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May, 1948

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In this explosion, which occurred in the Hutton seam, twenty-one persons lost their lives and three others were injured. This colliery is situated at South Moor, near Stanley, in North West Durham, and works the middle series of Durham seams, the Maudlin, Low Main and Hutton, in an area hounded on the West by the outcrop of these seams in the Lanchester district. The upper seams in the same royalty, namely, the Shield Row, Five Quarter and Main Coal, are worked from Hedley Colliery; both mines have a common centrally situated upcast shaft. The lower seams in the same area, namely, the Towneley, Busty and Brockwell, are worked from Morrison Busty colliery, which is a separate mine in the same group with its own upcast shaft and fan. Louisa colliery is served by three downcast shafts Louisa, William and Morrison North, and employs in all 1,480 persons underground and 350 on the surface for an average daily output of 1,450 tons. All the output is wound at Louisa shaft apart from a certain amount of overflow coal at Morrison North shaft.

Narrative of the explosion

The explosion occurred at 11.55 p.m. during the first and second hours of the fourth or night shift of Friday, August 22, 1947. All the twenty-four persons at work in the district were involved; nineteen were found dead, and of the five recovered alive two subsequently died. None of the other 192 persons employed elsewhere in the mine at the time were affected.

Discovery and Rescue Work. — The first persons to raise the alarm and to reach the scene of the explosion were a party of three deputies, W. Younger, J. Shanley and Hy. Robinson, all trained rescue men, who were regularly employed in the adjacent fire area. This party usually carried a canary and flame-lamp detectors, and they had with them a reviving apparatus for use in case of emergency. They had examined the fire stoppings alongside the 4th North Low Main Main Road on their way inbye from Morrison North shaft, and had just reached their station in the fire area about 250 yards to the south of and beyond the offtakes for the 4th North District, when they felt a momentary cessation of the intake air, followed immediately by a rush of dust-laden air coming in a normal direction from Morrison North shaft. This occurred at 11.55 p.m. according to Younger's watch. They realised fully what this denoted, and they picked up the canary and their flame lamps and ran northwards in the direction of the Morrison North shaft towards the seat of the trouble, which they soon discovered was in the 4th North District. Shanley then returned to the 4th Bankhead and telephoned this information to the surface, while Younger and Robinson entered the 4th North District, taking the canary with them. They went first into the Straight East gate through the heavy canvas cloth (which they state positively was intact), where they saw a light and heard moaning sounds ahead, and about thirty yards farther on they found one man (Minto — No. 1 of the injured) alive but unconscious, and two others (Talbot and Bailey — Nos. 1 and 2 of the killed) apparently dead.

Robinson went back to the 4th North off takes to telephone urgently for help and to get a stretcher for Minto, with whom Younger remained. It was then 12.20 a.m. by Younger's watch. Younger discovered that another of the men (Bailey) was alive, so he went to meet Robinson returning with the stretcher and sent him to fetch the reviving apparatus from the fire area. Robinson soon returned with Shanley and the fore-overman, John Hutchinson, who had descended Morrison North shaft at midnight and had been informed of Shanley's telephone message.

Younger and Shanley then recovered the three men in the Straight East gate, while Hutchinson and Robinson attempted to explore the South Heading, but the air was at that time too hot and thick with fumes to enable them to proceed very far. However, a little later on, and without effecting any repairs to canvas cloths, these four men were able to get along this Heading as far as the 2nd East loading point and up the 2nd East loading gate as far as the face line. The cloths across the old East gate had been disarranged and the one across the 2nd East gate had been destroyed. They came across the two drillers (Johnson and Kilgallon — Nos. 2 and 3 of the injured), both alive but unconscious at the deputies' kist, and they brought them out to fresh air.

