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  Individual Details   Individual Details  
 


Phillip Godbeer

Age:   32
Died:   27th Nov 1924
Accident:   27th Nov 1924 5.30 p.m., 4th hour of shift
Year Born:   abt. 1892
Colliery:   Killan, Penlan Slant
Company:   Killan Collieries Ltd.
Occupation:   Collier
Notes:  
Inrush of water from old workings
Buried:   [not known]
Category:   Miscellaneous Underground :: Irruptions of Water

Description

Inundation of Water.

An inrush of water took place in the Penlan Seam of the Kilian Colliery, Glamorgan, at about 5.30 p.m. on the 27th November, 1924, by which five lives were lost, and there were possibilities of greater disaster, for 67 persons were in the mine at the time.

The Penlan Seam, which dips north-east at the rate of 1 in 1½ to 1 in 3, outcrops on the surface under a thick bed of sandstone, and the workings are wet.

The Main Slant is almost due north, and off it, at intervals of about 100 yards, levels to the east and west have been driven, while off these levels single stalls or top holes have been driven to the rise with connecting cross cuts, forming pillars. For ventilation purposes, the levels are developed in pairs, but the top holes are only holed on to the level above as often as is necessary, so that the water is confined to defined courses as far as possible.

To the east, fourteen levels have been opened off the Main Slant, but to the west only seven, because on that side, parallel with the slant and some 350 yards from it, a large fault throws the seam down, so that expensive cross measure level course drifts have to be driven through a belt about 200 yards in width of dead ground to recover the seam on the thrown down side. The west levels down to and including No. 4 West were driven on beyond this fault up to another large fault, also roughly parallel with the Main Slant and 1,200 yards from it.

No. 4 West Level has not been worked for some ten years. No. 5 West Level was not carried beyond the first fault, but Nos. 6 and 7 West Levels were driven through the first fault and on to the second, and moreover, a slant from which several levels were opened was driven from No. 7 West Slant. Coal was being brought out of both No. 6 West and No. 7 West Levels, No. 7 being the intake airway for the section, and No. 6 the return.

There was a pumping station on the Main Slant at No. 5 West, so that water running out of No. 4 West Level was caught there and pumped to the surface.

In opening out top holes to the rise of No. 6 West beyond the first fault, care appears to have been taken to keep a substantial barrier of solid coal against No. 4 Old Level, and the reason for this is obvious — water made in the old workings above that level could be caught at No. 4 Level and drained to the pump on the Main Slant.

It is true that top holes to the rise of No. 6 Level, and close to the second or boundary fault, approached very near No. 4, and it is said that a holing was made accidentally, and Mr. John, the manager, thus gained access to No. 4 Level, and found that at the inbye end at least it was clear of water. Mr. John also says that he had made inspections of No. 4 Level just inside the first fault, gaining access thereto by means of an old adit level, but it is certain that a long length of No. 4 Level had not been inspected by anybody for many years.

It was decided to work out coal between No. 6 Level and No. 4 Level, which had been left previously for some reason. During 1924 top holes were driven uphill from No. 6 West, but none were holed up to No. 4 West, the reason now given being that it was not desired to have water running down the steep top holes — 1 in 2 — as it would carry dirt down from No. 4 West Level and spoil the coal. Some weeks prior to the 27th November, one top hole — Wolsey's — had been stopped on account of percolation of water from a break in the roof, and the manager says he knew quite well that the face of this top hole was then within a few feet of holing into No. 4 Level.

The plan of the workings did not show this, and when later, for the purposes of the inquest, a plan was asked for showing the position as at the time of the inrush, it showed the horizontal distance between the face of Wolsey's top hole and No. 4 Level to be 50 feet.

The last survey previous to the accident was made on the 18th September, 1924, and Wolsey's top hole was stopped about seven weeks later. It appears the workings between No. 6 West Level and No. 7 West Level were not surveyed. The surveyor had made a traverse of No. 6 Level long ago, and any workings opened to the rise were put on to the plan from information supplied by the manager. Plate No. 5, on which the workings as shown on the colliery plan are in dotted lines, and roads surveyed after the accident are in full lines, shows how this worked out in practice. The reason advanced for adopting this method was the difficulty of using a dial on such a steep inclination. Clearly the plan was not as accurate as required by Section 20 (1) of the Coal Mines Act.

I do not accept the statement of the manager that he knew Wolsey's top hole was within a few feet of No. 4 Level. My belief is that through the plan being inaccurate he enjoyed a false sense of security.

The width of the working was admittedly 14 yards, and no boring whatever was done. The agent and manager claim that water could not accumulate in No. 4 Level, owing firstly to the natural dip of the Level to the Main Slant, and secondly to the porous nature of the rock-roof — hence they did not carry out Section 68 of the Coal Mines Act in any of the places approaching it. My belief is the boring was not done because the manager felt he could rely on the correct relative positions of No. 4 and No. 6 Levels, and he admits he did not want to hole into No. 4 Level. He got wrong as to the position of Wolsey's top hole because the plan was wrong, and hence the disaster.

On the afternoon shift of the 27th November, 7 persons were at work in No. 6 Level, while 19 persons were at work in No. 7 West Level or the slant off it.

At about 4 p.m., the fireman, on arriving on No. 6 Level, found some of the men in alarm about water running down Thomas' top hole, but after inspecting the workings up there, he was in no way apprehensive of danger. However, at about 5.30 p.m., as he wanted certain work done to divert the water from its then course, he brought the men down on to the level — very fortunately, as it turned out, because shortly afterwards they heard a roar, and water rushed down on to them. One of these men was drowned.

