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	Gallantry		Gallantry

	George Allen
	Carnegie Hero Fund - Certificate of Merit
	Date:	03 Apr 1930
	Colliery:	Herrington Colliery
	Occupation:	Deputy

 

At 4.30 a.m. on Friday, 3rd April, an explosion of firedamp occurred at Herrington Colliery, Co. Durham, on a 30 yard longwall face in the North East District of the Hutton Seam, which resulted in the deaths of two persons and injuries to two others. The explosion was localized and of no great violence, and only slightly propagated by coal dust.

The North East district was approximately 1 mile due North of the downcast shaft and was reached by a 400 yard cross measure drift driven from the Maudlin Seam. The Hutton Seam was 3 feet thick with a blue shale roof 12 feet thick, above which was a hard post. Bottom canches were taken up in the gates making a total height of 5 feet 6 inches, but along the face only the section of the seam was worked.

The mine was ventilated by an electrically driven double inlet Walker Fan with a capacity of 140,000 cubic feet per minute. Approved flame and electric lamps were in use. The mine was dry and dusty. The district in question was apparently well stonedusted and consisted of three gates 10 yards apart, giving a total length of longwall face of 30 yards opened up from a main intake airway. Firedamp had never been reported in the district prior to the accident.

No attempt was made to ventilate face "A.B." shown on Fig. 2. The intake air was allowed to pass direct into the main return airway without entering the district. There was no connection between the last working place on the face "A.B" and the return, except a 1¼in. drill hole which was bored through 3 yards of rib coal to prove its thickness.

Up to the shift on which the accident occurred the coal was entirely won by hand, hut on the day prior to the accident an electrically driven coal cutter was introduced and commenced cutting the same night. At the time of the accident only four persons were employed on the face.

The machine started cutting at "A" (see Fig. 2) and had reached the mooring prop in the right hand nook close to "B" when an explosion occurred, killing one person outright, and burning three others, one of whom subsequently died.

About 2 hours prior to the accident the deputy in charge of the district made an examination and found that a roof weight break was forming parallel with the right hand fast side and at right angles to the longwall face close to "B." No firedamp could be detected issuing from this break.

A flame safety lamp provided for the use of the machineman was, after the explosion, found hanging up in the mothergate 20 yards or so outbye of the working face.

The three men who were burnt were able to leave the face and obtain assistance. After two unsuccessful attempts owing to fumes, an overman and the deputy reached the face via the right hand crossgate, succeeded in travelling along the mothergate and located the machineman. They were forced to retreat owing to the state of the atmosphere, but on the next attempt with further assistance, they succeeded in reaching the machineman and carrying him into fresh air. He was then found to be dead.

After the accident a considerable amount of firedamp was found on the face between the mothergate and the coal cutting machine. There is no doubt that gas did issue from the roof break found by the deputy in sufficient quantities to form an explosive mixture.

The source of the ignition of this explosive mixture was found to be the faulty construction of the switchgear of the coal-cutter, inasmuch as there was a rectangular opening 3in. square in the base of the switch box through which the insulated conductors passed to connect the switch to the motor.

Another opening was found about 1in. wide by 2in. long in the base of the switch box at the upper right hand corner, through which the insulated conductors passed to connect the switch to the terminals of the plug socket.

The switch was therefore not protected so as to prevent open sparking as required by General Regulation 127 (v) and 132 (i).

This occurrence shows the vital necessity of adequately and constantly ventilating all working places in compliance with Section 29, Coal Mines Act, 1911, and for taking such precautions. as are necessary to guard against electrical apparatus being introduced belowground in a defective condition.

I would again refer Owners, Agents and Managers to the Circular Letter issued in 1928 by the Chief Inspector of Mines, calling attention to accidents which occurred through ignitions of firedamp attributable to the use of electric power at or near the coal face.

By your direction proceedings were taken against the Agent, Manager and Electrician for alleged breaches of the Coal Mines. Act, 1911, and General Regulations made thereunder, and convictions were recorded. Particulars of these are given in Appendix I of this report.

For their courage during the rescue work following the explosion at Herrington Colliery, described on pages 14 and 15 (above!), William Brown, overman, and George Allen, deputy, were presented with framed certificates of merit and a cheque for £10 by the Carnegie Hero Fund Trustees.

Source: Mines Inspectors Report for 1930

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