Description

No. 21 accident. — Inundation of water, Clay Cross.

The accompanying plan shows the position of the workings inundated, No. 2 pits; also those from which the water came, No. 1 pits, which were made about 23 years ago. On the deep of No. 1 pits, and at that time up to the boundary, the late Mr. G. Stephenson gave instructions to the manager of the pits, Mr. Martin, since dead, to work out the coal coloured pink, and within the letters A, B, C, D, for lodges for water. Five headings were driven to the deep, according to distances supplied to Martin, and a communication was made on the level course along the deep extremity of these headings. When this was completed, Mr. Binns (now chief manager), at that time Mr. Stephenson's private secretary, surveyed round these headings and laid the survey upon the plan. The accompanying plan represents that part of the workings as laid down on the plan. Martin was the responsible manager of the mine under Mr. Stephenson's directions. Martin was instructed to get the coal out, within the limits A, B, C, D, up to within 30 yards of the No. 1 main level. Mr. Stephenson had great confidence in Martin, and frequently left him for weeks together in charge of the works. At this time Mr. Stephenson was much from home with his professional engagements, Mr. Binns also accompanying him.

In 1848, the No. 1 pits ceased coal getting, and the black shale ironstone, 23 yards above the coal, was opened, and has since been regularly worked. The extension of the stone workings towards the outcrop has let down the surface water more rapidly than the pumps could lift, and consequently, there has been a gradual accumulation in the No. 1 pits workings. At the time of the breach, 11th June 1861, there was 14 yards in depth No. 1 pits, and a head of 24 yards at the breach.

The No. 2 pits were sunk in 1839, under Mr. Stephenson's directions, and both shafts were tubbed. The main or black shale coal being found free of water in these pits, Mr. Stephenson decided to have no communication with No. 1 pits, so as to keep the large feeder of water in those workings.

In 1851, the Clay Cross works were purchased by the present proprietors, viz., William Jackson, Esq., M.P., Sir Morton Peto, M.P., Sir Joshua Walmesley, and E. L. Betts, Esq., Mr. Binns being appointed chief manager. Mr. Binns confirmed the views of Mr. Stephenson, with reference to isolating No. 2 pits from No. 1. However, before No. 2 workings approached near to No. 1, Mr. Binns was anxious to have correct plans, and had the whole of the No. 2 workings resurveyed, and new plans made. He having confidence in his surveys of No. 1 workings, the question of barrier between No. 2 and No. 1 for some time occupied his attention. He first decided to leave a barrier of coal not less than 20 yards; with this barrier, he intended to have a series of bore holes towards the old workings. However, having confidence in the survey of No. 1, made by himself, and considering the difficulty of dealing with a large number of bore holes plugged up, he decided to leave 40 yards of barrier, and dispense with boring, instead of 20 yards, and that thereby he would be secure against this water.

On Tuesday, 11th June 1861, about three o'clock in the afternoon, a miner, named Natty Dawes, working up Dan's incline, south side of No. 2 pits, observed a little wet in his stall, at E. in plan, in the holing between the top and bottom coals. The section of the seam is, —

It was not unusual for the parting to be wet, both in these stalls and others far from the old water. Dawes left his work about three o'clock, a short time before the regular time, and in passing down Dan's incline, told Timothy Smith, a son of the deputy of the district, to inform his father of the circumstance of the wet; the boy was engaged at the incline brake, and could not leave. Dawes, instead of going himself to inform the deputy, as required by the special rules, left the pit.

When the pits are in full work, there are 249 men and 71 boys employed, besides 17 men in the roads and airways. On the north side of the mine there are four day deputies ; on the south side, five day deputies. There are also a day overman and night overman, and two night deputies, under the directions of John Parker, the underviewer. When Mr. Binns is at home, he meets the underviewer and head overman in the afternoon of each day, at the office, for consultation. In his absence, the underviewer and overman meet.

At the time of the breach, there were on the north side 63 men and 23 boys ; on the south side, 39 men and 32 boys. About five o'clock, Alfred Smith, the deputy of the district in which the breach took place, came to his son at the brake in Dan's incline, when the son informed him what Dawes had stated. The son remarked that he had finished work, except running one set down the incline, and that he was waiting for a loaded tram to make up the set. A noise was heard, which the father said was some trams coming; they listened for a moment or two, and found that it was the roar of water coming from the direction of Dawes's stall. Alfred Smith immediately ordered his son away to tell every one he met to go out of the pit, and also to tell the deputies to get their men out, as the old black shale water had broken in. Alfred Smith, by great exertions, got out his men safely. The son informed the first deputy he met on the south side, and hastened forward to tell those on the north side. The north side deputies got all the men and boys out safely ; but, by an unfortunate oversight, they forgot to warn three men and a boy working in the stone headings, which were being driven from north side No. 2 pits to the Tupton coal, 60 yards above the main coal. The levels rise to the mouth of these headings, and the headings rise half an inch to the yard for 400 yards, so that the pits bottoms would be sealed up before they discovered the water.

On the south side the deputies did not act with that promptness which characterized those on the north. They sent boys to warn the men and made the best of their way out of the mine.

Fifteen men and boys working in Britton and Wood's district did not escape; and 3 in Silkestone's district. It was however clear from the evidence that they were all warned.