The debris carried by the water caused blockages on Nos. 6 and 7 West Levels, and the scouring action of the water in undermining supports caused considerable falls. Moreover, the silt blocked the suction pieces of the pumps and put them out of commission, so that the ordinary feeders of water collected in the No. 7 West Slant, and in the bottom of No. 14 East Slant (at the extreme bottom of the workings). The water level in No. 7 West Slant could not be ascertained for several days after the inrush, so that it is very difficult to form an estimate of the quantity of water suddenly liberated from No. 4 Level. On such a gradient a comparatively small quantity of water could do a great deal of damage.

Within a few hours of the alarm being raised 11 persons were got out from behind obstructions in Nos. 6 and 7 Levels.

A man — James Goulding — 21, rider, was found alive fast under the haulage rope on the main slant at 13 East Level, but he died before he was released — 4 hours after the inrush. This man would probably have been saved had not a pumpsman told several persons that he was dead. Five persons were recovered alive, and a dead body (that of Charles Evans, 39, collier) found, at 8.30 p.m., on 29th November — 51 hours after the inrush — on No. 6 West Level; while next day — Sunday, 30th November — at about 5 p.m., a man and a boy were recovered alive on No. 2 West Level off No. 7 West Slant.

The manager, Mr. Will John, took the leading part in these operations, which were not performed without great labour.

The ventilation had been interfered with, and a good deal of black damp came off with the water, while silt had to be cleared away and falls cut through.

The persons rescued from No. 2 West Level off No. 7 West Slant were carried through deep water and got out by a very small road — an old top hole ; and it was not until 3rd December that a heavy fall on No. 7 West Slant was sufficiently cleared to allow easy access to the water.

Early next day a portable pump had been got into position and started lowering the water very quickly. Progress thereafter was, however, slow, as not only had several falls to be cleared, but the ground which had been under water had to be carefully timbered.

At 5 a.m., on the 16th December, the body of Wilfrid John, 15, trammer's helper, was found. He had been drowned. It was not until the 1st January, 1925, that the bodies of Archie Davies, 28, and Philip Godbeer, 32, two colliers, who had been working at the bottom of No. 7 West Slant, were found in the return airway, covered entirely by fine silt.

Attention was then devoted to getting to the place where the water broke in, to ascertain what had happened, but the presence of black damp was a great impediment. A special road had to be driven in coal by which, at last, on the 26th January (three months after the inrush), access was got to Thomas' top hole, and thence to Wolsey's top hole.

Wolsey's top hole was found to be 51 feet wide, and the coal which had formed a barrier against No. 4 Level had disappeared for a width of 30 feet. No. 4 Level was blocked immediately east of the breach with debris — the ordinary detritus formed by weathering in old workings — while to the west, the same material on the floor held back pools of water.

Fissures in the coal to the west of the breach contained yellow ochre, quite dry near the top of the seam, but still passing some water near the floor, indicating that the source of the water had been at one time at a higher level.

The coal to the rise of No. 4 Level had been worked out, but it was possible to get up the old top holes for some 30 yards. Debris — of the same character as that found on No. 4 Level — lay on the floor of these top holes, and at some date later than their deposition a stream had cut a way through. The rocks above a line some 30 yards above No. 4 Level were stained with yellow ochre, and the pools in No. 4 Level had deposits of ochre in them. None of the standing timber in No. 4 Level had fungus growing on it.

Giving evidence at the inquest, Mr. E. Sims Rees, Senior Inspector of Mines, put forward the opinion formed by him and myself as to the deductions to be drawn from the visible evidence. Briefly, this opinion was that a blockage existed somewhere on No. 4 Level, causing an accumulation of water; that prior to 27th November some of this water escaped through breaks in the coal down Wolsey's top hole (which circumstance might have been taken as an indication of danger); and finally, the coal gave way and discharged the water in bulk down the steep roads in the seam.

The agent, Mr. Joseph Tanner, and the manager, Mr. William John, did not agree that water had accumulated in No. 4 Level. They advanced the theory that the water broke away from somewhere higher in the old workings, but that when it was released it broke the thin coal separating the face of Wolsey's top hole and No. 4 Level, and so caused the disaster.

The Coroner put three questions to the jury :—

(1) Had any working in No. 6 Level approached within 40 yards of No. 4 Level on the 27th November, 1924, to the knowledge of William John and Tanner ?

(2) If yes, was it the duty of John to have directed boreholes to be made, and to work narrow ?

(3) Whether, by omitting to do so, one or the other — John or Tanner — and if so, which of them, was guilty of want of reasonable and ordinary precaution ?

The jury, after a lengthy consideration, replied to the first question in the affirmative, but announced there was no prospect of agreeing in answering the other two questions.

In answer to a further question from the Coroner, the jury found the deaths of the five persons were accidental. The Coroner accepted the verdict and adjourned the inquest sine die.

By your direction informations were laid against the agent, Mr. Joseph Tanner, and the manager, Mr. William John, with respect to the alleged breaches of Section 20 (1) and Section 68 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, but at the time of writing this report they had not come before the magistrates.


Memorial: 1924 Killan Colliery Disaster

Memorial Image


Related Articles

Pub.
Date
Article (Newspaper)
19 Dec 1925  News And Notes (The Science and Art of Mining)

Sources
  • 1924 Mines Inspectors Report, Swansea Division (No. 7) by W. J. Charlton, H.M. Inspector of Mines [DMM Ref: L-01624 - Tom Bainbridge Collection], Page: 25
  • 1924 Mines Inspectors Report, Swansea Division (No. 7) by W. J. Charlton, H.M. Inspector of Mines [DMM Ref: L-01624 - Tom Bainbridge Collection], Page: 49, Accident Number: 58

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