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  Individual Details   Individual Details  
 


Bernard Short

Age:   31
Died:   25th Nov 1924
Accident:   25th Nov 1924 4.30 a.m., 6th hour of shift
Year Born:   abt. 1893
Colliery:   Waleswood
Company:   Skinner and Holford, Ltd.
Occupation:   Collier
Notes:  
Died from gas poisoning whilst trying to save fellow workmen
Buried:   Ecklington Churchyard
Category:   Suffocation by Natural Gases

Description

Suffocation by Natural Gases.

There was only one fatal accident from this cause, but unfortunately three men lost their lives. The circumstances are so important that they are set out rather fully.

The accident happened at Waleswood Colliery, South Yorks., in the Flockton Seam, which in the area concerned was 3 ft. 6 ins. thick with a rock roof and fireclay floor. A district of longwall working was stopped in 1913, and in June, 1924, it was decided to commence coal getting operations in the area. With this end in view, going to the rise, two headings were commenced, one of which, known as 45's, was set out to hole into the old workings.

These headings, 12 feet wide, were at light angles to and commenced from the intake and haulage road known as 60's level on the return side of several disused headings connected with the abandoned area to the rise of the same level. The headings were presumably well ventilated by brattice as no gas had been observed. An air measurement on 60's level prior to the accident showed that 8,100 cubic feet of air per minute were passing.

On 25th November, at 4.30 a.m., when 45's heading had advanced 53 yards, one of three men working at the face pricked through into old workings. This occurred several days earlier than expected owing to an error in the relative positions of the heading and the old workings as shown on the plan. This error could readily have been discovered and allowed for by a simple measurement from 45's heading to the first disused heading outbye along 60's level. The error had no bearing on the accident other than to precipitate events.

The level of the heading at the holing was almost 19 feet above its origin.

Immediately after the holing had been made, two of the men — a collier and a filler — took out a full tub and, when returning with an empty, encountered at a point 14 yards from the heading face an obstacle which was subsequently found to be the body of the man who had remained in the place. The filler crawled past the tub and collapsed. The collier, seeing what happened to the filler, turned round and, only partly conscious, managed to stumble down to the level and send warning to the men in 46's, the neighbouring heading. Unfortunately, one of these latter rushed into 45's heading in a vain attempt at rescue with fatal consequences to himself. The fireman, whose certificate had not been renewed during the preceding five years, was early on the scene, but as firedamp had by that time made its appearance near the bottom of the heading practically nothing could be done.

It was not until 6.30 a.m. that by means of smoke helmets the three men were got out of the heading. Artificial respiration was tried unavailingly for over two hours when a doctor pronounced life extinct due to asphyxiation.

In the course of subsequent investigations a hole 90 square inches in area was found connecting 45's heading with the old workings from which air was coming carrying 18.55 per cent. of firedamp as shown by a sample collected thirty-six hours after the holing was made. A sample of air collected in the old workings eight days after the accident showed 38.15 per cent. of firedamp.

The cause of the accident is not obscure. Connecting 45's heading with the old workings provided an outlet and air passing into the area of old workings, chiefly via heading C (see plan), forced out into 45's heading noxious gases which had accumulated in the unventilated old workings.

The man working in the place had realised the danger too late for he had evidently made an attempt to get out before being overcome. His electric lamp was found burning but an oil safety lamp had been extinguished.

At the very full inquiry conducted by H.M. Coroner, J. Kenyon Parker, Esq., it was put forward by and on behalf of the Management that, almost coincident with the holing, firedamp issued into the old workings from fractures, caused by the working of a seam 90 yards below, which extended upwards through, and allowed gas to escape from, an unworked seam some 13 yards below the Flockton.

It was further contended that sulphuretted hydrogen had been formed in the old workings due to the decomposition of the pyrites of the Flockton Seam in the presence of moisture, and that it was this gas which caused the deaths.

The theories put forward serve to show how necessary it was to ensure that the operation of driving the heading to connect with the old workings was carried out with due regard to the safety of the men employed.

It is by no means impossible that sulphuretted hydrogen was present in the old workings — in fact its presence should have been suspected. But I cannot agree with the remarkable coincidence — in view of the associated circumstances — and the fact remains that the possible danger from gas was not given that consideration which it deserved. The only precaution, if such it can be called, was to examine parts of the old headings and part of the counter level from heading C to the next.

A week before the accident a deputy travelled heading A for a distance estimated at from 20 to 25 yards and did not find gas. After the accident heading A could be travelled for a distance of 30 yards where further progress was blocked by a fall, headings BB were gobbed up and heading C could be travelled to a fall at the junction with the counter level which was open for 50 yards to a dirt stopping.

Reverting to the question of poisoning due to sulphuretted hydrogen, the danger of which is well known, Professor Wheeler, who gave evidence only from a scientific standpoint, in the course of his statement made the interesting observation that the characteristic smell of sulphuretted hydrogen disappeared as the percentage increased to dangerous proportions, being then evidenced by a sweet taste. Some of the rescuers said that the smell of sulphuretted hydrogen evident at the entrance disappeared as they penetrated up the heading.

Two points arising out of the accident which deserve mention were on the delay in rescue operations.

The place of accident was approximately a mile from the shaft and there was subsidiary haulage to within a few yards of 45's heading, but it was necessary to travel over 500 yards to a telephone and even then there was no one at the pit bottom to receive messages. In these days of proficiency in means of rapid communication it is no credit to anyone that telephone connection cannot be quickly established between such distant points and the shafts or surface.

There were 86 men in the mine and no person superior to a fireman was in charge. It was not until 5.30 a.m., when the Under-Manager, who was at home when the accident occurred, reached the scene that rescue apparatus was sent for. It is to the credit of the Under-Manager that when he arrived at the heading he immediately realised the situation, and having sent for smoke helmets made several unsuccessful attempts to rescue the unconscious men at his own grave risk.

Had smoke helmets been immediately available underground in the hands of a capable official, the occurrence might not have proved fatal.

Proceedings were instituted against the Manager and Under-Manager under General Regulation 28 for failing to take precautions and against the Manager for employing an unqualified fireman.


Tombstone

Ecklington Churchyard



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Names on this tombstone
NameDiedAgeBorn
Bernard SHORT  25th Nov 1924  31  1893 
Clara SHORT       

Sources
  • 1924 Mines Inspectors Report, Yorkshire Division (No. 3) by H. M. Hudspeth, H.M. Inspector of Mines [DMM Ref: L-01624 - Tom Bainbridge Collection], Page: 27
  • 1924 Mines Inspectors Report, Yorkshire Division (No. 3) by H. M. Hudspeth, H.M. Inspector of Mines [DMM Ref: L-01624 - Tom Bainbridge Collection], Page: 69, Accident Number: 137
  • Tombstone photograph (T-11142-21-0340) © Ian Boulby

Researchers

Email  Researcher  Date  Interest 
Moira Barclay   11 Sep 2021 

Bernard Short was my grandfather. I am interested in any information of his work in the pit and of his death . I understand that there was a big piece in a local paper about the accident


If you are researching Bernard Short (e.g. for family tree purposes) and you would like to hear from others with the same interest then please complete the details in the following form. We will show the information you provide on this page so that you can be contacted.

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