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William Morgan
No. 54. On Tuesday, the 15th of July, the inhabitants of the Rhondda Valley were thrown into a state of the most frightful excitement, arising from the fact that an explosion of gas had taken place that morning at the Cymmer Colliery, the property of Messrs. Insole and Son, of Cardiff, and had resulted in the sacrifice of human life to an extent unparalleled in the history of coal mining of this country. It would appear that at about six o'clock on the morning in question, 160 men and boys had gone into the colliery, and were proceeding as usual to their respective working places when the explosion took place. It was first thought that every life in the colliery would be lost, but in the course of a few hours it was found that several who had only reached a short way in were enabled to get to the shaft, and were saved, but not until the evening of the 16th could the number of lives sacrificed be ascertained. It is with regret and pain I have to report that this sad event caused the death of 114 fellow creatures. The ventilation of this extensive colliery is carried on through a brattice shaft, the upcast portion of which is about 10 feet area. The air travels from the "intake" to the return in one continuous current, a distance of about six miles, and passes over a furnace through an opening of about six feet area. The airways for a considerable distance inside a 16 feet down-throw fault run parallel to each other, being separated by loose stones and rubbish (gob). The size of the airways at the fault measured about 13 feet area, and through this the whole of the air for the ventilation of the greater portion of the colliery had to pass, and for directing the air to the several headings and stalls 72 doors are used. From the bottom of the shaft two levels are driven, one in a north and the other in a southward direction, and off these levels cross headings are worked a distance of from four to six hundred yards. I made an examination of the colliery, with a view, if possible, of ascertaining the cause of the explosion and how far it had extended. It was confined to the south workings, which are the most extensive. The flame appears to have traversed from the face to within 300 yards of the shaft ; and from the evidence given at the coroner's inquiry, and other indications, I think it first originated in the extreme end of the workings in a stall which had been idle for some days. It would appear that the fireman in making his examination in the morning before the men went to work discovered the presence of gas in David Morgan's stall, but did not report it to the manager. Rowland Rowland, the overman, not knowing the state of this stall, ordered William and Llewellyn Thomas to go there and work, and from the position in which the body of Llewellyn was found, it is most probable that this was the point at which the first explosion took place, and by blowing away some of the doors the ventilation was cut off and smaller explosions followed in other parts of the mine. Had not the return air been already foul and nearly at the explosive point, the fire would not have extended as far. The rider coal above the main bed gives off more gas than the main coal itself, but as that rider coal is taken down in the levels and headings inside the fault, where alone this rider coal is met with, firedamp cannot, therefore, exist in those workings in a compressed state, and the gases made would be given off into the ventilation. If the ventilation were weak at this point, it is very likely that some of the gas so given off would be lurking in the roof and above the gobs, and in any part where the rider coal may have subsided, which, in the absence of a sweeping current of air, would not be safe for the workmen. At the coroner's inqpisition it was stated that the manager of the colliery seldom or ever went underground, his time being chiefly occupied on the surface attending to the necesssry arrangements for the disposal of the coal. The overman and firemen take charge of the underground workings under the direction of the aboveground manager. From the evidence given by all the witnesses connected with the colliery, the mine for some time was in a dangerous state, that the usual indication of the presence of firedamp, a "cap" on the candle, had been observed for some time before the accident. Griffith Williams (a witness) said that on the Thursday before the explosion the "cap" on the candle was more than two inches long, and that there was not a breath, of air moving. Mr. Grey, surveyor of the colliery, had also observed the "cap," and had represented to Mr. Jabez Thomas, who was supposed to be the manager, that it would be necessary for the better ventilation of the colliery that a communication should be made between the old and new pits, increasing the size of the shaft and doing away with the brattice. The explosion and its consequences are attributable to the following defects, — non-observance of the 1st general rule. "An adequate amount of ventilation shall be constantly produced at all times to dilute and render harmless noxious gases to such an extent as that the working places of the pits," &c., "shall, under ordinary circumstances, be in a fit state for working." The first special rule, which directs "that the manager should lay out the ventilation of the mine, and make due provision for removing noxious gases." The 14th special rule says "that the air-ways shall be of a sufficient size for the full and effectual ventilation of the mine, and the overmen shall take care that the whole of the working places are properly ventilated. If any working place shall appear likely to be dangerous, or should the air become inadequate, impure, or noxious, the workmen shall be at once withdrawn, except those who may be indispensable for the removal or remedying the defect." "The workmen shall be prevented from entering any portion of the mine until the firemen shall have been into and examined carefully the working places, and until they shall have returned and cautioned the workmen against entering any portion which may be in an improper condition." The 20th special rule. — "The overman shall report to the manager and the firemen to the overman all danger or defects which occur in the mine, and they shall suspend all operations attended with unusual risk, and shall stop any working place which may appear not safe until the removal of the defect." The great length of the cross headings, the distance the air had to travel through small and defective airways, the large amount of leakage that must necessarily take place at the doors and loose stoppings (gobs) between the intake and return, the smallness of the upcast behind the brattice, would alone be sufficient to account for the catastrophe. I would here remark that brattice shafts are always more or less objectionable, and for extensive collieries like those in the Rhondda Valley they are not safe. The coroner's jury, after a long and patient hearing of the evidence, returned a verdict of manslaughter against Jabez Thomas, manager, Rowland Rowland, overman, and the three firemen. At the Swansea assizes, his Lordship, Mr. Baron Watson, in his address to the grand jury said, "that inasmuch as Mr. Jabez Thomas was the aboveground manager and did not go underground, he could not be held responsible, and that as regards the other men no direct case of omission was brought against them, and he could not see how they could be guilty of manslaughter." The grand jury, however, returned a true bill against Jabez Thomas, Rowland Rowland, and Morgan Rowland. The prisoners were then tried, and after hearing the evidence, "his Lordship directed the jury to return a verdict of Not guilty against Jabez Thomas, and said that the law required that there should be an immediate personal default before a conviction for manslaughter could take place." In the case of the other prisoners, The Judge in summing up said "that the two prisoners stood indicted for slaying another, without malice aforethought, which was manslaughter. Now, did the facts as they had come before them bring the charge of gross negligence, which gross negligence was the immediate and direct cause of death, home to the prisoners, to return a verdict of Guilty against Morgan Rowland? The jury must be convinced that the explosion originated in deceased Morgan's stall, and that the usual precaution had not been taken by placing the proper danger signal." If they supposed the explosion might have originated in any other part of the mine they would give the prisoner the benefit of such doubt, and return a verdict of Not guilty. His Lordship having gone through the evidence, put it to the jury to say whether, according to the evidence, they believed, and according to the law he had laid down, the prisoners to be guilty ? The jury acquitted both the prisoners.
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