By the time the first rescue team arrived in the district, at about 1.30 am., these men had also recovered deputy Estell still alive at the kist and had brought out five dead bodies from the South Heading, and they had located four bodies in the 2nd East loading gate. An attempt was also made by them to get to the loading point on the Straight East gate, where they could see signs of fire, but the fumes were too heavy for them to make any progress. They were not at that time aware there were any men on the West side, but in any event the canvas cloth across the South Heading to divert the air current into No. 1 West bord had been destroyed and this side was consequently fouled with afterdamp.

About this time the undermanager, Mr. Peel, arrived on the scene and took charge of the operations. Rescue teams quickly located the remaining bodies on the South Heading beyond the 2nd East loading point, on the 2nd East loading gate beyond the face line, and on the West side ; while another rescue team entered the Straight East gate, where they came across Westgarth (No. 3 of the killed), with his clothing on fire, just beyond the loading point. Other clothing there and a wood chock carrying the conveyor gearhead were smouldering. They extinguished these incipient fires with sand and brought out the body of Westgarth, after which the fumes in the gate quickly dissipated.

There were no falls of ground seriously impeding the ventilation, which was speedily restored by re-erecting the cloths across the South Heading and the 2nd East loading gate and renewing those on the old East gates, and the remaining bodies were recovered without the aid of rescue apparatus.

The positions of the dead and injured persons when recovered are shown in Fig. l. The clothing on the nineteen bodies was examined at the surface for contraband by a Police Inspector in the presence of an Inspector of Mines and representatives of the National Coal Board and the Miners' Lodge; and cigarettes and matches, including one pocket petrol lighter, were found on eight of them. This matter is referred to later.

Exploration of the District. — This was possible within a few hours of the explosion, at which time the undermanager found a small accumulation of firedamp in a roof cavity at a 3 ft. fault at the roadhead of No. 4 West bord, which he describes as four per cent, at about one foot from the roof, but which was not discernible in the general body of the air. This had dispersed by the following day.

It was soon evident that coal dust had played the major part in the explosion; indeed, in view of the amount of coking and of the previous history of the seam at this colliery, it was at first thought the explosion had been one of coal dust only and that firedamp had not entered into the matter at all. Investigation showed, however, there was no evidence that any preformed cloud of dust had been created at the outset or that there had been any igniting medium of sufficient intensity to initiate a coal dust explosion.

The details of the after-effects in the district are given in Fig. 1, and the main indications of the passage of flame and blast are described below.

On the Straight East gate there was pronounced coking on the roof supports, etc., from the roadhead back down the gate as far as the North Heading return airway, where the regulator had been blown out. Minto, one of the survivors, stated that he and his mate Westgarth had just reached the loading point, 30 yards back from the coal face, at the commencement of their shift, and that they were undressing when he "heard a bang," but he cannot recollect anything more. He was found afterwards 50 yards outbye and near to two other men, Talbot and Bailey. These men had not arrived there when Minto first entered the gate with Westgarth and he cannot explain how he came to be found at this point afterwards.

The evidence was clear that the explosion had not traversed the 2nd East face or any part of the tub gateways or roadways at the inbye end of the South Heading. On the other hand it is significant that it had swept throughout all the conveyor roadways, both existing and disused (but still accessible).

The explosion had developed remarkably little violence, doubtless due to the relatively small quantity of combustible matter in the atmosphere, coupled with the absence of long lengths of roads along which pressure could build up and to the opportunity for dispersal of the force of an explosion, both in front of and behind the flame, provided by the South Heading and the West face line ; and the comparatively slow travel of the flame had evidently caused the unusually extensive coking to be observed.

It is reasonable to deduce that a mild firedamp explosion in which coal dust played no part at first had traversed the East face line between the Straight East loading gate and the 2nd East loading gate and had extended outbye along these gates and the intermediate East Motor bord, so as to open up several separate coal dust explosions one in each of the gates. The most violent of these dust explosions occurred on the 2nd East loading gate and this erupted violently into the South Heading and continued up No. 4 West bord opposite to the West face line, where it spread leftwards as far as the tailgate and to the right down No. 1 West bord to the South Heading, and there died out.

