This "Memorandum of Agreement" will furnish every observing mind with a correct idea of the nature and spirit of the Bond by which the Colliers are governed and coerced. As there are in general only slight verbal differences in the bonds of the several collieries on the Tyne, whilst the leading features remain the same, the copy here given will sufficiently represent the whole.

It may be laid down as an essential maxim, both in law and equity, that every agreement, whether written or parole, should have an eye to the mutual advantage of both the parties engaged therein; and implies, in the very nature of it, the idea of reciprocity of understanding, and the assent and consent of both of them. "What can be more absurd, as well as more dangerous," says Sir Wm. Jones, "than frequently to be bound by duties, without knowing the nature and extent of them."

We therefore object, in the first place, to the imperfect mode of making us acquainted with the bond. Every person connected with the coal works well knows that the bond is read only once a year, at the time of binding, by one of the agents, from an eminence in the open air. His articulation is not always sufficiently loud and distinct so as to be heard by all the men, some of whom are necessarily standing at a considerable distance from the speaker. It should also be remembered, that at this season of the year the wind is often blowing, which also greatly obstructs the sound from reaching the ears of those who are at a distance. Those that are near the speaker, when they hear an alteration made for the worse, (which has not unfrequently been the case for some years past) begin immediately to complain of such measures; and as it is not the business of the speaker to listen to objections, he continues his task to the end without stopping, whilst the loud murmurings of the complainants prevail to such a degree, that very little more of the matter of the bond can be heard. But allowing that the bond is distinctly heard by every one present, it by no means follows that they must retain the whole: for the fact is, that the bond is of such an extent, the particulars so numerous, and the impression made upon the mind so faint, that the greater part soon escapes from the memory; so that long before the year has brought round the period for another binding, scarcely a trace of the bond is to be found remaining on the memory. Besides, the ceremony of reading it is no sooner ended, than the poor victims of ignorance and despotism are called on to sign the contract, whether they understand it or not : and thus are the poor colliers frequently induced to subscribe articles and conditions which they very imperfectly understand, and which are, in many important respects, injurious to themselves. Hence arises a fruitful source of litigation and of interminable disputes, relative to the true intent and meaning of various clauses in the bond : this the poor collier has frequent occasion deeply to regret, when he finds that the decisions of the magistrates (like various clauses in the bond itself) are generally contrary to his interest.

In order, therefore, that the colliers may obtain a thorough knowledge of the Articles of Agreement which they may soon be called on to subscribe, we propose that a copy of the intended Agreement be given to the workmen of each colliery, at least fourteen days previous to the period of binding.

We object, 2ndly, to a clause in the 2nd. Article of the Agreement, which says, "That all penalties and forfeitures shall be deducted from the first and next following earnings of the parties incurring the same, until fully paid."

This regulation, though a source of great emolument or profit to the owners, has been the productive cause of much injury and oppression to the labourer, who, in most cases, is utterly unable to obtain any redress. The local government of a colliery, as it refers to fines, is purely despotic. For a very trivial default, on the slightest evidence, a man is judged, condemned, and fined, without his being able to defend himself by the ordinary means which would be allowed him in any court of law or judicature. The reason is obvious; he is tried, not by his peers, but by persons who not only make the law, but who are also, in cases of this kind, interested in his conviction, and who, at the same time, unite in their own characters the legislative and judicial functions.

We think it right that every man should receive the whole amount of his earnings, whatever that may be. If really guilty of a crime worthy of being fined, let him refund the sum required. Should he think the demand illegal, and refuse to pay it, the owners then have a remedy at the bar of their country, to which the delinquent is amenable. This method of procedure, which would secure to us the fruits of our industry, would also restore to us the benefit of the laws of our country, which are said to be the birth-right of every Englishman, but of which we have for a series of years been unjustly deprived.

We object, 3rdly, to the following clause in the 3rd. Article: "That if, from any accident happening to the engine, or from any other cause, a pit should be rendered unfit for working, and the said parties hereby hired shall be laid idle for more than three successive days," &c.

This regulation has been, in many instances, most skilfully managed by the masters, in a way to be productive of great oppression and injustice to the workmen and their families. Agreeably to the letter of this article, the masters have it in their power to lay every collier idle for three quarters of the year, without giving him a farthing to subsist on during the whole of that time. When coals are not wanted, the pretences for laying the pit in are numerous and most trivial. If the appearance of the sky only indicate a shower, we are detained at bank until it descends, and then we must go home again; or should a little snow be upon the ground, the coals must not be teemed amongst it, lest they should be spoiled. And thus, on every little pretext, or caprice, are we rendered liable to be deprived of our labour and our wages.

We therefore propose, as a remedy for this grievance, that we shall in future be paid two shillings and sixpence for each and every day the pit is laid idle, from what cause so ever it may arise. And in case of being provided with any employment, then to be paid three shillings and sixpence per day. And should we, in cases of need, be sent to work at any other colliery, at the distance of three miles or more, to be paid two shillings per week, as lodging money, and the boys to be paid the same, during the whole period of such employment.

