flanges varied from two and a half to three inches. It was known beforehand that there was a minimum clearance of four inches at one point between the hoops of the cage and the bottom flange of the girder, see Figure ii. At about 6 a.m. on the morning of the accident, immediately after the engineer had run the cage up and down the shaft, David York, a master shifter, accompanied by an overman, descended on top of the cage and examined the shaft to the Hutton inset where they remained, sending the cage to bank. The banksman then sent down a cage load of officials, including Robert Redpath, the Undermanager, to the Hutton Level. The Undermanager and two other officials got out at this level and proceeded inbye, the remaining three officials being lowered to the pit bottom. The cage was then sent back to the Hutton inset and afterwards empty to bank. David York, the master shifter, who was properly authorized to give and receive signals, remained in charge at the Hutton inset. At about 7.40 a.m. the Undermanager, Redpath, and the two other officials returned to the Hutton inset where the cage was then standing, and told York that they wanted to go to the pit bottom. York gave the cautionary signal to the engineer and loaded the cage with the three officials. As there were no other persons then in the Hutton Seam he rapped the cage away and entered it himself. The cage gates provided were not used. As the cage was lowered the right hand corner of the top hoop caught the bottom flange of the girder beneath the inset. The cage tilted slightly and remained suspended — See Figure 12. Shortly afterwards the winding rope was seen to be passing the cage and going down the shaft. The engineer was entirely unaware of what had occurred, and as the rope acted normally, he thought the cage had arrived at the pit bottom. Owing to the engine being in gear, he did not feel the loss of his load. He kept the cage at the pit bottom, as he thought, for ten minutes, and then thinking that the men had forgotten to rap clear, he commenced to raise it very slowly in order to bring it to bank. In point of fact he was actually only raising the rope. In the meantime the men in the cage had realized their perilous position. York who was at the end of the cage nearest the inset pluckily volunteered to try and climb up to the Hutton level, a distance of about seven feet, in order to telephone for assistance. At great personal risk he succeeded. He had to squeeze between the cage hoop and the girder and keep himself clear of the cage by means of a two-inch pipe in the shaft which ran into the centre of the inset. He had only a few inches of clearance in which to work and any movement of the cage would have sent it to the bottom. He acted in a very courageous manner. The other men did not dare to get Out of the cage; they realized that movement on their part would undoubtedly have liberated it. After reaching the inset York ran about 150 yards and telephoned to the surface. When he returned to the shaft the Undermanager instructed him to signal to stop raising the rope. It was feared that the moving rope would dislodge the cage Shortly afterwards, the cage slipped and crashed to the bottom of the shaft carrying the slack rope with it. The three men were instantly killed. York estimated that the cage remained suspended for a period of 10 to 15 minutes. The cage fell with such force that, although the winding engine brakes were fully applied, the sudden shock broke one of the main drum pedestals, together with two holding-down bolts, also one tooth of the 18-inch pinion wheel which rendered the flywheel brake inoperative. The 12 coils of rope on the drum were wrenched off and fell down the shaft. Subsequent examination of the shaft showed it to be in good condition and, apart from the point where the girder was fixed, there was good clearance throughout. The rope guides were found to be taut with the cheese weights hanging freely. Prior to the accident it is said that the cage had never caught nor rubbed the girder. In my view the accident was due to the swaying of the cage and rope guides caused by the men entering the cage at the Hutton Seam inset. Owing to the slow movement of the winding rope, coupled with the swaying of the cage and guides, the top hoop of the former caught the lower flange of the girder with sufficient grip to hold it. A certain amount of sway is usual with rope guides, but this is more pronounced when cages are fitted only with two middle guides. Where little clearance is available, at least three guides should be fitted, or other precautions taken. Following the accident the overall length of the cage was reduced by six inches, and four 25-feet guiding skeets were fitted in the shaft at the Hutton inset. GALLANTRY IN MINES His Majesty the King was graciously pleased to approve the award of the Edward Medal (in bronze), to David York, a master-shifter, for his bravery in connexion with the shaft accident at Pelton Colliery. The circumstances of the accident and York's gallant attempt to rescue his comrades are reported on page 32 of this report.
Donwell — Holy Trinity ChurchyardLocation: OS Map 88, Grid Ref NZ297586
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