A man named Slater, who worked at the extreme of the south side, followed the last persons out for some distance, then passed part of them, and when he came to the foot of Dan's incline found several more objecting to go through the water. He stepped in and urged the rest to follow him ; he expected they were doing so, but on getting to No. 2 separation door near the shafts, he looked round but none had followed. At No. 2 separation door he saw E. Forrester, Geo. Mills, Siddens, Brunt, and others, attempting to open the door, to get to the upcast shaft, but the accumulation of refuse washed to it by the water was so great they could not, he asked them to follow him to the downcast shaft, they did not, he went and escaped. He was the last person who saw them alive. When John Parker, the underviewer, was informed of the accident, he immediately started to the pits, and descended ; by this time the downcast shaft, which is 3 feet 6 inches lower level than the upcast, was nearly roofed. He, John Brown, and other officials, and a large body of men, exerted themselves in the mine to get out the men. Some of the men taken down by John Parker, broke down the brickwork at No. 2 separation door, and found a youth named Bounce there. From the evidence this youth left the far end of south side 15 minutes after the others left. He was not warned of the accident. He had been waiting some time for an empty tram, and as the trammers did not return he supposed it was closing time for the day. He dressed and came out and struggled through the water to the separation door No. 2, and had just arrived when the brickwork was knocked out. Those lost on the south side had a better chance of escaping than this youth, having 15 minutes start of him. The supposition is, that after Slater left those men at No. 2 separation door, they returned on the level and joined the men and boys at the foot of Dan's incline, down which the water was a rushing torrent. They then returned to the road called "horse road" near the end of the levels, up that road, and along the return to Dan's incline at 1. There they would be stopped, as the water rushed along part of the return from G to I. No doubt they were up this road when the youth Bounce escaped.

After the escape was cut off through the bottom of the shafts, there remained the furnace drift, which enters the upcast eight yards from the bottom, and communicating with the seam 50 yards on the rise side of the shafts, 14 feet higher level than the upcast bottom. Water was poured down this drift to cool it, but no person could go into it in the face of the steam. No one escaped through it.

I arrived at the works between eight and nine o'clock the night of the accident, at that time the water was up to the furnace drift. Active preparations were immediately made to recover the bodies, by drawing water and by making communications from other workings, F to H, in No. 4 pits workings ; but it was not until the twenty-second day after the accident that the bodies were recovered. Four bodies were found at the foot of No. 1 incline, north side; 13 at the foot of Dun's incline, south side; 5 near the foot of horse road, south side; and 1 in the back level, far end, south side.

I made an early examination of the breach and found a hole 16 inches wide and 8 inches deep in the parting between top and bottom coals, and in a narrow pointed corner of a heading 4 ft. 6 in. through ; the heading had been driven from the point C. It is probable that Martin had driven this heading as a lodge for water until he had worked the coal up a short distance, when the goaf would hold the water that drained from the coal. A small water lodge had been made between B, C, when Mr. Binns surveyed this work, which he laid down in the plan. This may have filled, and Martin ordered this heading to be driven for a like purpose. The distance from C, E, is 43 yards.

The 15th general rule provides "that sufficient bore-holes shall be kept in advance, and if necessary on both sides, to prevent inundations in every working approaching a place likely to contain a dangerous accumulation of water." Mr. Binns stated that he had confidence in the accuracy of his plan of No. 1 pits ; and having tested the plan of No. 2 pits he felt secure in an approach to No. 1 workings of 40 yards. That he considered it safer without boring and 40 yards barrier, than 20 yards barrier and a series of bore holes.

The danger in approaching old workings is from an isolated head being driven beyond the limits shown in a plan. A series of bore holes may be made without discovering a head driven beyond the main workings. In this case had two holes been bored 15 yards back from the present face of the stalls and bored 20 yards, it is doubtful whether either would have hit this heading. The enlarged sketch shows the position of the stall and the heading.

Had a boring been made in Dawes's stall these would have been the position of the last holes bored.

From this accident we learn two important lessons, viz., that extreme accuracy is necessary in laying down upon a plan every detail of the workings of a mine ; and secondly, the necessity, where two shafts are upon or near the same level, in inclined seams, of an outlet on the rise, or communications with the workings on the rise side of the shafts, and the shafts some distance above the bottom, as a means of escape. If the latter is done it will be a far greater protection in case of inundation of water than boring. As I have before stated a series of borings may not discover a heading that has been driven beyond the main workings. There have been several instances of bore holes failing to discover casual headings in old drowned workings. Hence the necessity of means of escape on the rise of the shafts. For several years the plans of Clay Cross have been kept with accuracy. A surveyor is employed solely in the colliery, who records upon the plans every detail. The underviewers give notice when any work is opened, and it is immediately surveyed and recorded. I had opportunities of testing the accuracy of these plans during the recovery of the bodies.

It is gratifying to know that the 14 widows and 32 children of the sufferers have been comfortably provided for. Ten of the children can earn their own living. Mr. Jackson, on behalf of the Clay Cross Company, offered to make provision for the bereaved. Many gentlemen of the county expressed a desire to show their respect for the firm and Mr. Binns by being allowed to subscribe to a fund for the support of the widows and children. A fund of £2,000 was raised, headed with £500 from the firm. This amount is considered more than sufficient for the purpose. A widow without children is allowed from 8s. to 9s. per week, and coals ; a widow with children, from 12s. to 14s. per week, and coals.

Related Articles

Sources

• 1861 Mines Inspectors Report, by John Hedley, H.M. Inspector of Mines, Page: 55
• 1861 Mines Inspectors Report, by John Hedley, H.M. Inspector of Mines, Page: 62, Accident Number: 21

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