The Presence of Firedamp. — It is necessary at this stage to discuss how inflammable gas came to be present in dangerous quantity in the 4th North District, having regard to the previous history of the seam at the colliery.

There was subsequent evidence of the presence of firedamp on the West side in the roof cavity already mentioned; and on August 27, five days later, inspectors of Mines and the Undermanager found a larger accumulation at the roadhead corner of the inbye West tailgate, which tailed out some yards along the face line and down the gate. About three hours later it was found this gas had been dispersed by the normal air current, and an unsuccessful endeavour was made by short-circuiting the air to ascertain its actual point of issue.

In view of the proximity of old workings on all sides of the 4th North District any emission of gas from the Hutton Seam itself can, I consider, be ruled out and the Low Main Seam 30 ft. above had been pillared in the area for over twenty years and any gas occluded in the strata above the Hutton Seam would have drained away during this period.

In considering possible reasons for the presence of an inflammable mixture of firedamp and air on the East face line and the Straight East gate, two important factors have to be taken into account

(1) The unsatisfactory arrangement of the single cloth across the outer end of the Straight East gate, on the short length separating the intake and return air at this rather vital point. Any derangement of this cloth would allow intake air to short-circuit to the return and affect adversely the ventilating pressure creating circulation of air in this part of the district. Alternatively, a similar disturbance of the regulator cloth at the Wembley connection would have the same effect; and either or both of these events would considerably reduce the quantity of air coursing this part of the district and could even produce stagnation of the air. There was no direct evidence of any failure of the ventilating arrangements, but they were sufficiently precarious to warrant being taken into consideration for this purpose.

(2) Disturbance of the strata below the Hutton Seam by abutment pressure brought about by the working of the lower seams, which can cause firedamp to be liberated from these seams or wastes and at the same time provide a relatively easy upward path for the gas — a not unknown occurrence at other mines in this country. There were no indications of floor breaks, apart from fault slips in the 4th North District, but it is the fact that water made in the Hutton Seam percolates through to the Towneley workings below.

In this particular area the Towneley Seam, 26 in. thick and 55 yards below, had been worked since 1946 and a longwall face was being advanced northwards; and the Bottom Busty Seam, 3 ft. 1 in. thick and a further 33 yards below, had been worked in 1931 and again in 1946. There are also two thin unworked seams between the Busty and the Towneley Seam. The relative positions of the workings in the Hutton Seam and those of the two lower seams suggest that the workings in the Towneley Seam had increased the span of the worked-out area from west to east; at the same time a face advancing to the north was widening the span from south to north. At a certain stage in this expansion of the worked-out area an increased rate of general settlement was inevitable, and accompanying this there would be increased pressure at the abutments surrounding this area. These effects would be transmitted to the Busty Seam waste below. Furthermore, it will also be seen from the same plan that there had been an abutment in the Busty Seam from 1931 to 1946, which would have the effect of further disturbing the strata. It seems probable that such action did occur and caused firedamp to issue from these lower seams and workings, and could account for the firedamp found on the West side after the explosion. The firedamp involved in the explosion may well have issued under the same influence on the East side, particularly where the various abutment pressures meet to the north of the Wembley return airway connection.

If this action caused only a very small rate of issue of firedamp of a few cubic feet per minute, which would not be detectable on the reduced flame of a safety lamp with the normal air current flowing, any interruption in the ventilating arrangements from one or other of the possible causes mentioned above (1) would in a comparatively short period bring about a firedamp-air mixture above the lower limit of inflammability in this part of the district.

In the absence of any other feasible explanation of the source and presence of this inflammable mixture on the East side, it seemed safe to conclude that the firedamp came from the lower workings and that the locus of the emission was on that part of the East face line immediately on the return side of the Wembley connection, where the area would be above the most intense abutment pressure zone in the Towneley Seam. The evidence of increased violence at this place indicates a richer inflammable mixture there.