We object, 4thly; to that part of the 4th. Article which says, "That the proprietors shall provide and keep a tub of the standard measure of the corves." This we consider of exceedingly dubious import. As it is not specified what particular measure is intended, it may be construed to mean the measure that custom has introduced into the trade. But before custom can become binding in this case, it must be uniform, which has not been the case in the collieries. And even then it is of no avail; for it has been decided, (Rex versus Arnold, 5 T. R. 353) "that no custom or prescription shall prevail against the uniformity of measures, notwithstanding such custom may exist beyond all memory, and has been used without any visible interruption."

But if we seek for the meaning of the standard measure of the corves, in the practice.of comparing corves, we are inclined to think that the corf has to measure the tub, instead of the reverse. We can, however, affirm, that at a colliery which has obtained sufficient notoriety by its practice, when the corves were too big for the tub, the tub was enlarged to agree with the corves.

We object also to the method of setting out the corves prescribed in another clause of the 4th. Article. After a corf, which is always liable to many accidents on its passage from the board, by which it may be reduced, comes at length to bank, and is found half a peck short of the measure, is it right ? is it just to deprive a man, on that account, of his labour, to the amount of nineteen and a half pecks of coals ? Now, allowing a man to have sent his corf away from the board intentionally half a peck defective, whether does he, or the master who claims, in consequence, 39 half pecks for nothing, act with most injustice ?

The mode of setting out corves at present adopted gives rise to much injustice and oppression towards the colliers. Many instances might be adduced and referred to ; let the following suffice.

At one colliery on the Tyne, after much altercation between the agent and the workmen, relative to the measure of the corves, the latter succeeded in getting the measure tub brought to the mouth of the pit, where it ought constantly to be kept. The banksman, however, with a view to chastise the men, and intimidate them from making a similar request in future, next day set out 13 corves. Of these only 7 were found deficient of measure; some of them wanting only half a pint, whilst some of the others were redundant 3 pints. What still more stigmatizes the character of the agents on this occasion is, that they would not suffer a man to make up the deficiency of one corf by the overplus of another, either for himself or his neighbour. So that if a corf contain ever so much over the measure, the master claims the whole surplus, without any remuneration to the workman ; but should a single half pint be wanting in the measure of the corf, the poor collier loses the whole of the remaining quantity. This is contrary to every rule of justice and equity, and demands a speedy remedy.

"And the measuring and comparing a suspected corf with the standard shall not take place unless the hewer thereof be present, until after two hours from the sending such corf to bank, or until the number of suspected corves at any pit shall amount to eight." — See Art. 4.

It is well known that colliers are from eight to fourteen hours in the pit, and if the masters pleased to shew the extent of their spleen and power, they could cause ten or twelve scores to be set out before the hewers came to the bank to compare them; therefore, according to the above clause, they could teem them all over the heap, even supposing they were above measure, before the hewers came to compare them with the standard. The following is a proposed amendment:

That the proprietors, &c. shall provide and keep at the mouth of each pit a tub of the royal standard of this realm, to be used at each colliery ; and that the corves sent to bank, and suspected to be deficient in measure, shall be measured and compared with such royal standard of the realm ; and if found deficient, payment shall be made to the hewer thereof for the quantity of coals found in the corf after having been compared with such standard, and the hewer shall not be subject to any other forfeiture on that account. And the measuring and comparing a suspected corf with the royal standard shall not take place until the hewer thereof be present.

We also object to the last clause of the 4th. Article, in reference to foul coal, splint, and stone being found in any corf to a certain amount, and the penalty attached thereto.

We object to be fined for foul coal ; because, under this term the master classes whatever part of the strata he pleases. Thus, if the coal be tainted with red rust, in consequence of the damp air penetrating the pores to a certain depth, it is considered of inferior quality, and therefore called foul coal. But there is considerable difficulty attendant on a complete separation of it. When it is effected to the best of a man's knowledge, should he omit to mark the corf that contained the foul coal, or the mark be rubbed off, as sometimes happens, it is laid out. Now, were the bond, in this case, to be put in full force against the hewer, he would have to pay for this single corf of 20 pecks, four pounds 15 shillings. And as if this were not punishment sufficient, he is, by the bond, rendered "subject to such other penalty as may be inflicted by law ;" while the law, the judgment, and the punishment, are wisely retained and administered "at the option or discretion of the proprietors, their executors," &c.

Where there are two or three bands in a seam, besides the top and bottom stone, it is extremely difficult to rid the coal of every portion of it, with no other light than the faint glimmering of a Davy lamp. It is therefore, we think, very unreasonable to charge us at the rate of threepence per quart for stone, splint, &c. found in a corf, while you pay only fourpence per bushel for taking them out when brought to bank. The following amendment, which we hope will be considered just and equitable, we propose as a substitute for the objectionable clause.

And in case splint or stone be found in any corf, to the amount of three quarts or more, the hewer thereof shall forfeit at the rate of one penny per quart for each and every quart above two quarts of such splint and stone, but shall receive the agreed price for hewing the clean coal therein. And if the whole quantity of splint or one found in any one corf exceed one peck, the hewer thereof shall be subject to such penalty as may be inflicted by the law of his country, and forfeit no other sum.

We also object to the last clause of the 5th. Article, by which we are obliged to lie idle ten days at Christmas which, in practice, is usually extended to fourteen or sixteen days. This appears to us to have been framed purposely with a view to deprive us of a claim which we would otherwise have to a parish settlement in consequence of our servitude. We therefore propose that the above clause be wholly omitted, and that we may, in future, be bound for one whole year.

We object to that part of the 7th. Article which requires us to do various kinds of work. As some parts of the work which we are bound to perform is beyond the ability of many of us, we are consequently obliged to employ others, at our own charge, to do the work required. We wish, therefore, to be bound only to hew; but at the same time would be willing, in case of need, to do what other work might be required, so far as we may be able, on certain specified conditions.

We next object to the latter part of the 8th. Article, which imposes a fine of one shilling for every corf of good coals mixed with bottom coals, and one shilling for every corf of round coals mixed with small coals. The separation system is, we consider, highly injurious ; in the first place, to the proprietor of the royalty; secondly, to the public at large; and, lastly, to ourselves. How the interests of the two former are affected, it is not necessary to our present purpose to shew. Suffice it, that we advert only to the manner in which we are ourselves affected by it.

In the first place, it is an utter impossibility to send a single corf to bank without being mixed with small coals. Now, supposing a man were to work twenty-five fortnights in a year, ten days each, and twelve curves each day, at 6s. 6d. per score, he would hew 3000 corves, for which, on the separation system, he would have to forfeit, according to the rigour of the bond, 3000 shillings, or £150. As the amount of his earnings, on the above calculation, would be only £48. 15s. he would consequently, at the end of every year, be indebted to his master £101. 5s. besides the total loss of his earnings.

We object to the clause in the 9th. Article, which requires three days notice before the corves can be measured. As the corves are made under the direction of the master, and the men have no control over the making of them, after every precaution to reduce them has been resorted to, they are generally found, when measured, to be too big, some of them to the amount of four or five pecks. As this is an undeniable fact, the three days' notice required must be a serious injury to the workmen whose labour is thus greatly increased without any remuneration. This notice also prevents, in many instances, the detection of the fraud; as in three days the largest corves may be either cut to pieces, or greatly reduced in size. Were merchants always to have three days' notice previous to an examination of their weights and measures, few, it is presumed, would be found deficient. The object of the legislature, and the ends of justice, would thus be defeated, and fraud would flourish and be encouraged. We therefore propose that, in future, only one day's notice shall be required for measuring the corves, if found too big, the hewers to be paid for the extra measure, calculating from the period of the last measurement. If found too little, the hewers to forfeit accordingly.

We object to the clause in the 10th Article, referring the settlement of differences and disputes between the contracting parties to two Viewers. We admire the wisdom of our ancestors, who appointed that every Englishman should be tried by his peers, a mode the most equitable perhaps that could be imagined. Agreeably thereto, we propose that, for the purpose in question, two Viewers be appointed by the proprietors, and two hewers by the workmen, who shall be empowered to settle all disputes referred to them.

Lastly, we beg to propose that, in future, there be allowed, for binding money, half a guinea to every married man, and one guinea to every unmarried man.

After reciting so many objections to various articles in the Bond, it will naturally be asked by many, why we should so repeatedly have entered into an "Agreement" so very objectionable. Indeed, this question has often been asked, not only by the coalowners themselves, but also by magistrates and law men. Why, say they, did you agree to these Articles ? You were previously at liberty to go where you chose, and were not compelled to enter this "Agreement". True, we were not compelled by any physical force; but we were certainly impelled by a power equally compulsory, arising out of the circumstances in which we, or the most of us, are placed. Born to no other inheritance than poverty, we have to depend solely on the labour of our hands for the maintenance of ourselves and families, which requires, on our part, incessant attention and toil. It is not, therefore, a matter of indifference to us whether we shall be bound or not. As a good understanding exists amongst the coal owners on the Tyne and Wear, on this head, and the Bonds are all alike, in all the objectionable parts, and the time of binding likewise the same in all the collieries, it has hitherto been very ingeniously contrived that the poor collier shall have no choice, no alternative. Should he object to sign the Agreement, it would not be altered to please him, and there are others to be found to supply his place. Should he go to another colliery, he would find that the binding time was over, and also that there the same objections were to be found in the Bond. In fine, every impartial person must, we think, coincide in the opinion of Lord Thurlow, an authority of some weight in cases of this kind, that the Pitman's Bond, or "Agreement," as it is called, is an instrument of oppression and fraud.— "If the person did not understand the bargain he made, or was so oppressed that he was glad to make it, knowing its inadequacy, it will shew a command over him, which may amount to fraud." Heathcote v. Paignon, 2 Bro. Ch. Rep. 167.